Soviet-Iraq Relations, 1985 to 1991 Recent Trends by Kausar, Farhana
*SOVIET-IMQ RELATIONS. 1985 TO 1991 
RECENT TRENDS/ 
MSSERTATION 
Submittad in PmXW PuHilm«nt of th« RMiuirements 
lor th9 Aw$ni of ttw Dm^t— ta 
MMttt of ^dtloisopl^ 
IN 
PCMITICAi SCIENC€ 
BY 
FARKANA KAUSAR 
Under tha Suporvision of 
Prttfesspr Taufiq Ahmad Kizami 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALI6ARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALI6ARH <INPIA) 
1993 
J^' 
fiif ^ -A.' 
lllllll 
DS2201 
II T - * ' ^ 
He (Allah) taught man that 
which he knew not 
(The Quran 96:5) 
D E D I C A T E D T O MY 
P A R E N T S 
Professor ?.es. : 26183 
Off. : 26720 
Department of ?ch:i:ai Science 
Aligarh Muslim "Jniversity 
ALIGARH-202 002 (INDIA). 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
This is to certify that the entire work on 
"Soviet-Iraq Relations, 1985 to 1991 — Recent 
Trends", has been carried out by Ms Farhana Kausar 
under ray supervision. The dissertation is suited 
for submission for the award of the degree of 
Master of Philosophy in Political Science. 
^^'//i 
( T. A. Ni(z4mi ) 
C O N T E N T S 
PAGE No. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
PREFACE 
CHAPTER - (I) I^AQ AND WEST ASIA 
A Geopolitical and Strategic 
Perspective of Iraq 
B. Origin of Baath Party and Its 
Emergence in Iraq 
C. Oil and the U.S.S.R. (Oil,A Rich 
Resource of Iraq) 
i - 111 
1-21 
1 
13 
18 
CHAPTER II GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION OF THE U.S.S.R 
ITS FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS WEST ASIA 
A. Importance of West Asia to the 
Soviet Union, Strategic and 
Economic. 
B, 
D, 
Soviet Union 
Nationalism. 
and the Arab 
Soivet Opposition to 
nance. 
U.S. Domi-
Basic 
Iraq. 
Soviet Postures Towards 
22 - 62 
23 
30 
38 
52 
CHAPTER III ARRIVAL OF GORBACHEV - POLITICAL 
REFORMS AND IMPACT ON WEST ASIA, 1985 
ONWARDS 
63 - 78 
CHAPTER IV GULF WAR 1991, AND THE U.S.S.R. 
Kuwait Iraq Relations, U.S.A. 
and U.S.S.R. 
Iraqi Aggression on Kuwait, War 
with U.S.A. and its impact on 
Iraq. 
B. Role of the Soviet Union 
C. Soviet Disintegration and West 
Asia (Iraq) 
79 - 119 
80 
93 
110 
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
APPENDIX - I 
APPENDIX - II 
APPENDIX - III 
APPENDIX - IV 
APPENDIX - V 
APPENDIX - VI 
APPENDIX - VII 
APPENDIX - VIII 
TABLES 
1. 
2, 
3, 
FIGURES/MAPS 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Recipients of Soviet Economic 
and Military aid, 1954-67. 
Soviet Arms Supply to Its Chief 
Clients, 1964-1978. 
Soviet Deliveries of Major 
Weapons to the Countries with 
which a Friendship Treaty had 
been signed. 
Bar Diagram Leading Importers 
^Arms^ 
Iraq - Kuwait Conflictual Ref-
lections and Allied Attack on 
Iraq. 
West Asia - Iraq and Her Neigh-
bours 
Erstwhile U.S.S.R. (Common-
wealth of Independent States) 
120 -
135 -
158 -
162 -
177 -
181 -
184 -
190 -
196 
- 134 
- 157 
- 161 
- 176 
- 180 
- 183 
 189 
 194 
195 
- 199 
44 
55 
61 
76 
80 
2 
23 
• 'V <V «» *\ rt *• *» »\ 4 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I feel immense pleasure and contentment by performing 
my primary duty to bow and offer 'Sajade-Shukr' in the Grace 
of Almighty Allah Tala, the most merciful, cherisher and 
sustainer, who bestowed on me the gift to explore new 
frontiers in my studies. 
I shall ever the failing with my limited vocabulary 
to reveal my profoundest sense of gratitude to my diligent 
and ingenious supervisor Dr. T.A Nizami, Professor in the 
Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, 
Aligarh. His inexhaustible treasury of knowledge, pa«iancean 
advices and showering affection with constant encouragement 
kept me viable not only in my studies but in other aspects of 
life. 
I am greatly thankful to my teacher Prof. Hasan Ahmad, 
Chairman, department of Political Science for his kind 
cooperation and warm affection. 
My deep sense of gratitude are expressed to my 
teacher Prof. A.F. Usmani in the Department of Political 
Science, A.M.U., Aligarh, as he extended his elderly care, 
keen interest and valuable help. 
It is excellence of my destiny that I am previledged 
to present my true thanks to my other teachers' specifically 
Prof. M.A. Kishore, Prof. A.P. Sharma, Dr. B. RahmatuIIa of 
this department and Dr. Mohammad Gulrez, Centre of West Asian 
Studies, for their attentive cooperation. 
I can never wink over the appreciable facilities and 
help exerted by the staff members of Maulana Azad Library, 
A.M.U., Centre of West Asian Studies Library, A.M.U., Defence 
Strategic Centre, A.M.U., Seminar Library of the department 
of Political Science, Sapru House Library, New Delhi, J.N.U. 
Library, New Delhi and American Centre Library, New Delhi. 
I regard my honest thanks to my teachers Prof. D.D. 
Tripathi, Principal, M.G.P.G. College, Fatehpur, for his 
unflinching motivation despite of being a hundred miles away. 
It is my pleasant duty to be indebted always, spiri-
tualy to my revered parents and loving brothers Mohd. Irfan 
and Mohd. Tariq, for their essential moral and material 
support with their imperishable blessings and ever being 
there, where I needed them most. 
My everfresh obligation and gratefulness are due to 
my friends, Naghma, Farah Naaz, Huma, Rakhshanda, Nazura, 
Saba, Monika, Shazia, Anisa and Zainab for their friendly 
strength, zealous presence and brilliant suggestions. 
Last but not the least I sincerely acknowledge gaily 
support of non-teaching staff of the department of Political 
Science. 
I thankfully owe sincere cooperation of M/s Sabir, 
Mohd. Akhlaq and S.Masahab All for typing this work success-
fully and timely. 
I am solely responsible for whatever faults and weak-
nesses appear in this study. /;^ (W^ -J^ ^^ ''^ -^ Au^ V^l_ 
(Farhana Kausar) 
Deptt. of Political Science 
A.M.U., Aligaia 
U.P. 
P R E F A C E 
P R E F A C E 
After the end of the World War II, the Soviet Union 
and the U.S.A. erierged as two ideologically conflicting super-
powers and continued to dominate the international environ-
ment through their respective tactics and strategies. 
The era of intense cold war influenced every corner of 
the globe and created lack, of trust and of meaningful dialogue 
between the two. West Asia became a centre of super power 
rivalry, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. needed the region for their own 
strategic purposes and economic requirements. 
The sudden and dramatic disappearance of the Soviet 
Union leading to unipolar international system, new realities 
and new options have been opened for West Asia. 
The Soviet Union strengthened its position in West 
Asia by diplomatic, economic and military relations with Iraq, 
Syria, Libya and Egypt. Moreover it supported 'Arab-
nationalism' and non-alignment. 
The second dimension of Soviet ideological influence 
came from communism which had considerable appeal for the 
exploited section of the third world countries and socialist 
parties operated therein. 
Socialist Ba'ath Party of Iraq played a pivotal role 
of a strong link between the Soviet Union and Iraq. On the 
XX 
other hand American involvement was strong, as it supported 
the 'Zionism' and its imperial trends were opposed by the Arab 
World and the Soviet Union. 
Arrival of the former Soviet leader, Michael Gorbachev 
brought a new dimension in international politics, and conse-
quently cold war departed from international scene with 
confrontations and regional conflicts (existed earlier). 
But the most striking and disastrous event in the 
post cold war era was the crisis of 1991 in West Asia. 
Gradual decay of the Soviet influence as superpower had 
started and America took full advantage of this situations 
with its supremacy and dominance in the region. 
The entry of Saudi Arabia as an important partner of 
U.S. alliance, provided an opportunity to establish American 
position in West Asia for many years. 
Iraq without any support faced harsh policies of the 
U.S.A. and the departure of the Soviet Union left America the 
only superpower in the unipolar world. 
The present study consists of five chapters, 
reflecting recent trends in Soviet-Iraq relations since 1985 
to 1991 including post cold war era. 
The first chapter outlines the geographical framework 
of West Asia and geopolitical situation of Iraq. Internal 
politics of Iraq, foreign relations, energence of Ba'ath party 
and its development etc, have been covered. 
1X1 
A picture of superpowers rivalry in West Asia, their 
interests, diplomacy and responsive moves and Soviet foreign 
policy has been presented in the second chapter. 
The third chapter deals with new phase of inter-
national policies with the emergence of Michael Gorbachev and 
implementation of his innovated policies of new thinking, 
'Perestroika' and 'Glasnost'. 
The fourth chapter sheds light on Gulf War 1991, 
Soviet disintegration, its foreign policy towards Iraq during 
and after the war. 
Finally an attempt is being made to understand U.S. 
intervention, atrocities, dominance and arbitrary trends 
towards the various countries of the world in an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and insecurity. 
Some of the important treaties etc. between Soviet 
Union and Iraq have been included in the appendix. 
CHAPTER - I 
IRAQ AND WEST ASIA 
CHAPTER - I 
IRAQ AND WEST ASIA - A GEO-POLITICAL AND 
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE 
No area of the world is of greater persistent concern 
than West Asia. The turnoil prevailing there, for decades has 
reinforced a sense of seeming intractability of region's main 
problems. Geographically, the West Asia is situated 
immediately to the south of the heartland (The Soviet Union) 
and West of Pakistan, alongwith western Europe more than half 
2 
of riraland. 
The geographical factor in West Asia has a great 
significance, since no other region is so strategically, 
located as West Asia. And this was practically confirmed 
3 
during two world wars. 
Political history of West Asia in the past is 
absolutely different from now. In the ancient age a couple of 
large empires, (Turkish)aftd Ottoman fought with each other for 
their supermacy. 
1. Sharma, I.P., 'West Asia Mirage of Peace', The Third 
Concept - An International Journal of Ideas, Oct - Nov, 
1991, p. 44. 
2. Chatterji, C. Nickshoy, The Muddle of the Middle East: 
Vol. I, Albanian Publication, Hauz Khas, New Delhi, 
1973, pp. 2-3. 
3. Earnest Jack, Background of the Middle East, Cornell 
University Press, ly^Z, pp. 11,12. 
4. Encyclopaedia of Britanica, Vol. 18, William Benton 
Publishers, London, p.b. 
Fr&'Ho-i 
The history of West Asia upto the World War I, is 
largely a history of two empires; Ottoman and Persian-Iraq was 
one of the essential state of Ottoman empire. After dis-
integration of Ottoman empire by the first world war, Iraq 
slipped into British mandate. That time Britain alone had a 
supremacy in West Asia protecting her imperial life line and 
interests. Britains' hegemony had been exercised since 1918 
by economic, military and political means in that region. 
Iraq, 'Al Jamhuriatul Iraqiyah' is an independent 
country of West Asia, situated at northwest end of Persian 
Gulf. It is bounded on the north by Turkey, on the east by 
Iran, on the southeast by Persian Gulf, on the west by Syria 
and Jordan and on the south by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Historically it was known as ' mesopotamia' (The land 
between two rivers) Euphrates and Tigris, later came to be 
known as Iraq, Al Jamhuriatul Iraqiyah. 
The nationalist report of 1920 and strong popular 
resentment against direct British rule, led to the crowning of 
King Faisal from Hashemite dynasty on August 23, 1921. But 
British control continued through Anglo-Iraq treaty provi-
sions. This treaty enhanced British interference in Iraqi 
domestic and foreign policy. 
5. Lencezowsky George, The Middle East in the World 
Affairs, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 
pp"i 3-268. 
6. Encyclopaedia of Britanica, Vol. 18, Willian Benton yciopaeaia or isricanica 
lishers, London, p. 872. PuH 
Singh, R.K., "Iraq Since 1945", Foreign Affairs Report. 
Vol. IX, No. 7, July 1960, Indian Council of World 
Affairs, pp. 76-77. 
From October 1922 treaty, which confirmed British 
control over Iraq upto 1930, Iraq continued to strive for 
freedom. Despite the treaties of 1926 and 1927 it could not 
o 
satisfy Iraqi nationalists. 
Final treaty of 1930, signed between British High 
Commissioner and Iraqi Prime Minister Nur-es-Said, confirmed 
its support to Iraq to the admission in the Arab League. It 
9 
promised also total independence of Iraq. 
Iraq as independent country, became the member of the 
Arab League in 1932 and tried to restore tranquillity after 
widespread political turmoil. Iraq had the distinction of 
12 being first among Arab countries to achieve freedom. 
During the ensuing period of independence, Anglo Iraqi 
relations deteriorated^ steadily but Britain continued to 
8. Lenczosky George, 'The Middle East in the World 
Affairs', Cornell Univ. Press, 1952, p.270. 
9. Lorenzo Kent Kimball, The Changing Pattern of Iraq, 
Robert Speller and Sons, 1971, p. 58. 
10. Chatterji Nickshoy, The Muddle of the Middle East, 
Vol. I, Albanian Publications, New Delhi, p. 425. 
11. Cardri, Saddam's Iraq, Zed Book Publication London, 
1986, p. 12. 
12. Lorenzo Kent Kimball, The Changing Pattern of Politi-
cal Pov;er in Iraq, Robert bpelier Publisher, New iJork, 
iy/3, pp. 5/-5b. 
maintain her dominant position. The tussel was due to not to 
the greater freedom to be acquired by Iraq but by dint of pre-
mature death of King Faisal in 1933, a trusted friend of 
B r i t a i n . •'••^  
However Independence of Iraq and its admission in the 
Arab League did not mean self government and freedom for Iraq. 
Numerous difficulties cropped up as challenge to the newly 
independent state including ethnic problem of Sheit and Sunni 
communities on the Euphrates. A period of coup d'etat 
from 1936 to 1941 started with seven revolutions to bring 
military rule. In December 1942, Nuri Said Pasha, Prime 
Minister of Iraq initiated a scheme for the unification of 
Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine. 
As intense Arab nationalism had started, in Iraq, Nuri 
was anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties with all 
Arab States. Arab League was to be formed to realize the 
hopes and aspirations of the Arabs States. 
13. Lenczowsky George, The Middle East in the World 
Affairs, Cornell Univ. Press, p. 273. 
14. Lorenzo Kent Kimball, The Changing Pattern _of the 
Political Power in Iraq, Robert Speller, New York, 
1973, p. 62. 
15. Haddad M George, Revolution and Military Rule in West 
Asia - The Arab States, Robert Spellers, ly/U, New 
York, pp. 60-66 (See details). 
16. Mansfield Peter, The Middle East - A Political and 
Economic Survey, (edt.) Oxford Univ. Press, 19/3,p.ZZ. 
17. M. Khalid, The Arab States and the Arab League - A 
documentary Record, vol. II, p. S^ T 
Nuri said was the first champion of Arab nationalism 
and the pioneer of the Arab unity. He devoted his much time 
and energy for this purpose. He stated in an interview -
"Arab unity is one of our first aspirations. I can't tell you 
when and how it will be achieved but the important thing is to 
18 prepare for it by all means." 
Between World War I and II there was an attempt to 
develop a meaningful Pan-Arab nationalism based on a mixture 
of socialism and democracy, but it failed to gain any popular 
support. The events of the world wars proved British's 
continuing and increasing dominance and mono-politic role in 
country's policies without any difficulty. The immediate aim 
of Arab (Iraqi) nationalist was to estimate foreign interests 
as soon as possible. 
After the World War II, Iraq passed through a every 
critical stage in West Asia. Emergence of Arab unity (Pan 
Arabism) membership of Arab League, emergence of Soviet Union 
as a rival of U.S.A. on ideologically confronting forum, 
stream of anti-'Zionism' after the creation of Israel and 
support of Soviet Union against anti-imperial and anti-zionist 
20 trends, played an effective role on Iraqi politics. 
18. Lorenzo Kent Kimbal, ... op. cit., pp. 70-73. 
19. Ibid., p. 73-74. 
20. Foreign Affairs Report, July 1960, pp. 78-79. 
The uncomfortable Portsmouth treaty of 1948 could be 
ratified and British attempted to renegotiate, but the then 
Premier Taufiq Alaswadi sought revision of the treaty. Arab 
world was passing through a crucial age in development of its 
foreign policy of neutrality. This policy gathered an immense 
21 
support. 
It was a period when U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. were rivals 
having a cold war almost in every sphere of the world. 
Strategically and economically West Asia has been a signifi-
cant land for them. Arrival of the U.S.S.R. as the communist 
superpower on the international political scene, became a 
threat to U.S.A.'s interests in the region. Soviet designs 
towards Turkey and Afghanistan and Iran made U.S.A. active. 
Hence in the name of containment Soviet moves were deterred 
through the Truman and Eisenhower doctrine. 
In 1953 John Foster Dulles, the then US Secretary of 
State, toured the West Asia and proposed the idea of MEDO 
(Middle East Defence Organisation) - comprising all the states 
of the region. But it was not feasible due to widespread Arab 
22 
opposition to it. Nuri Said, the perinnial prime minister 
of Iraq was convinced that Iraq's best interests could be 
21. Cardri, Saddam's Iraq Revolution and Reaction Zed Book 
Publication, London, 1973, p. 80. 
22. Foreign Affairs Report, ... op. cit., p. 79. 
8 
served by joining a western sponsored security system. Nuri 
Said made concrete moves towards closer collaboration with 
Turkey. In January 1955 Turkish prime minister Adnan Menderis 
and Iraqi prime minister Nuri Said announced in Baghdad a 
mutual assistance pact which was signed on February 24, 
1955.^ "^  Pakistan joined on 23rd November 1955. Through 
Turkey and Pakistan, Baghdad Pact had a link with NATO and 
SEATO as well.^"^ 
Prime Minister Nuri supported his plan for joining the 
Baghdad Pact by saying that Iraq was a weak country and it was 
his duty to strengthen it against foreign danger, both 
25 Communists and Zionists. 
Prime minister Nuri not only suspected communism but 
remained abstained from making any relationship with the 
U.S.S.R. Nuri Said's feeling towards Soviets was reciprocated 
by Moscow and they easily identified that Iraq was a feudal 
monarchy and tool of western imperialism. 
Thus the Soviet Union, interestingly moved towards 
Ireq as a trusted friend, due to its strategic significance 
socialist movement, anti-western policies and geographical 
nearness. It was a master mind of Soviets that they did not 
touch it untill there was British shadow. Only keeping it in 
23. Lorenzo Kent Kimball, ... op. cit., p. 80. 
24. Earnest Jack, Background of the Middle East, Cornell 
Univerrsity Press, U.S.A., 1952, p. TV. 
25. Foreign Affairs Report, ... op. cit., pp. 78-80. 
26. Lenczowsky George, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, 
American 'Enterprises institute of Policy Research, 
Washington, 1971, p. 125. 
its view to make it an ally it remained silent. Little diplo-
matic economic relations which were made during 1945 to 1957, 
were to be solidified permanent. It was to be used as an 
imperial tool against U.S.A. 
Jamal Abdul Nasir, the popular leader of Egypt, 
strongly opposed any Arab country for joining such a pact 
because he believed that a western alliance meant perpe-
tuation of Western and European influence in the region. 
President Nasser tried unsuccessfully to keep away from 
27 
western alliance. Iraqi pro-western orientations were 
critically watched by the radical Arab states. During Korean 
(1950-53) crisis, it supported U.N. force, while Egypt and 
other states refused to take part in U.N. operation. During 
Suez Canal crisis (1956), Iraq proved its strained hand to 
28 
support Egypt while other states supported whole heartedly. 
Iraq's membership of Baghdad Pact became a liability 
and a source of embarassment when British and France attacked 
29 
with cooperation of Israel at the end of October 1956. The 
role of Iraq, in Suez canal crisis, was militarily and 
27. Foreign Affairs Report, ... op. cit., July 1960, p.80. 
28. Ibid., p. 81. 
29. Haddad M. George, Revolution and Military Rule in^  ^ h^e 
Arab States, Rober~t Speller and Sons, 1970, pp./7-78. 
10 
politically disappointing. On the eve of war Syria and Jordan 
established unified military command whereas Iraq did not 
participate. Politically Iraq became a misfit country anongst 
30 Arab States. 
Another great Nasserite success in early 1958 fired 
the enthusiasm of Arab nationalist and gave hope to Iraqi 
opposition. This was the proclamation of creation of U.A.R. 
(United Arab Republic) with Syria on February 1st. 1958. Iraq 
did not recognize this new unification and moved towards Arab 
31 Union with Jordan on February 14, 1958. 
Despite the best efforts of British government to 
protect their imperial interests in Iraq, a corplicated power 
struggle started between American and British economic 
interests on the one hand, and between U.S., U.S.S.R. and U.K. 
on the other. Thus, Iraq got involved in international power 
32 
struggle during cold war era. 
Revolution of July 14, 1958, Kassim Era - A Period 
of Blood-bath and Uncertainitles: 
General Abdul Kareem Kassim was selected chief of the 
movement by the military officers.Kassim became commander-in-
30. Kirk George, 'The Middle East During the War, Survey 
of International Affairs, 1939, p. 432. 
31. Earnest Jack, Background of the Middle East, Cornell 
University Press, New York, 1952, p. 29. 
32. Lorenzo Kent Kimball, Changing Pattern of Political 
Power in Iraq, Robert Spellers, 1973, pp. /U-/1. 
11 
chief of the armed forces and Abdusalara Arif his deputy 
minister. In his attempt to consolidate his personal power 
he gained popularity and Kassim strove to give his regime a 
neutralist, nationalist and revolutionary character and an 
effort was made to iriprove relations with the socialist block. 
This was noticed first on international level by recognizing 
communist China and restablishing relations with the Soviet 
Union; and accepted from socialist block economic and 
military aid. Meanwhile Arif-Kassim rivalry started and he 
was accused of favouring Ba'ath Party and vorking with 
U.A.R.-^ '^  
Kurds, who were continuously striving for their 
autonomy, were not ready to be submerged in a greater 
35 
state. Iraq being a newly independent country inherited 
certain problems of Ottoman empire and some problems were 
resulted by nationalist movement, social and economic interest 
and international change and pressure. Kurdish problem 
remained a serious problem for the government. They made it 
clear that any attenipt to unite Iraq with other Arab states 
37 
must lead to the creation of separate Kurdish entity. 
33. George M. Haddad, ... op. cit., p.p. 87,101,103. 
34. Ibid., p.p. 104, 109. 
35. Ibid., p. 110. 
36. Ghareeb Edr;ond, Kurdish Question in Iraq, Syracuse 
University Press, U.S.A., 1981, p.l. 
37. George M. Haddad,... op. cit., p. 115. 
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In the meantime Mosul and Kirkuk revolts took place by 
a series of anti-Kassim trails. Kassim's relations with 
Soviet Union remained cordial, econoaic and military aids were 
restored from the U.S.S.R. The old hostility between Nuri 
39 Said and Nasser again was directed against Kassim. 
Kassim's Failure and Fall: 
In an attempt to gain prestige, he sometimes created 
unnecessary troubles for himself. Bearing troubles with 
Arif, Nasser and Pro-Nasserites and even with communists, he 
unwisely added another one - claiming oil rich Kuwait as a 
part of Iraq, immediately after Britains proclamation of 
Kuwait's independence in June 1961. 
In the Kurdish revolt of 1961 under the leadership of 
Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the then leader made Kassim much 
unpopular in the army. Third dispute stated in the fall of 
1961 with Iraqi Petroleum Company (ICP) when Kassim's govern-
ment drastically restricted its concession in its royalty. In 
the fall of 1962 Kassim took measures to establish an Iraqi 
national oil company. 
38. Ibid., p. 116. 
39. Ibid., p.p. 116-17. 
40. Ibid., p.p. 117, 118 & 119, 
13 
Y 
General Kassim's rule lasted only for foi* years, six 
months and twenty five days. By the end of this period Iraq 
was more disunited and economically stagnant. On February 8, 
1963 a military coup of Ba'ath army officers took place and 
Kassira was toppled. The significant characteristic of the 
revolt related to its repercussions on the Arab world and the 
position it took towards Nasser and Arab unity. Egypt was the 
first country to recognize the Iraqi regime. Aflaq wing of 
41 Ba'ath maintained a close relationship with Nasser. 
3" Origin of Ba'ath Party and Its Emergence in Iraq: 
Ba'ath Party was founded in Damascus in 1944 by three 
educated Syrian intellectuals, Michael Aflaq, a Greek 
Orthodox, Saleh Din Al Sitr, a Sunni Muslim and Zaki al 
Arsuzi, an Alawite. Significantly the most distinct 
characteristic of Ba'ath Party is to be found in its 
preachings of Pan Arab ideology. According to Aflaq, Arab 
society could only be revitalized through Arab unity and 
Ba'ath Party was to be popularized to achieve this 
objective. 
The Ba'ath Party ideologically in Iraq was brought by 
two Syrian teachers late in 1959. By 1949-50, Baathis ideas 
41. Ibid., p.p. 122-28. 
42. Sluglett Farouk Marion and Petre Sluglett, ^ Frorn 
Revolution to Dictatorship, Iraq since 1958, K.P.I. 
Ltd. Press, London, 1987, p. 87. 
43. Ibid., p. 90. 
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spread farther amongst Iraqis, particularly students, lawyers 
and teachers. By 1952 Ba'ath members were able to play a 
significant role in nationalist strikes and demonstrations 
against government policies. During 1952-56 it contributed to 
the increasing nationalist tide in Iraq in the Arab World as a 
whole.^^ 
The party faced many difficulties and setback during 
Kassim era. During his rule it was not allowed to play any 
significant role. When Kassim the military ruler conspired 
against Ba'athists, they reacted strongly. 
Ba'ath party in Iraq was the first ideologically 
oriented party to dominate the government and monopolize in 
any Arab country. Its domination was entirely dependent on 
military power. The Iraqi communists attempted to sieze the 
power in July, 1963 but they were sentenced to death very 
46 
soon. 
The outcome of the revolution for the time being was 
uncertain as the communists and some army officials were 
inclined towards General Kassim. Heavy fighting continued. 
The new National Council of Revolutionary Command appointed 
44. Ghareeb Ednond, The Kurdish Question in Iraq, Syracuse 
University Press, U.S.A., 1981, p. 45. 
45. Ibid., p. 51. 
46. Haddad M. George, Revolution and Military Rule in the 
Middle East, Arab States, Robert Spellers, 1970, p.p. 
132-33. 
15 
Abdusalam Arif who helped to organize revolution of July 
1968. The year that followed 'The six day war' of early 
June 1967, was one of unrest and discontent in Iraq. 
President Arif remained indecisive when the Soviet Union tried 
to strengthen relation with Iraq. Abdur Rehman Arif was over-
throw by Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr, President of Iraq, in 1968 July 
48 
coup. 
Ideology: 
The Arab Ba'ath socialism is the most authentic 
expression of this country's old struggle of the Arab mind for 
a comprehensive philosophy of thought and action, which could 
on the one hand be based firmly on the Arab spiritualism and 
cultural ethos, and on the other may equally be able to take 
cognisance of the dynamics of the world reality based upon the 
interaction of economic forces. Arab Ba'ath socialism 
represented an ideology of what was most essential and dynamic 
in the collective Arab ethos. To quote the words of Michael 
Aflaq, the founder of Arab Ba'athist movement - "The Ba'ath 
represents the continuity of the most glorious traditions of 
the Arab mind answering, at the same time, problems of the 
49 fast changing world around us." 
47. Edmond Ghareeb , ... op. cit., p.p. 52-53. 
48. George M. Haddad, ... op. cit., p.p. 147-56. 
49. Birendranath Diwan, The Land of Aiab Resurgence, Press 
Asia International Pvt. Ltd., 1979, p.p.lU,49'',67. 
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Ba'athist on the other hand always emphasized that 
Marxism, particularly its dialectical approach and its 
scientific diagnosis of economic situation, must be regarded 
as a very positive contribution to socialist thought. 
The constitution of Ba'ath Party, adopted in April 
1947, concluded three central dogmas: 
1. Unity and freedom of Arab nation. 
2. Personality of Arab nations. The Arab nation was 
characterized by virtues which were the result of its 
successive rebirth. These virtues were characterized 
by vitality and creativeness and by an ability of 
transformation and renewal. This renewal was always 
linked to growth in individual freedom and harmony 
between its evolution and national interests. 
3. Thirdly, Ba'ath Party believed that colonial is and 
imperialism as crime. It tried to foster and enhance 
human values as well. 
Proximity With the Soviet Union: 
Soviet interest in Iraq was particularly non-existent 
untill the military coup of 1936 in which the left-wing took 
part. Baker Sidqi regime after 1968 revolution, was viewed by 
Moscow as progressive movement as a nationalist front, ' 
50. Ibid., p.p. 62-63. 
51. Devlin, F. John; The Ba'ath Party - A History From its 
Origin 1966; Hoover Institute Press, Stanford, 
California, 1976. 
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in which radical left wing forces were influential without 
being conspicuous. Soviets preached a philosophy for the 
political and scientific region which challenged the west. 
Development of non-align movement at that time in the Arab 
world promoted positive image of the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Union emerged as supporter of NAM (non-align movement) and 
protector of the Arab cause. 
According to Michael Aflaq, "Nothing can be equal to 
this policy in impact and forces and counter-balance its 
52 danger except the policy of a great country." Inner rifts 
took place in the communist party led by Zaki Khairi. This 
division complicated the dialogue for the Ba'ath and on the 
other hand it stood to gain dissention from a competitive 
53 party. 
Significantly, stream of Ba'ath Movement brought an 
ideological strengthening between the Soviet Union and Iraq, a 
west Asian and third world country ideologically and 
economically. Syria, Jordan, and Egypt also had Ba'athist 
movement but Iraq became the most outstanding country of 
Ba'ath (ruled by it) party, having an ideological similarity 
with the U.S.S.R., while their very spirits were far-far 
52. Laidi Zaki, (ed.) Tjie Third World and the Soviet 
Union, Popular Prakashan Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, 1988, p.41 
53. Lenezowsky George, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, 
American Enterprises Press, Policy Research, 1971, 
p.125. 
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different being a Communist and Muslim country. There were 
many clashes between two parties Ba'athist and the 
comnunists but generally both countries, a super-power and 
its client were together on the path of political economic and 
military co-operation as well as deterring the western noves 
and colonial trends in the region. 
^- Oil and the U.S.S.R. (A rich resource of Iraq): 
Although oil was discovered at 'Naft Khaneli' in 1909 
the first commercial oil field was developed at Kirkuk 
between Zegros mountain and Mesopotamian places in 1972. It 
has remained the country's main source of income. The second 
largest field is located at Zubair Rumailah near Basra. Upto 
1961, protecting, extracting and exploiting of oil were 
monopolized by Iraq Petroleum Company or its affiliates 
mostly under the British control. It was finally nationalized 
on July 1st, 1972 in which Soviet consent was included too. 
Naturally, Iraq is a gifted country by its precious 
oil resources. Inspite of getting independence Iraq had to 
struggle alot to draw its oil companies from the dominance 
of Britain. Immediately after 1968 revolutiuon oil companies 
were given the assurance that the new regime would honour the 
oil agreements and it would respect all obligations under 
international agreements. Later on differences developed 
between companies and the government. Saddam Hussain 
54. Encyclopaedia of Britanica, Vol. 9, 5th edition, 
Benton IPublisHers, ly^i To~~m3> Toronto, p. 877. 
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genuinely stated that there would be no interception and 
monopoly of outside power over Iraqi wealth or resource. In 
the meantime Arab Israeli war strengthened the position of 
nationalists and demanded total nationalization of the entire 
oil company and its branches. Consequently, in a ministerial 
meeting in Baghdad on May 29, 1967 Iraq, Algeria, UAj^ Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Libya and Abu Dhabi took part deciding to 
suspend flow of Arab oil to any state which supported 
aggression against Arabian territorial integrity. In 19 67 
Soviet delegation took part in this campaign. It pledged to 
extend necessary aid to Iraqi national oil company for 
drilling in South Iraq. 
One important reason for Iraqi political isolation 
with the west was easy relations with the Iraqi communist 
party which had deteriorated further after an agreement with 
the Soviet Union to develop North Rumaila. Saddam Hussain's 
regime gained political support from socialist countries. 
The situation of Ba'ath party during the nationalization 
period of 1972 and Algires agreement in 1975 March, remained 
precarious. 
55. Lorenzo Kent Kimball, The Changing Pattern of 
•Political Iraq, Robert Spellers and Sons, 1971, p.p. 
129-36. 
56. Sluglett Farouk Marion, Iraq Since 1958 Revolution to 
Dictatorship, K.P.I., New Fetter Laane Press, London, 
1987, p.p. 145-48. 
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Saddam Hussain believed that the nationalization was a 
significant achievement and would lead towards the establish-
ment of people's democracy and economic welfare of the people. 
Monopolistic behaviour of the oil companies was contradictory 
to the interests of the country, and it was necessary to gain 
control over the wealth of the nation and recovery of the 
full rights. I-perialist powers erroneously thought that 
Saddam's visit to Soviet Union was pressure tactic whereas it 
was brought into existence Soviet Iraqi treaty and created 
better understanding between the two countries. 
It developed economic commercial political and 
military co-operation. The first military agreement between 
Baghdad and Moscow on 17 December 1972, became a prelude to 
the co-operation treaty in April 1972. This established a 
congenial ground for a strategic and ideological alliance 
between the two regimes bound together by shared 
revolutionary sentiments against Zionism. It was explicitly 
defensive and accompanied by stepping up Soviet military 
CO 
.deliveries to Iraq. 
President Ahmad Hasan al Bakar during the fifth anni-
versary revolution in 1973 said, "The friendly Soviet Union 
57. Kishtainy Khalid, Saddam Hussain on Current Events, 
Longman Group Ltd.^ 1977, p.p. 1-4, (see further 
details in this book chapter I and II). 
58. Laidi Zaki, The Third World and the Soviet Union, 
Popular Prakashan Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, 1988, p. 45. 
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has stood behind our people and nation in critical times 
extended to us valuable assistance which had an important 
effect in our progressive and liberal struggle. We are very 
anxious to maintain the Arab Soviet friendship which had 
liberal struggle. We are very anxious to maintain the Arab 
Soviet friendship for which we struggled to maintain its 
59 developments in all fields." 
The President of Iraq, repeatedly applauded and 
accepted Soviet's support to Baghdad as a 'friend in need and 
friend indeed.' Vice President Saddam Hussain too appreciated 
strategy of non-alignment and being a member country of this 
movement, Iraq received the concrete support of the U.S.S.R. 
He noted, "We also fully support of this non-aligned 
policy and exert every possible effort to promote our 
effective role in that direction. We consider the Soviet 
Union as a truthful friend in support of Arabs. Many 
socialist countries are extending in one way or the other 
support to the Arabs struggle. But in the same time we don't 
look forward to the Soviet Union or any friendly country in 
the world to assume our responsibility in defending our 
independence, sovereignty and legitimate rights." 
59. Speech of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakar at Fifth 
Anniversary of 68 Revolution, 1973, Ministry of 
Information - Al Hurriya Printing House, Al- Jamhuriat 
Press, Baghdad, p. 63. 
60. Comrade Saddam Hussain - Talks to Arabs on Foreign 
Pressmen, translated by Baghdad Observer, Documentary 
Series, Ministry of Information, p. 46. 
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CHAPTER - II 
GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE U.S.S.R. - ITS FOREIGN 
POLICY TOWARDS WEST ASIA 
A. Importance of West Asia to the Soviet 
Union.Strategic and economic: 
Both the geographical proximity to oil resources and 
important communication lines have attracted the big powers 
to West Asia. The various European powers tried to establish 
their control over West Asia leading to much rivalry among 
themselves. Thus mutual rivalry infact, acted as a 'check' 
on their mutual ambitions. 
The Soviet Union till its disintegration was giant 
among the countries of the world. It covered such a vast 
expanse of the earth's surface that its physical environment 
from the cold Arctic Tundra in the north, to the deserts of 
Central Asia in the south and from the grasslands of the 
Ukraine to the forests of Siberia. In the north, the USSR 
faces the Arctic ocean. In the east, the Pacific coast is 
backed for the most of its length by high mountain ranges and 
also icebound for much of the year. In the southeast USSR 
adjoins China and Mongolian people's republic. In the south-
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west it has Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey as neighbours. In 
the -.vest it adjoins various European countries. 
Two features distinguish Russia from its European 
counterparts. First, Russia although very large in extent, 
was territorially continuous and reasonably co-pact. While 
western empire depended on long, vulnerable sea connections 
to link the mother countries for their far-flung colonies. 
Secondly, Russia for the most part remained intact since it 
reached its maximum extent, in the middle of the nineteenth 
2 
century. 
The entire area of USSR was 8,591700 square miles 
including those areas which the Soviet annexed in 1939. 
Being a largest nation of the world it covered one sixth of 
the world's land. It included half of European eastern side, 
about one third of Asia and part of VJest Asia. The Soviet 
Union occupied east and west covering half way around the 
globe,in other words the distance between the east and west 
3 
ends on the globe, was merely a thousand miles apart. 
1. Cole J.P., Geography of the Soviet Union, Butter-
worths Publication House, London," 1984,' p.p. 1-4. 
2. Ibid., p. 7. 
3. Huszar B. George, Soviet Power and Policy, Thonias Y. 
Cornell Company Publishers ,1955,"p. 29. '" 
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Geographically, U.S.S.R. had a large covering and 
proximity with various regions. West Asia being strategi-
cally important to the Soviet Union had also a close 
relations with her. Ideologically confronting with America, 
U.S.S.R. tried its best to anchor diplomatically a forum to 
check U.S.A.'s calculating moves in this region. 
West Asia lies at one of the most strategic points 
in the world. The region makes a connecting chain between 
Europe, Asia and Africa and lies at tangible cross-road of 
the world's land sea and air communication. Soviet Union had 
a common frontier with Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. Through 
the Persian Gulf and Turkish straits it also possessed 
valuable outlets to the sea. 
With a strong position in the Arab World, she conti-
nued to dominate the area for strategic, economic and other 
reasons. In the case of the Arab countries the Soviet Union 
had wooed in the past decades more than any other outsider 
(power). In west Asian region the U.S.S.R. as a political 
actor, in the world affairs was conveniently restrained for 
long period by the western powers. 
4. Ibid., p.p. 474-75. 
5. Klieman, S. Aaron, Soviet Russia and the Middle East, 
Washington Centre of Forsijn Policy ?vesaarch, Scnool 
of Advanced Studies. John Hopkins University, 
Baltimore, London, p.p. 1-5. 
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The Soviet involvement in West Asia brought new 
dimensions in international political scene. It was a period 
of struggle between two imperialist groups. The anglo-French 
and Austro-German conflict when October revolution 1917 was 
brought by Valdimir Lenin and it got whole hearted support 
from exploited working class groping for peace and stability 
and economic balance. from 1917 U.S.A. looked Soviet Union 
as a threat to the established political and social order and 
liberal ideology. 
Recognition of Russia (USSR) was strongly opposed by 
those who viewed communist ideology as over whelming 
propaganda in their country. U.S.A. recognised U.S.S.R as a 
communist power after several years in 1933. 
Principal aim of Soviet Union with regard to western 
Europe and U.S.A. particularly was to weaken the region and 
minimize the capability to counter U.S.S.R. and mitigate the 
strong moves of interference with Soviet activities in any 
region. By and large, Soviet foreign policy specifically 
after 1945 gradually developed on the basis of ideological 
conflict with U.S.A. They fought ferociously, indirectly 
through their conflicting interests and intensified the cold 
war. 
6. Goldwin, A. Robert, Reading in Russian Foreign Policy, 
Oxford University Press, 1959, p.p.3,lJi ,liii) i 1/b. 
7. Huszar, B.D. George, Soviet Power and Policy, Taomas, 
Y., Cornell Press, New York, 1955, p.386. 
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VJest Asia has been consistently observed as the 
centre of world politics and keen attention for many 
countries. Its crucial situation and location at inter-
national continental crossroad of Eurasia and Africa being 
centre of lands, sea and air communications - enhanced its 
strategic importance. Being an oil rich region it has drawn 
-.ore attention of superpowers as well as their minute 
interests. 
West Asia has an excellent proximity with Soviet 
Union according to its geophysics. Since it emerged as rival 
communist superpower to challenge America - its interests and 
attempts to solidify its root in the region (West Asia) had 
Q 
been determined by its doctrinair policies. 
Soviet ideology, massive arms instruments, intra Arab 
dissessions, the optimistic sense of history and more 
significantly Arab radical nationalism, were factors which 
favoured Moscow. 
West Asia is fraught with vital attractive assets 
and these assets are very significant for Moscow so far as 
strategic and defensive interest is concerned. A defensive 
system from Baltic Sea to Pacific Ocean with in the Soviet 
border land - has been constructing for a long period by the 
Soviets, that is why Soviets sought to convert Turkey, Iran 
and Afghanistan into satellite states. Soviet Union 
8. Ismail, Y. Tariq, The Middle East in the WorldJPp..Utic, 
A Study in Contenporary ...Internationa- KeiatLonjsj 
Syracuse University Press, 1974, p.l. ' 
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determined to expand her influence and foster its interest 
in West Asia with a view to provide a corridore for direct 
challenge to American navy in the Indian ocean, and to keep 
watch on American activities of submarines in this region and 
Diego Garcia. 
The primary economic asset, of course, is the oil, as 
weapon and wealthy resource, strategy and 'gifted boon' for 
West Asia itself. The U.S.S.R. had been active in acquiring 
the oil or to deny it to be used by its western rival 
9 powers. 
Soviet deployment in Mediterranian Sea had several 
Czarist precedents. Russian territorial expansion had not 
touched the Arab countries. The Soviet Union could easily 
escape to be as imperial power as others. And this factor 
got a compatability with Arab nationalism. Thus, the 
Soviets found an opportunity to capitalize anti western 
feelings and to penetrate the area politically. 
Under Stalin, the communist leader of U.S.S.R. the 
country had pursued a policy essentially directed towards 
consolidation of Soviet influence and control, a peripheri of 
the Russian nation. Nikita Khrushchev reshaped military 
policy to support a political strategy that committed the 
10 
Soviet Union to global competition with U.S.A. 
9. Huszar, B.D., ... op. cit., p. 485. 
10. Beling, A. Willard, The Middle East,West for .American-
Foreign Policy, StaFe University Press, New York, 
Albang, 1973, p.>. 204, 209, 210. 
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West Asia has received a big share of Soviet economic 
and military support. It was estimated that of 3 4 billion in 
military assistance dispersed from Moscow by the end of 1968-
the UAR received approximately $ 1.5 billion and Iraq and 
Syria more than $ 0.5 billion. 
Leonid Brezhnev a-.plified Soviet military objects 
against NATO. Soviet Turkish relationship dramatically 
improved during the last several years as a result of East 
west detente and worsened relationship between U.S.A. and 
Turkey following Cyprus crisis. The U.S.S.R. formally 
withdrew its claim over Turkey's eastern provinces Kara and 
Ardhans. 
Traditionally Iran looked at Soviet Union with 
distrust, fear and distance because of Soviet southward 
expansionism, territorial asgrandisement^jmilitary aggressive-
ness and political interference and designs. Later on, 
deciding to normalize relations in pursuance of this policy, 
Moscow incorporated the treaties with three southern 
13 
neighbours in Asia, Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan. 
11. Klieman, Arson, Soviet Russia and the Middle East, 
John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, London, 1070, p. 69. 
12. Beling, A. VJillard, ... op. cit., p.p. 215-18. 
13. Lenczowsky George, Soviet Advances in the Middle 
East, American Institute tor Public Policy Research, 
Washington, Dec. 1971, p.p. 23-24. 
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1945-47 Soviet Presence In Iran, Soviet 
secured three significant gains: 
1. A bilaterally recognized legitimacy of the communist 
regime in Azerbijan within the framework of Iranian 
state. 
2. Entry into Iranian Oil Sector. 
3. Communist party of Iran got participation in Iranian 
cabinet (Parliament). 
Baghdad Pact and American-backed monarchy in Iran of 
(Raza Shah Pahelvi) encouraged western powers, specially, 
U.S.A. to flourish its interests in this region. Soviet 
response to this consolidation was hostility and Iran was a 
specific target. In 1960 Soviet attention diverted towards 
communist China and subsequently it loosened its grip over 
southern tier and its moves towards developing countries -
hope for Iran and recognition of Shah's government. 
Consequently soviet visits converted into Soviet Iranian 
economic assistance agreement. 
B. Soviet Union and the Arab Nationalism: 
The disappearance of Ottoman empire and domination of 
the Arab lands by non-Islamic European powers gave rise to 
new currents of Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism carried 
14. Ibid., p.p. 27, 30-32. 
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two things Pan Arabian and Arab nationalism. Pan Arabian was 
launched for the unity and solidification a-ong Islamic 
countries while Arab nationalism carried a message of broad 
perspective having the entire phenomenon of Arab unity, 
whether they are African countries or else. 
Significantly, it was an orientation and a national 
stream to foster Arab unity and their mutual collaboration in 
different fields. Ideologically, it was a strong strategy to 
stand viably against imperial, Zionist and western penete-
ration. Naturally, this blossoming stream ar.ong the Arab 
states got Soviet shadow and encouragement by its some incli-
nation towards ideology of socialism and one of its tenets to 
oppose western influence. 
Circumstances in West Asia were more favourable for 
Soviet peneteration notably the emergence of a number of 
revolutionary nationalist regimes in the Arab world. These 
regi:nes were critical of western trends. Moreover, western 
policies in West Asia were contradictory except in Turkey. 
Western policies experienced setbacks directly or indirectly 
in West Asia. Whereas Soviet policies were plausible and 
favourable for the radical Arab regimes. After the 
withdrawal from Baghdad Pact, Soviet relations were tense 
with turkey and Iran while in other areas Soviet influence 
increased. 
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Interestingly, Soviet union was bolstering this 
movement of Pan Arabism only to gain prestige ariong the West 
Asian nation against U.S.A. Christianity (U.S.A.) and 
connunism Atheism (U.S.S.R.) both were challenges to the 
spirit of Islam. 
Furthermore there were three factors composed of 
essence of nationalism in the Arab world. 
1. Arab liberation - Arab struggle for liberation from 
real or imaginary remanants of western dominance. 
2. The desire to modernize their socio-political 
structure by replacing traditional authoritarianism 
with emerging political trends. 
3. Arab efforts to develop their under-developed 
countries. ' 
Soviet Union had been recognizing this sort of 
nationalism and posed herself as selfless friend of the Arab 
community, specially oppressed people by colonial and 
imperial atrocities. The period of four years 1955-59 was a 
tine of regional and international changes and develop-
ments. Main trend was gradual infringement between Arabs and 
U.S.A., especially nationalist pioneers Egypt, Iraq and 
Syria. following developments reflected on international 
political scene. 
15. Lenczowsky George; Soviet Advances,... op. cit. 
p.p. 1 - 2 . ' 
33 
A. Growth of Arab nationalism in the Arab world with in 
the framework of Afro-Asian Bandung Conference in 
1955. 
B. Extension of American policy of containment (Baghdad 
Pact Feb. 1955) and Eisenhower Doctrine as steps 
1957. 
C. Establishment of closer ties between Arab 
nationalists centres and the Soviet Union. 
D. Challenge western supremacy in the Arab World 
(Nationalization of Suez Canal Nasser Factor). 
E. Surge of radicalism in the Aran World communist and 
socialist advancement in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. 
F. Intensified drive for Arab unity UAR and federation 
with Yamen 1958. 
G. American intervention in favour of moderate Arab 
status quo. 
Nasser the Egyptian leader converged his attention 
towards military Pan Arab policy - rupture between American 
Egyptian relations became inevitable. On the other hand 
diametrically Soviets were whole- heartedly supporting three 
main trends of contemporary Arab nationalism, neutralism, 
anti-Zionism and radicalism which emerged as a' setback to 
American Arab relations. 
16. Ibid., p.p. 56-57. 
17. Ibid., p.p. 57-58. 
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At this crucial juncture two stunning situation 
emerged in the Arab world scenario. 
1. Creation of Arab League (1945) 
2. Creation of Israeli State (1948) 
The Arab League was a result of two factors and 
intense desire of unity and solidarity among the Arab States. 
Secondly, little move of Britain to gain Arab attention in 
London Conference of Arab States to consider the Palestinian 
problem. 
On March 22, 1945 at Cairo, seven Arab states signed 
that Pact of Arab League in which Nuri Said played a vital 
role. During 1950 to 1960 Arab League followed seemingly a 
course of Pan Arab solidarity. The basic issue of solidarity 
18 
was independence from western imperialism. 
The Balfour Declaration of 1917 was a betrayal of 
Arabs. Inspite of promising Sharif of Mecca to protect 
Palestine and Arab unity, British allowed for a state 
establishment dominated by the jews in the Palestine. On 
November 29, 1947 General Assembly voted to recommend 
19 position of Palestine. 
18. Lenczowsky George, The Middle East in the „Wo.rld 
jiff airs, Cornell Univ.'Press, New York, 1962, liird 
Edition, p.p. 633-647. 
19. Ibid., p.p. 376-93. 
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Arabs always looked at jews, with suspicion and hated 
western dominance. Consequently, ernergence of Israeli state 
triggered off violent Arab jews war of 1948. On May 14, 1948 
National Council at a session of TelAviv proclaijied the 
20 Jewish state of Israel. 
The war of 1948 and 1956 (suez canal crisis) showed 
military weakness of Arabs and their disunity. This again 
increased their desire to cling together to forn one mighty 
state. Israel thus acted as a catalyst by which Arab 
nationalism inflammed and found its only unity of purpose and 
pushed Arab nationalists in the direction of Pan Arab unity. 
Thus it was quite obvious that creation of Israel had 
created tension between Arab world and America and the west. 
This opened the door of opportunity to take full advantage 
for Soviet Union by adopting a policy inclined towards Arab 
nationalism and anti-Zionism. Sasic attitude of the 
U.S.S.R. towards Arabs was ostensible benevolence and 
friendships. Consequently, Soviets developed close relations 
with Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Algeria and Yamen 
revolutionary republics, inspite of being basically far from 
Islamic spirit. Soviet assistance towards Arabs was to 
satisfy their psychological needs (anti-imperialism and 
Americanims). 
20. Ibid., p. 396. 
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Arab nationalism was not universal significance, it 
was self centred. Fundamentally, there were certain basic 
divergence inspite of Soviet Arab policies convergence. In 
addition to this basic ideological differences Soviet Union 
had to choose sides on a number of issues. 
1. Arab unity. 
2. Position of Communist towards Arab unity. 
3. Kurdish problem. 
4. Role of Palestinian Guerilla in Arab 
22 Israeli conflict. 
Radical nationalism had been the strongest political 
force in the Arab world. Authentically it was collaboration 
23 
with Soviet Union against imperialism. 
Soviet actions and pronouncements weakened psycho-
logically western ties with the northern tier like CENTO and 
bilateral security agreements between U.S. and three north 
tier countries Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Soviet policy 
followed three broad lines. 
1. Close political alignment with radical Arab regimes. 
2. Arming those regimes and massively rearming them 
after their defeat in June 1967 war. 
22. George Lenczowsky, soviet Advances, 
... pp. cit., p.p. 58-69. 
23. Laquer, Z. Walter, Soviet Union and the Middle East, 
Rputledge and Kegan h'aui Fublistiers, i^oy, p.p.3it)-i9 
CENTO - Central Treaty Organization initiated by U.S.A. in 
1954. 
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3. A. Economic assistance - General industrialization 
in Egypt and vartiety of other industries in 
Syria and Iraq. 
B. Harnessing o£ major rivers and electrification 
(The Aswan Dam in Egypt and Euphrates Dam in 
Syria). 
C. Oil exploitation and development - North Rumaila 
oil field in Iraq and Syria oil-fields. 
Although western imperial rule in West Asia had 
receded, there remained a western presence of non-imperial 
type with its investments, commercial operations and western 
cultural assets. Soviet tried to champion the cause of the 
third world countries and thus opposed colonialism and form 
of western domination in the region. Despite the differences 
between Arab nationalism and Marxism - Leninism, "The 
success of soviet Union in the West Asia could be attributed 
primarily to the receptivity of Arab radical regimes to 
»» 24 
Soviet offers of arras and economy. Evidently Soviet Union 
had certain tactical reasons to shield Arab world. Moscow 
supported Jewish demand for independent state to get out 
Britain from the region. Moreover Islam was an obstacle to 
the communism and Soviets did not force Arabs to adopt 
extreme communism, as in case of Eastern Europe. It was Arab 
24. Lenczowsky george, Soviet Advances, ... op. cit., 
p.p. 159-163. 
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socialism instead of scientific communism. Undoubtedly 
Soviets and Arabs worked together to rootout western trends 
but the very moment U.S.S.R. wished to fill the vaccum in 
the region. interestingly Arabs did not let it to do so as 
Britain had done in Arab world. They wanted to be sovereign 
in their region and U.S.S.R. was to be a protecting wall for 
25 pursuance of national interests. 
"Radical Arab states have an interest in the conti-
nuation of American cold war, just as Soviet Union has an 
interest in continuation of Arab Israeli war. Neither seems 
to see the others conflicts with its principal antagonist and 
either in victory or reconciliation ." 
C. Soviet Opposition to U.S. dominance: 
End of the World War II left a hazy picture and 
unhealthy atmosphere of international political scenario 
dividing the world into two antagonistic blocs. This was the 
time when America abandoned the policy of isolationism and 
U.S.S.R emerged as an enemy of U.S.A. due to its totally 
diergent and character. This was a period of cold war, 
gradually crept almost all the regions of the world - whether 
25. Kanet, E. Roger, The Soviet Union and the Developing 
Nations, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
London, 1974, p.p. 169-70. 
26. Ibid., p. 171. 
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Asia, Africa or West Asia. Fundamental aim of the super-
powers was to dominate the entire world crushing each others 
accelerating influence in any of area. Both the superpowers 
tried to make the conflict perpetual due to hostile moves and 
counter moves. Immortality of the cold war deliberately 
desired to fulfill thair interests in different regions. 
Soviet interests in West Asia had undergone striking 
changes over the past generations. Whereas in the late 1940s 
and 1950s they were priinarily defensive to weaken the 
military belt of interlocking alliance created by U.S.A. In 
1960s and 1970s they assumed more ambitious expansionist 
approach in response to local conditions and tactical 
opportunities. Soviet interest in each region developed 
independently, in response to a changing conbination of 
security concerns, military capabilities and systematic 
rivalry with U.S.A.^^ 
The Soviet Union started a broader involvement in the 
world affairs, specifically in West Asia - ideologically, 
economically and politically. Soviet tool to deal with Arabs 
28 
was of much patience, 
27. Allen, S. Harry, Ivan Volgyes, Israel, The Middle 
East and U.S. Interests, Praeger Publishers, FTew 
York, 1983, p. 96. 
28. Maclaurin, R.D., Middle East in Soviet Policy, 
Lexington, D.C. Heath Company, Lexington, ly/j, p.p. 
134, 146. 
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The major threat to U.S. was the presence of U.S.S.R. 
The potential danger to U.S. interest in West Asia were 
29 
represented by the presence of U.S.S.R. 
George, F. Kennon's strategy of containment to check 
Soviet expansionist tendencies was a strong device. In West 
Asia first serious confrontation broke out when Soviet 
showed their stubborn intention to nake Iranian provir.ce as a 
permanent part of U.S.S.R. or to establish a governn:ent and 
then a divide it like Gerniany and Korea. Inspite of an 
agreement Russia was not ready to leave Iran, subsequently 
U.S.A. threatened to check the U.S.S.R. In the n:eantime 
Turkey and Greece were assisted by 'Truman doctrine' for 
military and economic aid in March 1947. In June 1947 
Secretary of State Marshall called upon the European govern-
ment to help themselves by drafting a programme of cultural 
and economic aid for reconstruction of European sphere. 
Russian response to 'Marshall plan' was 'Molotov plan' to 
30 
assist financially East Europe. 
"The Korean was led to the first and last real 
effort of all the major allies in the North Atlantic treaty 
organization (NATO) to build up their forces to a level, 
specified by the military as being necessary to withstand a 
29. Ibid., p. 51. 
30. Ferrell, H. Robert, American Diplomacy - A History, 
Indiana University, iJ.W. l>orton Company Inc., New 
York, 1959, p.p. 627-29. 
41 
Soviet attack." NATO was a military alliance for collective 
security of western countries to be used in war time. It was 
coordination and plan in peace time. Soviet Union had spread 
its influence internally and externally. In 1955 Warsaw Pact 
emerged as Soviet military alliance with East European 
countries against NATO. Apart from this, Warsaw Pact served 
31 in consolidation of communist bloc. 
"A proper balance between means and ends would enable 
us to contain Soviet expansion to U.S. in west Europe, Far 
East. Not much worried about Soviet peneteration in West 
Asia. Truman had carried out and Eisenhower followed it 
with slight alternation, specially in South Asia and West 
Asia CENTO." 
CENTO was a vital move of American foreign policy in 
West Asia. Strategically Soviet American interests in West 
Asia were inter-related with their other interests in Africa, 
32 Indian Ocean and Mediterranian Sea. 
Soon after Suez war of 1956-57, Washington declared 
Eisenhower Doctrine to be materialized in West Asia against 
international communism. The Soviets in the meantiraes had 
been making a successful effort to vitalize a political stand 
31. Osgood, E. Robert, Alliance and American Forei..^ n 
Policy,Scientific Book Agency, Calcutta, 1968, p.51 
32. Newzealand International Review, Vol. XV, No.3, 
May-June, 1990. 'pTT. 
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specifically in Egypt, Syria and Iraq - through moral, 
political, economic and military support against Israel and 
shielding them from American imperialism as their suspicion 
had developed. In Latin America Castro's support with 
U.S.S.R. gave a sign of peril to U.S.A. of communist 
flourishing interests. Berlin blockade already had become a 
malignant problem between two superpowers on the other hand 
leadership of President Nixon was somewhat submissive sort 
of^ and he had to withdraw troops from Vietnam due to unsuit-
33 
able circumstances and military weakness. Vietnam had got 
support of the U.S.S.R. and influenced by the communist 
stream. 
The U.S.S.R. passed through a strong and competitive 
period dm-ing Brezhnev era (1964-1981). In certain political 
moves the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev surpassed the 
leadership of President Nixon, especially in strategies and 
tactics during the cold war. 
The economic aid of the Soviet Union and U.S.A. was 
similar in political intent. Soviet aid sought to encourage 
economic growth and accelerate development towards 
socialism. Soviet analysts Mirsky and Avakov had determined 
the criteria employed by U.S.S.R. in directing the flow of 
33. Middle East International, Vol. 39, No.4, Autumn 
198b, p. byU. 
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aid to the third world countries and West Asia significantly, 
Iraq and Syria have been kept under the most important 
section of category first, as they were strategically 
34 
important, ideologically important and morally attached. 
The Russians seemed to be gaining grounds in Arab world at 
the close of 1960. Starting immediately after the Arab defeat 
in June 1967 Arab Israel war, soviet Union rearmed Egypt and 
continued its role as a balancer. In Arab-Israeli zone the 
Soviet Union was pursuing the diplomacy of polarization in 
hope of emerging its own influence and crushing American 
moves in the Arab world, the U.S.S.R. proclai::ed itself the 
patron and protector of Arab (in dispute with Israeland 
35 
advertised U.S.A. as a guardian of Israel. 
As a matter of fact Soviet Union had been playing a 
heavy handedness to oppose U.S.A. In 1967 war relations got 
strained with Syria and Egypt due to Soviet reluctance and 
drawn hands in its aids. It could not fulfill the promises 
made earlier as Arabs were in optimism. Arrival of Anwarul-
Sadat altered the situation and considering Soviet Union an 
undesired factor tilted towards America. Arabs had learnt a 
lesson from 1967 war and in next conflict of 1973 their 
policy of oil embargo played a key role to defeat Israel and 
34. Ivov Lederer and Wynes Ucinicli, Soviet Union and the 
Middle East, Post World War II Era, Hoover Instt. 
Press, Stanford Univ. California, l9/4, p. 97 (see 
table No.l). 
35. Hurewitz, I.C., Soviet American Rivalry in the Middle 
East, Praeger Publishers, New York, Washington, 1969, 
p.p. 1-3. 
RECIPIENTS OF SOVIET ECONOHIC AND MILITARY AID, 1954-67 
Counlry 
II.A.U. 
India 
Indonesia 
Iraq 
Afghanistan 
Syria 
Algeria 
Iran 
Paklntan 
Turkey 
Yemen 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Military and 
Non-HI1 ltd ry 
Aid total: 
1954-67 
' $ wliUoiio) 
2,5f)l 
2,203 
1,712 
834 
820 
693 
482 
440 
218 
210 
192 
102 
99 
Kniik 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Hon 
Aid 
($ 
1 
1 
-Military 
, 10',/i-f,7 
nl11 ions) 
,01 1 
,593 
372 
184 
570 
233 
232 
330 
178 
210 
92 
102 
89 
Knnk 
2 
1 
4 
9 
3 
6 
7 
5 
10 
3 
12 
11 
13 
Military Aid** ' 
l<)')-r,7 
($ nillions) 
No 
No 
1,50 
610 
1,340 
650 
250 
460 
250 
110 
40 
nilitary aid 
100 
•slUtary aid 
10 
Rank 
I 
4 
2 
3 
6.5 
5 
6.5 
8 
IQ.S 
9 
15 
UraziL 
Greece 
Guinea 
Somalia 
Morocco 
Mall 
Chile 
Arf.oiiLinn 
Kenya 
Canbodla 
Tiuiisla 
Tanzania 
Ceylon 
Sierra t.eone 
U(;anil.-| 
Sudan 
Ni'|in 1 
llurma 
(.' )iij',o( lira/zavll 1 e) 
Cameron j 
85 
84 
83 
76 
74 
60 
55 
45 
44 
35 
34 
30 
30 
28 
2f> 
22 
20 
14 
U 
8 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25.5 
25.5 
27 
28 
29 
10 
31 
32 
33 
85 
84 
73 
66 
44 
55 
55 
45 
44 
25 
34 
20 
30 
28 
16 
22 
:/() 
14 
9 
8 
14 
15 
16 
17 
21.5 
18.5 
18.5 
20 
21.5 
26 
33 
28.5 
24 
25 
30 . 
27 
2H.5 
41 
32 
33 
No nilitary 
No allitary 
10 
10 10 
40 
-
No «llItnry 
No •llltary 
No Unitary 
10 
No «llltnry 
10 
No nlUtary 
No nilitary 
10 
10 
No nilitary 
-
-
No nilitary 
aid 
aid 
• id 
aid 
aid 
aid 
aid 
aid 
aid 
aid 
15 
15 
10.5 
18.5 
15 
15 
15 
15 
18.S 
18.5 
SonL'j;Ml 
Zanhla 
Mauritania 
7 
6 
3 
34 
35 
30 
7 
6 
3 
34 
35 
36 
No nilitary aid 
No nilItary aid 
No nlUtary aid 
The figures used in tills table drawn fron U.S. Department of State (Intelll-
gonpe and Research) Kesearch Memorandum RSE-20 (August 14, 1968). Table 1, 
p.p'. 2-2; and Tabic 2, p. 6. For a somewhat similar presentation see 
Chirlc; H. flcl.anc, "ri)rel;;n Aid In Soviet Third World Politics", MIZAN, Vol. 
U), No.G (lOOrt), p.p. 21U-50, and osp. p. 247. 
Military and ri;'.iires liu-linlo all communist countries, not Just the U.S.S.R. 
M-iM arcJ Conpo (Urazzavl I Ic) received an estimated $5 million or less In 
military aiil, arbitrarily assunotl $5 nllllon for Mall and $2 million for 
CoMf,o(Hi SI' : hat 1 could have some sort of total for military and non-
roLlltary aid. 
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U.S.A. This time Soviet support was fulfledged but on the 
other hand it emerged with U.S.A. emphasizing on political 
36 peaceful settlement of dispute in U.N.O. with Anerica. But 
it was not such a vital step of U.S.S.R. for the Arabs. 
During October war the U.S.S.R tried to reshape and 
reconstruct the excellent Soviet image in the eyes of Arab 
states. Victory of Arabs in 1973 war and establishment of 
Arab unity on an anti American basis was a matter of joy for 
the Soviet leaders. Another important advantage for the 
Soviet Union from the war 1973 October was reconciliation 
between Iran and Iraq. Apart from that strategically Soviet 
standing augmented and it achieved several solid results by 
this war. Significantly U.S.S.R reconstructed its image 
which it had to face at the time of expulsion from Egypt 
1972.-^ ^ 
Soviet Union took a new look since the death of 
President Nasser in particular to undertake a rapproachment 
with Palestine resistance. On October 20, 1971, Yassir 
Arafat went to Moscow and Syria the head of the delegation of 
'Al-Fateh group of Palestine. The Soviet Palestinian 
closeness caused Arab communist parties to strengthen their 
36. Robinson Edmond, Soviet Foreign Policy - Superpower 
Paradox, Oxford University Press, 19/:), p.p. 6U-bl. 
37. Freedom, 0. Robert; Soviet Foreirrn Policy towards the 
Middle East Since 1970, Praeger Publishers, New York, 
1978, p.p. 146-47. 
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relations with resistance movement. American Egyptian 
O Q 
relations were too one of the motivating factor for this. 
The Camp David Agreement was signed on September 17, 
1978. Poland and Moscow both rejected it and termed it a 
39 
plot against Arabs and ignorance of P.L.O. claims. 
Immediately after the Camp David talks, the U.S.S.R 
agreed to visit Arafat, the P.L.O. leader's campaign to win 
international recognition for the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, by affirming that it was sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. Finally early in 
1982, the Soviets made a highly significant new commitment to 
Syria agreeing long standing President Hafizal Asad's request 
for strategic party to make the country equal to Israel. 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 1979 was the most 
exciting instance after Czechosolovakian intervention in 
1968 - as Soviet dominance in the third world. Factually, 
Afghan client was pro Soviet Marxist regime, moreover 
geographical contiguity of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union 
opened the door for this solid operation. Apart from these 
two reasons, control over Afghanistan was quite enough to 
sustain influential position of U.S.S.R in west Asia and 
38. Kellerman Barbara and Jeffry Z. Rubin, Leadership and 
N^ e.qotiations in the Middle East, Praeger Publishers, 
New York, 1988, p.p. 170-71. 
39. F.M.A. Papers (Arab World File) Institute of Palesti-
nian Studies Centre Beirut. Nasrullah Ayoob Building, 
July, 1974, p.3. 
40. Ibid., January 1979(1), p.43, No.(1155). 
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South Asia. American reaction was acute and President Carter 
announced an embargo of grains and technology sales to the 
U.S.S.R.'^ -'-
This brought a new epoch of new cold war when super-
power confrontations intensified and main aim was to dominate 
the third world. The theater of cold war shifted from 
entire world tc the third world, specially West Asia, South 
Asia and Latin America and Africa became the arena of 
regional conflicts. It brought serious implications for the 
security of other countries in the region. In new cold war 
era direct military intervention started with ideological 
differences, while in previous cold war only threats were 
made against each other by the both superpowers, whether it 
was in the form of any treaty, alliance or pact. But the new 
cold war was the manifestation of superpowers direct 
involvement to check each other strongly.. Pakistan's north 
west frontier had become heaven for millions of Afghan 
refugees. Pakistan was certainly in vulnerable condition and 
did not support guerillas or permit outside to do so in a 
significant way for the fear of provoking the Soviets. 
Secondly, Afghanistan's government indication to support 
separatists elements of Pathan and Baloochi in Pakistan and 
Iran was also a factor. Islamabad refused U.S. aid for 
military of 200 million dollars as it was enough to provoke 
Moscow. 
41. Kellerman Barbara, ... op. cit., p. 172. 
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On the other hand Iran was also standing at crucial 
juncture - due to upheaval, in the country by Koniaini's 
revolution and hostility with Iraq. Moscow's support to 
Marxist party 'Tudeh' and its forceful demonstration to 
advance its interests horrified the Gulf states psychologi-
cally. Soviet policy since revolution in Iran had been two-
folded on the one hand it appreciated Ayatullah Khoneini's 
anti western moves and tried to establish good relations; 
on the other hand supported Marxist party to weaken the 
government of Iran because Soviets found and felt Khomeini's 
regime unreliable and ideologically different enough. 
Regan Era - A Tough Time for U.S.S.R.: 
Unlike Carter, President Regan was firm beliver in 
containment while President Carter had virtually abandoned 
the containment and the U.S.S.R. took full advantage of it. 
Ronald Regen's decision to assist militarily to anti 
communist guerilla in the third world later came to be known 
as 'Regan Doctrine'. , 43 
'(3 
The most salient aspect of Ronald Regan policy was 
very strong anti-Sovietism and basic goal of West Asia policy 
of Regan was to construct West Asia as anti Soviet block. 
The Soviet leadership applied certain tactic to deter and 
42. Treverton George, Crisis Manar^ ement and Superpowers in 
the Middle East, Grower and Allenheld Press, London, 
1931, p.p. 81-85. 
43. Newzealand International Review, Vol. 15, No.3, May 
1990, p.4. 
49 
dissolve U.S. strong estabilization in West Asia by supplying 
military aid to its regional clients, economic aid to Aswan 
Dam in Egypt, Euphrates Dam in Syria. It solidified its 
influence by maintaining long term treaties 1971 with Egypt, 
1972 with Iraq, 1974 with Somalia, 1979, Ethopia and Yamen 
and in 1980 with Syria. 
But there were some obstructions and difficulties 
faced by the U.S.S.R at that time. Several regional 
conflicts and inter Arab confrontations caused liquidition of 
Soviet image among Arab States. Secondly Arab communist 
parties could not play worthwhile role in the countries in 
which they operated. Thirdly, increasing price of oil in the 
Arab world from 1973 enabled them to import technology from 
west and Japan. Fourthly, after 1973 Islam had become more 
resurgent and finally, U.S.A., France and China continuously 
opposed Soviet efforts to achieve dominant goals. Indeed 
Arab world was badly splitted and this was one of the 
problems U.S.S.R. faced in its quest for West Asia 
• c^ 45 
influence. 
The investment of AWACS aircraft and ground rdar in 
Saudi Arabia against Iranian threat seemed U.S. desire to 
help Arab states. Moscow's interest and concern was that 
Saudi Arabia might be enticed to support Camp David Agreement. 
44. Kauppi, V. Mark, R. Criag Notion, Soviet Union and the 
Middle East, 1980, Lexington Books D.C. Heath Company 
Toronto,1983, p. 71-75. 
45. Ibid., p.p. 73, 74, 75. 
(^i-JACS - Airways advance control system - aircraft ir.ported by 
Saudi Arabia from U.S.A. There was a condition bet^^en U.S.A.and 
Saudi Arabia that (Saudis) they would'nt use it against Israel). 
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Formation of G.C.C. composed of Saudi Arabia, Enerites 
(Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait) were basically pro-U.S. 
monarchies. Oman, Saudi Arab and Bahrain had military ties 
with U.S. and Oman was ready to provide RDF installation. 
Moreover in Iran-Iraq war Soviet Union wanted to be neutral 
because after the termination of war either or both could 
have turned towards U.S.A. These negative trends made 
nights restless for the U.S.S.R. 
U.S.A. pursued a policy that was mirror inage of 
Soviet efforts to build an anti-imperial block. Assassi-
nation of Anwarus Sadat, leader of Egypt in October 1981 was 
a majro turning point in West Asia and provided an 
opportunity for Moscow to call an international conference in 
connection with Arab Israel conflict. But in 1981, Moscow 
could not achieve worthwhile quest in West Asia. Syrian 
aircraft missile crisis in Lebanon, destruction of Iraqi 
nuclear reactor, Israeli bombardment on Beirut and Lybian -
U.S. clash over the Gulf of Sidra and U.S. Israeli strategic 
co-operation were contributory factors in disunity of 
Arabs.^^ 
In addition the consolidation of Hosni Mubarak's 
regime in Egypt together with Saudi proposal of the Shah 
Fahad plan was a long desired development for U.S.A. 
46. Ibid., p. 76. 
47. Ibid., p. 102. 
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The U.S.S.R tried its best to anchor a strong bloc 
against Regan's anti-Soviet activities but it was very hard 
nut to crack to overcome the problems and hinderences. It 
regained indeed a tough-ti:ie between two superpowers. neither 
of them seemed to be slight submissive or cool. 
•'Moscow correctly concluded that Washington's aim was 
to keep the Soviet Union out of the region. Indeed time and 
again Moscow has shown by its behaviour that prospects of 
iT.proved relations with U.S.A. did not take precedence over 
the U.S.S.R. determination to pursue its strategic and 
political objective in West Asia,. Opportunistic to the core 
its underlying strategic rationale was to undermine the 
position of U.S.A. Ambition, capability, determination and 
persisitence made Soviet formidable opponent in West Asia.'"^ 
D. Basic Postures of Soviet Union Towards Iraq: 
Geographically, Vietnam, Somalia, South Yamen, Syria, 
Egypt and Angola were important for U.S.S.R. Iraq being one 
of them was more significant than other states on account of 
its location in the Persian Gulf. Baghdad's anti western 
credential and policies directed at undermining imperialist 
position and influence were in harmony with Moscow's own 
position. Diplomatic relations were established first in 
1944 and ruptured due to western policies of Prime Minister 
48. Ibid., p. 102. 
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of Iraq Nuri Said and its membership in Baghdad -Pact in 
1955.^^ 
Iraq being heavily independent on the Soviet Union for 
sophisticated weapons and technological aid was obliged to 
provide port facilities to the Soviet naval ships to watch 
Persian Gulf. 
After July 1953 coup, the U.S'.S.R promptly recognized 
Republic of Iraq and General Kassim's anti western stance 
brought both countries together. General Kassim withdrew 
Iraq fron the membership of Baghdad Pact. And western 
reluctance, to continue supply of arms to Iraq, forced the 
Qassim regime to enter into an arras agreement with Soviet 
Union. The first consignment of Soviet weapons arrived on 
November 27, 1958. The Soviet - Iraq agreement provided for 
provisions of material and training of Iraqi personnel by the 
Soviet instructors. First Soviet shipsment included MIG-175, 
YAK-115, IL-28 and motor boats with fourty Iraqi Cadets were 
sent for training to the U.S.S.R. 
In late 1958 first commerce and military ties were 
established between U.S.S.R and Iraq. In March 1959 another 
49. Allen, S. Harry, Ivan Volgyes, Israel the Middle East 
and U.S. Interests (ed.) Praeger Publishers, U.S.A., 
1983, p.p. 101, 103. 
50. Maclaurin , R.D. Mughisuddin, Abraham, R., Wanger, 
Foreign Policy Making in West Asia Domestic Influence, 
"PTaeger Publishers, New York, 1977, p.p. 151-52. 
51. Ibid., p. 154. 
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agreement was concluded pledging 137 million dollars for 
Iraqi economic development. 
In February 1963 Ba'ath Party for a while, for the 
first time came into power. Relations were deteriorated as 
communist party was badly oppressed by the Iraqi government. 
Moscow was happy when regime was overthrown by Col. Abdus 
52 
Salam Arif and relations got normalized. 
The year 1968 marked a significant change fron co-
operation with West to Soviet Iraq relations as Ba'ath Party 
came into power. Revolutionary Iraq participated with Soviet 
desire to prevent U.S.A from filling the vacuun left by the 
Great Britain. The two countries had a common interest in 
frustrating western efforts. 
Their ideological objectives were entirely anti-
western. The purchase of the weapons was the first step 
taken by Ba'athist to establish solid co-operation with the 
Soviet Union. In 1969 July agreement Soviet technical 
assistance was to enable Iraq more progressive and enhance 
its capability for oil industries nuclear power (use for 
peaceful purposes) friendship, and co-operation treaty in 
1972 was the culmination point to bring the countries closer 
53 
each other. 
52. S-olensky, M. 01es,Betti; Smolansky, U.S.S.R and 
Iraq- The Soviet Quest for Influence, Duke University 
Press, London, 1991, p.p. 15-16. 
53. F.M.A. Papers (Arab World File), January 1982,p.1302/3 
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Improvement in Iraq-Soviet was enshrined in a friend-
ship and co-operation treaty signed on April 9, 1972 against 
the background growing decarioration in Egyptian and Soviet 
relations which culmination in expulsion of Soviet advisors 
from Egypt in July 1972. Moscow needed to make for this 
reversal and strengthen its position elsewhere in west Asia 
treaty with Iraq in a means to gain a foothold in an Arab 
Gulf country. It was signed in Baghdad on April 9, 1972 by 
the President Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr and prime minister Alexei 
54 Kosygin - during Soviet pre-iers' visit to Baghdad. 
After Soviet Iraqi treaty was signed bilateral 
relations in 1973 and 1974 were further developed by a number 
of visits of Saddam Hussain to Moscow. Political relations 
were also strengthened when "J.S.S.R tried to settle 'Shattal 
Arab' dispute with Iran (A constant dispute since the 
disintegration of Ottoman empire Iraq inherited in it 
1937).^^ 
With the treaty of friendship, Baghdad got advantage 
of new sophisticated missiles from U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R 
delivered SA-3 surface to air missiles, TV-22 medium range 
bombers, Scud surface to surface and Mig-23 which signifi-
cantly improved the effectiveness of Iraq airforce. However, 
from 1975 some political differences started between two 
^ . 56 
countries. 
54. Ibid., p. 1302/4; Soviet-Iraqi treatv 1972 - see 
details in Anoendix 'text) . 
55. Ibid., p. 130'2/4, Soviet Iraqi Treaty - see details in 
Appendix (text) . 
56. Sr.olansky M. Oles, ...op. cit., p.p. 180-33. 
55 
Disharmony in Soviet-Iraqi approaches to various 
regional problems were caused by divergent interests. Iraq 
with other Gulf states favoured London's decision and 
rejected the argument that departure of Britain vould result 
in vaccum to be filled by U.S.S.R. Moreover ic refused to 
join any western pact. These views were appreciated whole-
heartedly by socialist block. This ambiguous approach of 
Iraq (not to Soviets let establish their feet fully in the 
region and on the contary, not join any western pact dragged 
U.S.S.R in dilemma and U.S.S.R could not resolve the 
tensions. Subsequently, Moscow was having least interest 
about future of disputed Gulf Islands whereas Baghdad's 
interest was keen. 
Moscow did not remain behind and showed in February 
1972 its reluctance towards Iraqi antagonistic lOve to 
Tehran, despite of treaty. In March 1973 U.S.S.R along 
with other states (Arabs) prevailed on Iraq to withdraw Iraqi 
troops from Kuwait border. This time Moscow do:::inated Iraq. 
Diplomatically Iraq took many advantages to fulfil its 
national interest by using U.S.S.R and several tines did not 
heed attention on its activities - how far they were compat-
able with U.S.S.R.^^ 
57. Ibid., p. 184. 
58. Ibid., p. 186. 
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In this way, although Soviet Union continued to be a 
major trade partner of Iraq, the Baghdad government had been 
endeavouring diversity in its commercial and trade ties. 
Specially after signing Algires agreement in March 1975 the 
Iraqi government had taken several steps to broaden this 
horizon of comercial and technical relationships with 
western states and Japan. France became a major nuclear 
technology supplier and Japan as general technology supplier 
for economic and military development. During these days 
Iraq had not been dependent on only source of the U.S.S.R. as 
Egypt in 1967 to 1973.^^ 
Truthfully, Iraq many times did not pay attention 
towards its friend, Soviet Union and failed to maintain a 
loyal relationship because of having normal relationship with 
western countries. Though, this happened for a short time 
but slight rift between two countries appeared at that time. 
Soviet Iraqi relations became tense owing to the 
question of location of Soviet embassy in Baghdad, as Iraq 
wanted to remove it from its site close to presidential 
palace to the city's diplomatic quarter. Another Ba'athist 
and ICP conflict started, on ICP report, supporting U.S.S.R's 
role in West Asia during crisis. Consequently, Iraqi weekly 
•AR-RISALA' of May 5,1978 accusedof ICP as "subservient to 
59. Mac Laurin R.D., Mughisuddin and Wanger, Foreign 
Policy Making in West Asia - Domestic Influence on 
Policy, Praeger Publishers, fTev? TorTc^  19/7, p.lDri. 
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Moscow". President Saddam Hussain's threat to break 
diplomatic relations if U.S.S.R supported aid to Ethiopia in 
'Ogaden '•Jar', worsened the relations. Saddam Hussain stated-
"No country whether foe or friend would define Iraqi policy". 
Deliberately U.S.S.R. maintained silence - not willing to be 
retaliating towards Iraq. In late 1979 Afghan intervention 
operation by the U.S.S.R was strongly criticised by the Iraqi 
government 
60 
Inspite of these better relations, partially over-
lapping interests ensured their mutual cooperation. Specifi-
cally, in October 1976 U.S.S.R. and Iraq had concluded an 
arns agreement providing for delivery of T-62 Tanks and 
additional Scud missiles. In 1977 the Soviets undertook to 
supply Iraq with IL-76 long range military transport planes. 
Finally in 1979 last major deal before Iran-Iraq war the 
U.S.S.R contracted to supply Baghdad with MI-8 helicopters, 
MIG-23 and MIG-27 fighters and MIG-25 aircrafts for 
reconnaisance. As result by 1979 Iraq had emerged as 
Moscow's main third world recipient of modern weaponry. 
Factually as Iran Iraq war broke out on September 22, 
1980 Moscow wanted to support both sides. No doubt, 
relations were tense but after all Iraqi was an ally, and 
60. F.M.A. Papers (Arab World File), p.1302/5, 1980. 
61. S~olansky Oles, ... op. cit., p.p. 28-29. See Table 
_''c • 2 (Soviet Arms suppliers to its chief Arab 
Clients) 1964 to 1978 Next page. 
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oldest military client and co signatory of Moscow Baghdad 
treaty. But in the first phase of conflict U.S.S.R kept its 
C O 
drawn hands for Iraq. 
Interestingly, the revolution by Khomeini the Iranian 
leader, brought stunning postures for both superpowers. 
Ideologically Khomeini was against er.tirely with western 
trends and did not like communist peneraration too. But the 
Soviet Union tried to establish good relations on account of 
its anti western inclinations. Historically, Iran has its 
unique culture and old relations with Bukhara and Tashkent, 
TABLE - 2 
SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES TO ITS CHIEF CLIENTS 
FROM 1964 - 1978 
Countries 
Egypt 
Syria 
Iraq 
Libya 
1964-73 
2,305 
1,153 
742 
742 
1974-78 
430 
2,700 
3,600 
3,400 
Total 
2,735 
3,853 
4,342 
3,400 
Source: US Arras Control and Disarmament Agency, World 
Military Expenditure and Aras Transfer 1963-73, 
Washington D.C., 1975; 1969-1978 (Washington, D.C.), 
1980, p. 160. 
62. Legum Colin, Crisis and Conflict in the Middle East, 
Bomes and Meir Publisners, New York, 1971, 9.83. 
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inspite of being a West Asian country. Undubiously, Iraq was 
militarily ruled country but spiritually supported basic 
tenets of Iran. Iran-Iraq war was a setback in non-align 
movement but there remained a lurking threat for both super-
powers if Iran Iran might be united U.S.A had started to 
supply weapons to Iraq (when saw Soviet's strained hand to be 
a good opportunity for spreading its influence) but Iraq did 
not forget Soviet's reluctance it had faced. 
U.S.S.R's unfriendly stance in crisis, towards Iraq 
and move towards Iran was terribly felt by Iraq. Sadoon, 
Hammadi, the then foreign minister spoke out on March 11, 
1981, "Soviet refusal to supply arms to Iraq could not be 
easily and quickly forgotten." In an effort to restore 
its prestige and influence in West Asia. Soviet Union called 
for an international agreement to normalize the Gulf 
situation. But Soviet policy towards the Gulf was not 
expressed merely in broad declaration and pious statement so 
the Soviet Union invited contacts with almost all Gulf 
countries and other interested parties in the region. 
Soviet policy during Leonid Brezhnev era had secured 
significant gains in international influence and major 
achievements in global expansions. At the same tine it 
63. Journal of Foreign Affairs. Vol. 60, No.2, Winter, 
1^82, p. 102. ^ 
64. Khadduri Majid, ... op.cit., p.147. 
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suffered major failures and significant reverses most notably 
in West Asia where it lost its pivotal influence in Egypt. 
Each period of Soviet history and each decade of Soviet 
development brings before Soviet leaders new dilemma and 
choices. The delirana and choices of 1980s were harsher and 
difficult than other ones. 
"The Soviet Union entered in the strongest position 
in its history vis-a-vis its principal adversary, the U.S.A. 
never had the ability of the U.S. been weaker in terms of 
critical areas of conflicts, particularly in West Asia and 
Persian Gulf."^^ 
As a matter of fact Iraq wanted wholehearted support 
from both superpowers to check Iran. He emphasized many 
times that they should condemn Iran and convince it to 
terminate the war. But they did not seem taking necessary 
action in time. 
Soviet military support to Iraq with other countries 
generally continued despite of strained hands of the Soviet 
Union during the first Gulf War. Table No.4 illustrates 
Soviet arms delivery to three West Asian countries with which 
it had signed friendship treaty. According to this table 
Iraq had got a balanced position during the period 1981 to 
a. *\ 
1985 from the s o v i e t Union. 
65 . J o u r n a l of Foreign A f f a i r s . 1981, v o l . 59, p . p . 
999-1020. 
56 . Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East, by W.Hyland,pub.Unknown. 
67. Chubin Shahran and Char les Tr ioo , I ran and I raq a t 
War, L.B. Taur i s C. L t d . , London,' 1988, p . p . 1 9 2 - 9 5 . 
*^  Table No.3 has jo be seen on next oaqe. 
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After Brezhnev period, President Andropov and 
Konstantin Cherninkov did not leave any stunning development 
in the U.S.S.R policies. Period of 1982 - to 1985 passed -
through simply. Arrival of Gorbachev, in February 1985 
brought a tremendous, unprecedented and exciting changes and 
developments. 
CHAPTER - III 
ARRIVAL OF GORBACHEV - POLITICAL REFORMS 
AND IMPACT ON WEST ASIA, 1985 ONWARDS 
CHAPTER - III 
ARRIVAL OF GORBACHEV - POLITICAL REFORMS AND 
IMPACT ON WEST ASIA,1985 ONWARDS 
The October revolution 1917 had strongly swept off 
the former political system entirely. The U.3.S.R. as a 
communist superpower led idealogically rigid politically 
powerful, socially unique economically strong and strategi-
cally significant life against its rival U.S.A. Genuinely 
from Lenin to Brezhnev (staunch communist leader) 65 years, 
the U.S.S.R. breathing in cold war atmosphere; presented 
various picture of new developments and foreign relations on 
the canvass of international scenario. Soretimes more, 
sometimes less, every era opened a new chapter of unforeseen 
challenges, successes, failures and developments. 
Flowing with the stream of communism, U.S.S.R. would 
have taken some more years to reach its culmination point of 
classless society, stateless structure and true communism. 
But the arrival of Soviet leader Gorbachev, absolutely turned 
the direction of the whole syndrome with certain goals to 
achieve something new, to bring some new trends in a 
stereotype structure. Without abandoning the basic ideolo-
gies and communist pictures, his new policies of 'Perestorika' 
and 'Glasnost' and new thinking about internal external 
64 
position, emphasised human factor globally. This was not 
enshrined earlier ever in Soviet policies and agenda. "The 
first shift was from a cold war Marxist perspective to 
Gorbachove's new thinking diplomacy that stressed need to 
create an external climate conducsive to domestic economic 
development but at the same time was activist inter-
im 
nationally." 
On convenning the 27th CPSU Congress April 23, 1985 
Gorbachove stated - "Life itself and entire course of history 
convincingly confirm the great truth of Lenin's teaching. 
It has been reliable compass for determining the strategy and 
tactics of our march forward. Lenin taught communist to 
proceed in everything from the working people's interest to 
assess social, phenomena realistically from class positions. 
Today we check our actions and plans against what Lenin 
taught us, against his great ideas and we live and work 
2 
according to Lenin's behest." 
Gorbacheve was elected General Secretary on February 
10th 1985 after, the death of former leader Kostanin 
Cherninko. Thought by Gorbacheve's mind Soviet society in 
all the phases required a massive change and was ripe for a 
new democratic-liberal revolution in a light communist 
1. Asian Survey, Reviev; of Asian Affairs, Vol. XXXII, 
No.8, August 1992, p. 757. 
2. Gorbacheve, S. Michael, Peace Has No Alternative, 
Political Publishers, New Delhi, 1986, p.3. 
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society. He overhauled the entire Soviet political system or 
-ore precisely got a mandate from the Soviet cor.nunists to do 
so. He unvield absolutely the eyes of soviet people and all 
over the world. Now it was not a mystry behind" iron 
3 
curtain." 
After 1985, The Soviet union, underwent a revoiu-
tionry change in both foreign policy and domestic policy. In 
the foreign policy area, initial focus of those gradual 
changes emphasized the termination of conflicts v;ith the 
4 
'.V e s t. 
Gorbacheve's immediate reforms brought startling 
changes in various aspects of entire system and presented a 
particular term 'Parestroika' to be supplied for socio-
economic and political reshaping and restructuring. 
Glasnost became the catchword for expression of opinion 
freedom of speech, and socio-cultural liberties. It was also 
to check bureaucratic corruption and malfunctioning which had 
crept into very political structure. Democracy exclusively 
for political framework was to lead the country towards a 
liberal world by the working class (human factor). Most accep-
table strategics initiated by Gorbacheve were 'Perestroika' 
Gupta Sen Bhawani, The Gorbacheve Factor in the third 
World Affairs, B.R. Publishing Corporation, New 
Delhi, 1991, p.p. 20-24. 
Occasional Papers, June 1991, ACDIS, Programme in 
Arms Control and Disarmanent, University of Illionois, 
Urbana, p.p. 1-2. 
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and 'Glasnost' and new thinking which constituted U.S.S.R. 
socialist cum-democratic country. 
Michael Gorbacheve was not a man of yesterday. He 
spoke out in New York - "Today we face a different world for 
which we must seek a different road to the future. In 
seeking it we must of course draw on the accumulated 
experiences and yet be aware of the fundamental differences 
and between the situation yesterday and what we are facing 
today." Gorbacheve had revealed some of this policy 
preferences. His policies aimed to be modified according to 
the changing circumstances. Responsibilities and burdens of 
a country on his shoulders^were innense but at that time he 
was less equipped to carry them out. Necessarily, according 
to Gorbacheve at least these three aspects of change in 
policies were vital and important for the liveliness and 
mobilization of a mighty country after a long period of 
stagnance. Soviet policy towards the developing world went 
through three stages. First period was a period of great 
expectations which lasted from 1985 to 1988. The second 
period was of new foreign policy initiatives from Combodia 
in south east Asia, Nicaragua in Central America, Afghanistan 
5. Light Margot, Soviet Theory of International 
Relations, Wheat Sheaf Book Ltd., London 1988, p.294. 
6. The Times of India, Dec. 16, 1988, New Delhi, p.6. 
7. Problem of conmunism, Vol. XXXIV, No.3, 1985, p.23. 
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in Asia and Iran Iraq in west Asia, it lasted from 1988 to 
1990. The third period of Soviet third world policy 
continued till its disintegration. In this policy phase the 
Soviet Union attempted to assert republics autonomy. As a 
matter of fact, some of these policies proved to be perni-
Q 
cious for the communism. 
Economic mechanism is a back bone of the entire 
system of a country. Soviet system passed through different 
phases of economic reforms. New economic policy, first 
pioneered by Valdimir Lenin, was important because it became 
source of inspiration and legitimacy what Gorbacheve tried to 
do. Lenin's 'reformism' was a tactical retreat to enable the 
Soviet regime to go on the offensive path again at later 
9 
time when reform had exhausted its usefulness. 
Gorbacheve's 'Glasnost' proved in its earlier years 
miraculous cure for whatever ailed soviet society - poor 
harvest, infact mortality rates alchohalism, earthquacks, 
hijacking and ethnic clashes. The emphasis on 'Glasnost' 
suggested that every man and woman should know what are bad 
remanants in the society and how should it be removed off. 
It is possible only when they are given freedom to look, 
think and understand and to do accordingly. In summer 1986 
8. Occasional Papers, June 1991, ACDIS, p.4. 
9. Dissent, Summer 1987, p.p. 287-288. 
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he emphasised necessity of scientific and technological 
revolution for strengthening socialism and enable it complete 
socialisn in every parametre. 
Evaluating gorbacheve's new plans Theodore Draper 
seems doubtful in complete success of Gorbacheve in his 
pioneered new policies (domestic specifically). It is not 
very easy to break at once the whole communist trend and a 
solid structure of Marxist ideology through newly innovated 
reforms. Lest these various changes in every sphere 
instead of existing facts, drag the country into decline. 
But it was to be assessed till these policies were 
materialized. 
New Trends in Foreign Policy: 
The reforms of Soviet foreign policy consisted of 
four elements: 
1. A thorough overhall of personnel. 
2. The adoption of flexible and sophisticated diplomatic 
style. 
3. The promotion of more pragmatic policies. 
4. The espousal of new theoretical principles together 
with an agenda for their further elaboration. 
10. Ibid., p.p. 293-295. 
11. Ibid., p. 299. 
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The concept of ' Perestroika' was evolved, also for to ease 
out international relations - tensions and conflicts. It was 
a fresh approach to international issues all over the world 
12 including Europe, Asia Pacific region and East Europe. 
Not only country's foreign policy's new trends were 
enshrined to be carried out smoothly and pragmatically, 
Gorbacheve interests invested the authenticity of U.N. and 
made certain suggestions for enhancing the prestige of 
13 U.N.O. By and large it can be assessed evidently that 
since 1988 period of cold war started decline and an 
unhealthy atrnosphere of contradictions started to be changed 
into peaceful environinent. An era began with new positive 
developments for which International community was waiting 
for a long time. Mostly his policies started to get 
consolidation and success specially in International 
community. At that time it could hardly be guessed that some 
of his reforns would be harmful for the Soviet structure. 
After years of Ronald Reganist rejection of the U.S.S.R. as 
an 'evil empire' an excessive hardening of American attitudes 
towards the Soviets gradually diminished witha new kind of. 
'detente' and warm east-west relations. 
12. Light Margot, ... op. cit., p. 294. 
13. Chopra, V.D., Micheal Gorbacheve's New Thinking A 
Critical Assgsment Asia Pacific, Continental 
Publishing House, 113, Munirka Vihar, New Delhi, 
1988, p.11. 
14. Gupta Bhawanisen, ... op. cit., p. 160. 
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Significantly, the trend of greater Soviet American 
collaboration has held true, not only during unprecedented 
leadership in the Krenlin but also during tense relations 
between Washington and Moscow. Four general approaches were 
incorporated by the Soviet Union for prevention of crisis. 
1. An agreement on general principles. 
2. Creation and recognition of spheres of influence. 
3. Periodic regional negosiations with U.S. President. 
4. U.S., U.S.S.R. nuclear risk, reduction. 
Frequent disarmament summits, SALT meetings in Geneva 
Rykjavik summit in 1986 October, and INF treaty in April 
1988, were the pragamatic steps taken to mitigate the horror 
of nuclear disaster. Arms control was politically important 
in the context of managing peaceful co-existence. 
The INF treaty was a land mark on arms race ground and 
significantly brought closer two superpowers epitomizing the 
gulf made by the cold war. 
Michael Gorbacheve was well aware of negative 
consequences of third world's constant conflicts and inter-
ventions. He did not make third world, the arena of 
conflict. His approach was from intervention to withdrawal. 
15. Compbell, M. Kurt, S. Neilolac Farlane, Gorbacheve 
Third World Dilemina, routledge. New Feterlane, 
London, New York, 1990, p. 263. 
INF - Intermediate Nuclear Force 
SALT - Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between U.S.A. 
and U.S.S.R. 
16. Ibid., p. 259. 
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For Gorbacheve, Afghanistan became the Crux of his 
new foreign policy. An year long intense debate in the 
CPSU-yielded several points of agreements. His decision to 
withdraw from Afghanistan was definitely a vital and bold 
act of political diplomacy. It proved to be a catalyst for 
rapid winding up of all major third world conflicts involving 
the superpowers. In 1987 the Polit Bureau released a 
confidential document admitting a series of errors and 
misjudgements leading to the military move into Afghanistan, 
and troops started to leave Afghanistan since May 1988. 
Second crucial true, which came on international 
scene was termination of Iran-Iraq in August 1988. Gorbacheve 
played a Central role to bring a halt of eight years long 
war in West Asia. Soon after this an agreement was reached 
prevailing for the withdrawal of south African troops from 
Angola, withdrawal of Cuban Troops from south Africa and 
independence of Namibia in 1989. Withdrawal of Vietnarai 
troops from Kampuchia in 1988 talks for good neighbourliness 
between North Korea and South Korea - were the successful 
18 
results of Gorbachevian endeavours and U.N. efforts. 
The prospects were bright of Soviet Chinese and 
Soviet Japanese relations - which were also two positive 
17. Gupta Sen Bhawani, ... op. cit., p. 187. 
18. Ibid., p.p. 21-22. 
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developments on political land scape. Gorbacheve left a 
strong impact on west Europe and heralded the doctrine of 
'our one European homeland - East and West Europe'. In 
October 1990 German unification (long desired development) 
19 
was one of the manifestation of end of the cold war. 
Likewise growing Soviet interest in ASEAN as 
collective regional organisation of all round cooperation was 
another sympathetic trend. Perpetuating cold war in these 
regions was to be rooted out whether it is India or 
Pakistan, Japan or China, Malaysia or Korea Philippine or 
Singapore - were not to be made arena of conflict. World 
stability and cultivation of cooperation was one of the 
20 
standpoints of his policy. 
Emergence of gorbacheve was harbinger of open free 
and conducive society. People examined the ideological basis 
and legitimacy of socialism and political structure built 
therein. The leaders preferred democracy and subsequently 
political activities started and multi-party system was 
established. With the collapse of socialist theory in 
communist world NATO and Warsaw Pact almost disappeared as 
tight military alliance. Except China and Cuba, all the 
19. Ibid., p. 23. 
ASEAN - 'Association of South East Asian Nations'. 
20. Chopra V.D.,... op. cit., p. 177. 
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socialist countries moved towards democracy. This efforts, 
to transform the international system to less threatening to 
the Soviet interest and in this connection to reduce super-
21 power status, prevailed in many direction. Gorbachev 
thought reforms., inevitable. "President Gorbacheve had spun 
a webs of change and although he could not control every 
event that landed in it, no one doubted that he was the 
22 pivotal figure." 
The chronic roots of conflicts, divergent interests 
and opposite ideologies were embittered more, the cold war in 
region. Now cold war seemed to be nearing a historic 
conclusion. A confrontation created almost by seven decades 
of Soviet insistence upon its ideology and U.S. counter moves 
to dominate it, gradually entered in a new era. As a matter 
of fact East West reconciliation came merely as a result of 
drastic change in the soviet Union itself. With the decline 
of Marxist globalism, in Afghanistan, East Germany, Poland, 
baltic states and Azerbijan (crucial at that time) Soviet 
interest seemed to be peripherial in the region but it 
maintained influence and required interest at that time also. 
1. Peaceful settlement of disputes Iran-Iraq. This 
policy goal was in a position to a long support to regional 
conflict parties. 
21. Current History, October 1990, Vol. No.549, p.306. 
22. Ibid., p. 305. 
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2. Foremost interest was to avoid international 
conflicts. 
3. Psychologically, Moscow wanted to discourage the U.S. 
tendency to dominate major international geo-political 
issues, hence the soviet Union found a new interest in the 
instrumentality of N. U.N.O. as peace keeping machinery. 
Moscow kept on to enhance its hegem onistic interests and 
interventionary capabilities among various nations, that 
could liquidate U.S. characteristics and scope of its 
international military investment as a whole. Europe, China, 
Japan, Korea and India in North Tier states - Iran, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and Turkey and much of West Asia remained 
23 particularly in this regard. Soviet foreign policy towards 
Iran-Iraq war since 1980 had been fluntuating, mostly to 
prove to Iran its inclination towards it because of tensions 
with Iraq.^^ 
Soviet West Asia Policy During Gorbacheve era: 
The arena in which Soviet Union had undertaken the 
most visible initiatives, was West Asia. Moscow established 
diplomatic relations with Oman and U.A.R. in September and 
November 1985, respectively. The Soviet Union had been 
edging closer to responding ties with predominant military 
power in West Asia Israel as well. In April 1987, Gorbacheve 
23. Middle East Journal, vol. 44, No.3, Summer 90, p.420. 
24. Ibid. , p. 430. 
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asserted hafezal Assad for a dinner. Moscow's most remark-
able initiative came in Persian Gulf. The Soviets promptly 
to protect responded to Kuwait's request its tankers 
threatened by Iran in May 1987. Moscow was able to 
capitalized on American heavy handed response to the Gulf 
situation which tried to move towards Iraq. I'Jhile sending 
large naval task to support Iraq with weapons and voting in 
favour of U.N. security council resolution 598 urging a 
ceasefire, the Soviets kept their bridges open to Tehran by 
not supporting a second resolution mandating sanction against 
Iran. 
Especially, Iraq understood that Soviet were likely 
to reniain involved in the politics of Gulf region and aspire 
to bring out a resolution separating Tehran and Iraq. Soviet 
had been a major supplier of economic and military aid to 
Iraq. Some fluctuations during war and the southern matter 
and disagreements on tactics did not gather momentum. 
Soviet and Iraq both realized each other's need for 
implenentation and success of their long range policies. 
Soviet Union was patron of third world countries, 
specially non-aligned, and Iraq was one of non-aligned 
countries. By 1987, Iraq was the most strong recepient of 
military equipment supplies. Quantitatively speaking West 
26. Snolansky Oles, U.S.S.R. and Iraq - The Soviet Quest 
for Influence, Duke University Press, London, 1991, 
p. 274. 
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Asia is the largest importer of the third world's arms 
according to WHEAT 1988, West Asia imported 37.7 per cent of 
the total supply of the world. Iraq and Saudi Arabia were 
the largest importer of world arms supply by the U.S.S.R 
while Syria and Egypt occupied 4rth and 7th position 
>-• 1 27 respectively. 
Respectively, geographical location of both countries 
in the Persian gulf, proximity and regional significance of 
Iraq and eventual involvement of super powers had maximized 
the intensity of violence. The U.S.S.R. Consistently 
apposed this war (Iran, Iraq - 1980) and maintained a 
balanced position. Soviet insistence on Iran Iraq according 
to different timings, was only to the pursuit of its 
interest. 
What U.S.S.R and Baghdad had in common was their 
opposition of U.S.A. as both were anti imperialist and anti-
colonial . 
On its side Iraq during the later stage of war, Iraq 
tried to change U.S.S.R postures towards war by convincing 
wherever necessary to maintain a strong co-operation with 
29 Iraq, despite of some minor differences. 
27. Alam Saeed towards Persian Gulf,Causev;ay Publishing 
House, New Delhi 1993, p. 45. (Figure No.I has to be 
seen Bar Diagram). 
28. Snolansky Oles.,... op. cit., p. 274. 
29. Snolansky Oles., ... op. cit., p. 278. 
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President Saddam Hussain set out his country's 
approach to matters connected with Iran-Iraq conflict, 
Mr. Groraykev emphasised immediate political settlement of 
the dispute. The sides (Iran-Iraq) expressed that Soviet-
Iraqi harnony would prove beneficial for the people of the 
30 both the countries. 
Termination of war on August 20, 1988 is a hall mark 
in the orbit of Gulf countries. War terminated as U.N. 
declared withdrawal of troops from Iran and Iraq from the 
disputed region. 
For Gorbacheve it was one of manifestations of new 
world order initiated by him in post cold war era. It was a 
pragmatic step towards peace in West Asia. 
30. Asian Recorder, Vol. XXXII, 1986, p. 18712. 
CHAPTER - IV 
GULF WAR 1991, AND THE U.S.S.R. 
CHAPTER - IV 
GULF WAR 1991 AND THE U.S.S.R. 
Iraqi Aggression on Kuwait, War with U.S.A. and impact on Iraq 
A. Kuwait Iraq Relations, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. : 
The post cold war era brought a peaceful and 
congenial atmosphere in the world politics, but certain 
chronic disputes remained with their sparks which kept a 
fresh superpowers' interests, counter weight and rivalry. 
West Asia the most volatile area for external powers failed 
in giving any sign of absolute peace and absence of super-
powers' interest in this region. Iran-Iraq war, the tragic 
eight years had stirred the Gulf region, politically, 
economically, militarily and strategically. The period of 
1988 to March 1990 passed hardly without any stunning events. 
Since August 1990, again entire West Asian political scenario 
underwent a massive change. This unforeseen change left its 
impact not only on the Gulf region and West Asia but almost 
on Europe and Asia. During Iran-Iraq war U.S.A. had 
intervened in West Asia. It had developed a taste of 
military action in the Gulf region but that was a period of 
cold war and U.S.S.R. was a strong rival which could always 
stand viably to deter U.S. moves, this hindered hege-onic 
exploitation of this region. Post cold war period has been a 
FJI^NO/i/ 
80 
LRA6 KUWfWV CONFLlCTaflL RBFLECrfONS' 
o u • 
AJ C ^ 
a , eo • 
c 
01 
• a Br-t 
CM 
0) 
O 
M O 
"* o 
_ w c 
r^ w oj 
eoQ 
- c 
" - O O 
IL m 
Iraqi Assault Operations, 2 August SO BAQHOAD 
KARSAU 
IRAQ 
IRAN 
HEAVY BOMBARDMENT 
BY ALUED AIRCRAFT • 
SAublARABIA 
BLOWN UP BY U.S. TO STOP 
SPILLING OF OIL 
RIYADHrv,'.-\',''-<;v.,.N,'-.*. . ' . > • . 
OHWMMl I 
BAHRAIN 
vsx. 
• ; • . ^ ' • • • ! ; ' • : i 
ATTACK: b / A L L U D 
/UKCKAFT 
81 
period of tension reduction anong supe-powers and big-
powers. To bring such an atmosphere Gorbachev had played a 
key role but some of his innovated policies became fatal to 
himself and to the structure of the country too. Soviet 
cooperative hand with America, brought gradual dissolution of 
almighty superpower. Consequently American feet got a 
permanent strong hold in West Asia, specially after the 
invasion of Iraq on Kuwait. 
Iraq and Kuwait two oil rich countries of West Asia 
has been keeping some disputed for oilfields and two islands 
since the very disintegration of Ottoman Empire. Iraq has a 
historical enmity against Kuwait which was once a part of 
Ottoman empire's Government of Basra. 
In 1932 General Nuri Said, the then prime minister of 
Iraq, sent a note to British political agent, acknowledging 
the line that was proposed by Sheikh of Kuwait from the 
frontier, between two countries. Sheikh of Kuwait accepted 
General Nuri's affirmation of defined in earlier 
2 
correspondence between two countries in 1920 and 1932. 
Though Iran-Iraq war brought near, Iraq and Arab 
States (Saudi Arab, Qatar, Bahrain etc.)of Arabian peninsula, 
Iraq was considered at least since the overthrow of monarchy 
1. The Times of India. August 8, 1990. 
2. ^adduri Majir, The Socialist Iraq Since 1968, Middle 
East Institute Publication Washingtin, 1978, p. 153. 
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In 1958, as a political threat by these oil rich conservative 
3 
regLmes. 
In an agreement islands of Warba and Bubyan were to 
be annexed within the Kuwait border. After the world War II, 
problem of delimitation emerged by Kuwait in 1951 and Iraq 
was ready to do it on the condition, if the islands of Warba 
and Bubyan were included in the Iraqi territory which was 
necessary to newly built port on Iraqi's sea board accross 
from the Warba. Kuwait was not ready for any modification 
infrontier. In 1954, Iraq chalked out a plan to provide 
water fron 'Shattal Arab' to Kuwait. Iraq felt keenly the 
need for a support that could enable her military fleet to 
move out freely into the sea, for this strategic purpose 
"Iraq put forth claim to modify her frontiers with Kuwait not 
only to have a free access to the Gulf but also to able to 
defend her narrow coastline and to play her role as Gulf 
States." 
In spite of recognizing Kuwait in 1963 Iraq did not 
give up its territorial claims. In 1969, situation took a 
new turn and Iraq sought for stationing its troops in Kuwaiti 
territory to protect Umme Qaser. Kuwait was hesitant to 
allow it but mutual conversation among foreign ministers and 
defence ninisters of both the countries, referred an 
unwritten and it was sufficient as a green eight for Iraq. 
3. Link, August 26, 1990, Vol. 33, No.3, p.5. 
Warba and Bubyan - two controversial Islands between 
Iraq and Kuwait. 
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Iraq kept her force in Kuwait which resulted into border 
. . 4 
crisis. 
Iraq was ready to discuss frontier problem on the 
basis of previous documents to serve not only Iraqi Kuwaiti 
interest but also who Arab World. It was Ba'ath Party's 
commitment which was rejected by Kuwaities in reply on May 5, 
1973. There were different attempts to negotiate tine and 
again in which Iraqi leaders insisted to accspt defects to 
frontiers if islands of Warba and Eubyan were included in 
Iraq or leased to her. 
These islands are not smaller parts of Kuwait but 
cover a quarter of Kuwaiti frontier. For commercial purposes, 
Kuwait was ready to offer possible aids but many Kuwaitis 
were suspicious of Iraqi motives. In July 1977 Iraq became 
ready to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. 
After providing Iraq with large scale financial 
assistance during Iran-Iraq war 1980, up to a total sua of 5 
billion dollars in early stages of war, Kuwait's direct 
involvement to sell 125000 billion dollars crude oil on 
behalf of Iraq - shortened. It had already refused to 
station military of Iraq on northern islands Warba and 
Bubyan. They had become more significantly politically and 
4. Khadduri Majid, Socialist Iraq since 1968, Middle 
Cast Institute PiiBlication, Washington, 1978, p.154. 
5. Ibid., p. 157. 
6. Chanchreek, L.K. ; The Gulf War- a global crisis, 
causes future and ETfect, H.K. Publishers, New Delhi, 
r59i, p. 242. 
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strategically after the capture of Iran over Fao. policy 
of neutrality of Kuwait during the war 1980 underwent tight 
strains when Iran started to hit Kuwait - attacking with 
missiles on oil loading Kuwaiti facilities at sea. 
Iraq had been putting, pressures on Kuwait since 
then, on two counts - readjustment of frontiers so as to 
acquire the oil bearing area in Kuwait that forns an 
extension of the 'Al Rumaila' Oil Field of Iraq. 
Secondly an annexation of long term islands of Bubyan 
and Warba on border of Kuwait and Iraq. With these demands 
two new demands were added. 
1. Kuwait should pay compensation not only for the oil 
drawn by it from the disputed territory but also for a loss 
of due to the lowering of world oil price because of 
o 
production of oil by Kuwait and U.A.E. 
2. Secondly Kuwait must be .one of its states because of 
their proximity, and unity during Ottoman eraT The first 
signal of the coming crisis in the Gulf reflected Amman on 
February 24, 1990, at the first annivarsary meeting of Arab 
cooperation council in which Husani Mubarak showed somewhat 
anger on Saddam Hussain's bitter criticism of U.S.A. for its 
Chanchreek, L.K., the Gulf V>Jar. A Global Crisis 
Causes and Future and Effect, H.K. Publishers 1991, 
New Delhi, p. 242. 
Al Rumaila Oil field is situated near Basra, Iraq -
caused 1991 Gulf war. "^  ~~ 
8. Link, August 26, 1990, Vol. 33, No.3, p.p. 5-6. 
* Iran and Kuwait were i^nitiated during Ottoman era that is vvhy 
Iraq wanted Kuwait as its nineteenth state. 
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accelerating exploitation and futuristic plan to enjoy 
unusual freedom in West Asia due to declining influence of 
the Soviet Union. Saddam Hussain in his February speech 
accused of U.S.A. supporting Soviet Jews and soviets' 
flexible attitude towards the Jews. On July 17, 1990 in his 
revolution day speech Saddam Hussain lashed out imperialism 
and imperialists. He implied that Kuwait and - U.A.E. are 
the tools of imperialist. Iraq sent a letter to Arab League 
stipulating by complaints against Kuwaits that it had gone 
far ahead in their production of oil and stealing oil from 
Iraqi oil fields. 
Iraq accused of stealing 24 billion in petroleua from 
Al-Rumaila oil field alongwith their disputed border and 
insisted that Kuwait should settle long pending territorial 
disputes of Warba and 3ubyan. Kuwait's officials suggested 
mutually that their cash rich country might be able to 
compensate debt and finance but they determined that their 
could be no compromise on Territorial integrity. 
After two weeks of threatening Kuwait, President 
Saddam Hussain moved with intensity and machine like 
efficiency. He ordered more than 1001,000 tropps and hundred 
tanks to attack within few hours controlled the country and 
9. Ridgeway James, March to War, Fourwalls eight windows 
Publication, New York, 1991, p.p.25-26. 
10. Ibid., p.p. 29-30. 
11. Facts on file - Vol. 50, No. 2593, World News Digest, 
August 3, 1990, p.p. 565, 566. 
86 
Sheikh Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, fled away from Saudi Arabia. 
President Bush of U.S.A. announced forced' invasion and 
ordered economic sanctions against Iraq (Passed by the 
12 Congress). 
On the other hand Iraq said that it has responded to 
a call for help from young Kuwaiti revolutionaries who had 
overthrown the Sabah family, whom it declared as "traitor 
and agents of Zionist and foreign schemes." Sheikh Sabah's 
inclination towards western powers were entirely against Arab 
nationalism and president Saddam Hussain strongly opposed 
I t ." 
President Saddam Hussain, inspired by Jamal Abdun 
Nasser's pan- Arabism, in August 1990 marched into Kuwait 
and carried the banner of Arab mass conquerors, of old 
imbibing. The Arab mass with new pride. It was his 'Jehad 
14 in Kuwait to bring a new autocratic society'. 
In view of President Saddam Hussain, aggression on 
Kuwait was a holy war to be fought against imperialism. He 
spoke out, "Arabs" ! It is your Iraq it is cradle of right 
to sniff out drakness. Keep away the foreign army your holy 
shrine. Revolt against oppression and treachery. Your 
12. U.S. Department_of State Bulletin, Congress Quarterly 
ALMANAC, Vol. XIVI, 1990, 10th Congress, Ilnd Session 
p. 725. 
13. Facts on File, Vol. 50, No. 2593, August, 1990, 
p.p. i>66-b/. 
14. Ridgeway James,... op. cit., p.p. 27-30. 
87 
brothers in Iraq are ready got Jehad and without any hesita-
tion and fear from foreign powers. The policies initiated 
under the President Regan and continued by Presider.e Bush 
had geographical motivation to maintain Iraq as ccunter-
weight to the anti-American government and to wean aws^ ' Iraq 
from the influence of the U.S.S.R. Having suffered fron 
reverses in war time with Iran and having been cut off arms 
supply fro- the U.S.S.R. - Iraq moved towards U.S.A. (not 
ideologically and radically but purposely). Subsequently 
U.S.A. responded positively and Iraqi - U.S. relations grew 
with commerce and trade normal, since 1982 to early 1990. 
However in early 1990 (March) Iraqi criticism of U.S.A. 
enbittered the relations of U.S. and Iraq. Despite of 
dealing with Tehran, Moscow maintained its primary conmit-
ment to Iraq and indicated willingness to consider U.K. arms 
embargo against Iran - during 1980 war. After ceasefire in 
1988 Soviet - Iraq relations were normal and cordial- The 
leaders of both countries celebrated annivarsary of friend-
ship treaty before and after ceasefire 1988. It had been 
major source of sophisticated weapons and supplier of 
military goods. Over all its position and actions favoured 
15. The New York Times International, August 11, 1990, 
p.o, uol. i. • 
16. Congressional Quarterly, Vol. XIVI, 191 at congress 
llnd Session 1990, Washington, p. 717. 
17. Ibid., p. 722. 
88 
Iraq. During that time Iraq was neutral but President 
Hussain's harsh moves towards Kuwait and Criticism of U.S.A. 
manifested U.S. anger in 1990. 
In November 1990 President Bush used a strategic 
tool of 'Operation Desert Shield' on the other hand Michael 
Gorbachev^ opendoor policy for American proved to be a boon 
for U.S. hegemonic designs and U.S. definitely felt pleasure 
at the liquition of Soviet might. Now Moscow was no longer a 
source of expansionist threat. However, Iraqi nove towards 
Kuwaits S(i;itched on a mixed reaction of international 
community. Interestingly, many steps were supported by the 
U.S.S.R, which were taken against Iraq, though it was an old 
18 
client. The European community (E.G.) imposed a boycott 
on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil and prohibited the sale of ar:ns to 
those countries. Accordingly to resolution (661) The U.N. 
Security Council voted to prohibit the U.N. members from 
19 importing or exporting either Iraq or kuwaiti products. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Community, 
strongly condemned Iraqi mission on Kuwait. Reaction of Arab 
World was lukewarm. Except Kuwait all the West Asian 
countries suggested a diplomatic political solution without 
18. Year Book International communist Affairs, 1988. 
However Institute Press, Stanford University, 
California, 1988, p. 347. 
19. Congress Quarterly, 1990,... op. cit., p. 719. 
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20 
any foreign intervention. But, ultimately they also parti-
cipated in coalition force led by U.S.A. 
President George Bush addressed on 18th August 1990 
his decision to send military force to Saudi Arabia against 
Iraq . "immediately after Iraqi invasion, I ordered an 
enbargo of all trade with Iraq and many other nations 
announced sanctions. Additionally U.N.O., G.C.G. and Arab 
Leage courageously announced its opposition to Iraqi 
aggression. The Soviet Union and China ended arns sale. I 
pledge here today that U.S. will do its parts to see that 
these sanctions are effective and to induce Iraq to withdraw 
its troops from Kuwait. As I have witnessed throughout my 
life in both war and peace, American has never wavered when 
21 her purpose is driven by principles". 
This was the time when U.S.A. and (one time close 
frined of Iraq) U.S.S.R. stood together against Iraq, Moscow 
joined U.S.A. in urging a worldwide halt of arms deliveries 
to Iraq after what they called "Brutal and illegal invasion 
22 
on Kuwait". U.S. and Soviet as allies - its first time 
23 
since 1945, after world war II virtually acted as allies. 
20. Facts on File, Vol. 50, No. 2593,... op. cit., p.567. 
21. Congressional Quarterly 1990, ... op. cit., p. 726. 
22. The New York Tines, August 4, 1990, p.6, Col.l. 
23. The New York Ti-es, August 8, 1990, p.l., Col. 1. 
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The U.S.S.R has so far gone alongwith the U.S. led inter-
national consensus against Iraq, formerly a closed Soviet 
ally. Moscow had suspended arms shipments to Iraq, insisted 
on unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and backed U.N. 
trade embargo against Iraq. 
Gorbachev and Bush found a slight difference in Gulf 
situation to be divergent in views. Two superpoweers 
maintained close contacts negotiations and dialogue for the 
first time so intimately, which established a hall mark in 
West Asian superpowers rilvary scenario. Significantly, it 
manifested a stand of entirely changed superpower relation-
ship.^^ 
President Bush and Gorbachev held a joint press 
conference at Helsinkis' Finlandia Hall, on September 9, 
1990, to bring out a peaceful solution George Bush justified 
presence of force to prevent Iraqi aggrandisement in the 
region. Gorbachev wanted that war in the region could drag 
superpowers in an unpredictable stage. It was a dramatic 
symbol of post cold war solidarity that the two countries 
offered their support for Security Council Resolutions - 660, 
661, 662, 664 and 665 and spelled out their demands - Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of Kuwaiti government and 
release of all hostages. It does not mean that Soviet 
24^ Facts on file. Vol. 50, No. 2598, September 7. 1990, 
pTU^. 
25. Newsweek, Vol. XVI, No.12, Sept. 17, 1990, p.9. 
26. Facts on File, Vol. 50, No.2599, Sept. 14, 1990,p.683 
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Leader Gorbachev was compelled to accept all of President Bush 
initiatives of policies. The Soviet Leader innovated his own 
distinct policies during circumstances of the country. The 
Soviet Union enunciated its West Asian forein policy postu-
lates which supported U.S. moves. It was for the first time 
in history of international relations that two superpowers did 
not move in divergent directions. In Helsinki conference by 
and large both countries established some humanitarian aspects 
27 
and see::ed to be condemning Iraq. 
For the radical Arab countries Gorbachev's fault par 
excellence was that he had allowed the massive exodus of 
Soviet Jews to Israel at that crucial juncture. Freedom of 
emigration was the inevitable consequences of full acceptance 
of the Helsinki agreement, wich was an inherent part of 
Gorbachev's new thinking. This was most desirable boon for 
the Jews. Additionally, relations with Israel improved with 
an exchange of consuls and members of visits of Israeli Prime 
Minister to Moscow. Skilfully Israelis exploited the opportu-
nity of the time and capitalized the presence of Jewish 
communities in all soviet republics to open business trade and 
cultural deal and goodwill generally, naturally this relation 
28 proved to be setback for Iraq from the Soviet side. 
Had Gulf War errupted some years earlier, Moscow and 
Washington would have been found on the road of conflict and 
27. The Middle East International, Set. 28, 1990, p.14. 
28. Middle East International, 27th Sept., 1991, p. 18. 
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confrontations "The Showdown between Iraq a key soviet client 
and Soviet Arab a vital friend of America could have e-broiled 
the superpowers in the king of regional upheavel that can 
29 
escalate a wider Gulf." 
Soviet foreign minister, accused Saddam Hussain of, 
breaking rules of entire international community and violation 
of international law. Republics of the Soviet Union had 
somewhat differences among then. Moscow Parliament called for 
immediate suspension of the friendship treaty while Baltic 
30 states were reluctant to do so. 
In early stage of crisis during August 1990, Soviet 
foreign minister agreed to support U.N. economic sanctions 
against Iraq but stressed also Soviets aversive aood to 
31 American gunboat diplomay. 
President Bush acknowledged at the concluding press 
conference that U.S.A. had differences to use military force 
against Iraq, if it refused to accept U.N. demands. '^Ihile 
Gorbachev stressed the need of immediate political settlement. 
He said that there was no plan to send soviet troops to 
32 
enforce U.N. sanctions. 
29. Newsweek, Vol. CXV, No.12, September 17, 1990, p.9. 
30. Middle East International, Sept. 17th, 1990, p. 16. 
31. Newsweek, September 17, 1990, p.11. 
32. Keesings Contemporary World Records, Vol. 36. No.9, 
Sept. 1990, p. 37696. 
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5 Role of the Soviet Union: 
Keeping in view, this sort of thinking, the Soviet 
Union (having internal crisis and differences anong republics) 
generally carried out its own policies in the light of 
American moves towards Asia. In 1973 war 'Israel Arab) 
U.S.S.R. had stood with U.S.A. to resolve the crisis within 
the U.N.O. framework. But at the same time U.S.S.R. supported 
West Asia whole heartedly by military means but at that time 
nature of conflicts and superpowers relations were entirely 
different from post cold war era. Soviet American antagonism 
was augmented by the signing Camp David Agreemer.c in 1978 and 
more than this arrival of Reagan with all anti-Soviet 
policies. Ironically, Gorbachevian policies were meant for 
peace and amicability but unknowingly and unostensibly it, 
diluted gradually Soviet stronghold in all the regions. 
Thus slow disappearance of superpowers rivalry 
brought U.S.S.R. in a position of submission, and internal 
economic and political disasters were already existing there, 
consequently, these incidences made the U.S.S.R. very 
fragile. 
Soviet leader Gorbachev, sought U.S. economic aid 
because of country's internal circumstances and it was 
necessary to cooperate with U.S.A. On the other hand U.S.S.R. 
had a soft corner for Iraq. Naturally it was not easy to stand 
strongly against it. Gorbachev tried to be faithful, as a 
leader towards his country (U.S.S.R.) and si-nultaneously 
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friendly, with Iraq but unfortunately, circumstances made all 
33 
efforts futile. 
Soviet Izvestia commentator said "For the Soviet 
Union it would be a little premature to go against with 
•dominant opinion', in the Arab countries and enter too direct 
34 
an alliance with America". 
Foreign Minister of Soviet Union Eduvard Shevarnadze 
in U.N. General Assembly strongly condemned Iraq. He was 
(later on) ready to suggest use for force against Iraq if 
necessary, while Gorbachev consistently supported peaceful 
35 
resolution which was much stronger than a desire of fight. 
"As U.S. - Iraqi tension escalated, Shevardnadze the foreign 
minister of the Soviet Union resigned from the ministry. In 
his resignation speech, he warned of dictatorship and 
complained about incessant criticism of his Gulf policy from 
rightwing elements in the Soviet government." These confron-
tations brought a tough time for Gorbachev. Shevardnadze's 
resignation was a shock for him in those critical circums-
tances. Moreover, parliament demanded termination of soviet 
33. Newsweek, Sept. 17, 1990, Vol. GXVI, p.5. 
34. The New York Times, August 8, 1990, p.8, Col. 5. 
35. Keesings Contemporary World Record, VI. 36, No. 9, 
Sept., 1990, p. 3/byb. [ 
36. Problem of communism, July/August 1991, p. 12. 
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Friendship Treaty with Iraq. Lastly there was no remedy to be 
a mediator only. Soviet foreign ministry appeared to be 
undermining and denigrating equally. In truth, it is crystal 
clear that President Gorbachev failed to chalk out 
adequate policy to convince U.S.A. not to use force against 
it. The rift between foreign minister and the president over-
shadowed the Soviet politics and deterred an independent, 
vital, non hesitant and strongly designed foreign policy of a 
superpower ,.which had started to sink with all its character-
istics and powers. L'ntimingly, it was a situation of dilemma 
for the Soviets when they had to maintain very balanced 
situation neither to be furious to its key client nor 
damaging any international behaviour. In fact the Soviet 
Union was not in a position to be arrogant rival of U.S.A. on 
the other it had never liked to loose its proximity with West 
Asia, specifically with Iraq with whom a friendship treaty 
had been signed and certain values were enshrined stated 
therein. Representative of the U.S.S.R.^ in U.N.O. stated, "It 
is difficult and saddening for the U.S.S.R. to describe in 
this way the recent acts by Iraq a country to which we are 
tied through long standing friendly relations but we can't 
37 
assume a position of silence against our conscience." 
37. Soviet U.N.O. representatives' letter for foreign 
"affairs minister and Gen.Secretary in U.N.Q., August 
"5, 1990, 45th Session of U.N.O. Security Council 1990, 
p. 1,2. 
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Strategically, George Bush got an opprtunity for the 
pursuit of hegemony and dominance in West Asia region. There 
was a gross economic loss but U.S. foreign policy to protect 
her interest started with military intervention and then 
gradual establishment of force and all in all presence 
started. Apparently, U.S. emerged as a well wisher of Kuwait. 
U.S. moves, to get recored peace and stability and protection 
from Saddam Hussain of Saudi Arab and Kuwait, kept its oil 
interest lurked in this diplomacy. America had not forgotten 
1973 crisis, thus by this time it was a matter of joy for 
U.S.A. that including Egypt mostly West Asian countries had 
condemned Iraq and were participants of coalition force on 
Saudi ground with U.S.A. There was no alternative except to 
mingle with coalition force. Honestly, U.S.S.R. was unable to 
take any strong decision because of her own internal troubles 
and constraints neither it could send its troops due to 
economic crisis and enotional sympathy (hidden) for Iraq, nor 
express its attitude against U.S.A. By that tine Soviets had 
strengthened relations with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia also. 
President Saddam Hussain's under estimation for U.S. proved 
fatal to it. He knew that few dozen of hostages had paralysed 
America and brought disaster. A much thornier question might 
be whether the U.S. was prepared for the enormous geo-
38 political fall out attacking on Iraq. 
38. U.S. News and World Report, August 27, Septe-ber 13, 
•1990: 
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After weeks of comparing President Hussain with Adolf 
Hitler and suggesting that the Irasqi dictator is a threat to 
America's way of life', George Bush finally came face to face 
with the cost of eliminating America's new arch enemy. The 
American strategy was to leave President Saddao Hussain with 
no option except withdrawal from Kuwait. George Bush antici-
pated a containment against Saddam Hussain by using the whole 
39 
international community. 
Saddam Hussain threatened to scorch half of Israel 
with che-ical weapons if he was attacked. This time there was 
profoundly different situation than there had been ever of six 
day war or October war in 1967 and 1973 respectively. This 
time Soviet Israely relations had already became normal. 
Cairo and Damascus were aligned with U.S.A. and one of the 
brother country was surrounded by its own neighbours except 
40 P.L.O. and Jordan. 
The American oil interest in the Persian Gulf was not 
of recent origin. The main objective was to explore resources 
of other countries first, and keep the oil resources within 
the U.S. intact, as long as it was economically and strategi-
cally viable. 
39. U.S. News and World Report, September 10th, 1990, 
p.p. 26-27. 
40. U.S. News and World Report, September 17, 1990, p.36. 
41. Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIV, No.2, May 1991, IDSA, 
p.202. '' 
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Soviet Union seemed to have exchanged its direct 
support to U.S. war efforts for Washington restraints on 
Naltic issues."^^ 
Since the Gulf war broke out George Bush repeatedly 
suggested the new world order - and he introduced it on 
January 24, 1991 - where diverse nations are drawn together in 
a common cause to achieve the universal aspiration of mankind, 
peace security, freedom and rule of law. 
The U.S. challenges and Iraqi obstinacy led to a war 
that was full scale war in West Asian region. further 
negotiations stopped. On 29th November, the U.N. Security 
Council convened and adopted a resolution No. 678 drafted by 
U.S.A. which referred to its previous resolutions, regarding 
Iraqi occupation on Kuwait. 'Operation desert storm' in 
pursuance of liberation of Kuwait demanded by U.N. resolution, 
commenced on 16/17 January 1991. Aim of first phase of 
'operation desert storm' was to gain air superiority and 
supermacy and multinational forces overcanie to it on January 
30, 1991.'^^  
The most serious response to coalition forces from 
Iraq was attack with Scud missiles on Israel on February 15, 
1991. Soviet diplomacy sought to pursuade Iraq to withdraw 
42. Ibid. , p. 212. 
43. Mainstream, Vol. XXX, No.6, Nov. 30, 1991, p.5. 
44. Regional Survey of the World, the Middle East and 
North Africa, 38th edition, 1990, Europa Publication 
England, 1991, p. 494. 
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unconditionally from Kuwait. On February 21, 1991 Iraq agreed 
Soviet initiated peace plan but it remained unacceptable to 
the multinational force. Later on the U.S.S.R. proposed 
another six point plan for peace and Iraq accepted also but 
multinational force again rejected it. On February 28. 1991, 
President Bush announced war to liberate Kuwait, had been won 
and declared ceasefire. Iraq had no alternative but accept 
the ceasefire. "^  Subsequently withdrawal of troops from 
Kuwait started. Through successful Gulf War U.S.A. had cer-
tainly restablished its lost influence in West Asia, whereas 
Soviet influence in consequence had been reduced to a Tiiser-
able point. The new world order had a distinct Arierican 
46 tinge. 
Administration and Pentagon appreciated steps taken 
by the President Bush, for ouster of Iraq from Kuwait. At the 
same time White House was aware that ouster of President 
Hussain raised the States of Operation Desert Storm. It also 
risked alienating the Soviet Union, which was increasingly 
cautious in its conraents on the U.S. operations in the Persian 
Gulf. On February 9, 1991 Gorbachev warned that was was 
taking on ever more alarming and dramatic turn that the U.S. 
alliance was in "danger of exceeding the mandate" of the U.N. 
Security Council resolutions which set the goals of reserving 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 
45. Ibid., p. 495. 
46. Ibid., p. 12. 
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Despite Soviet criticism Congress continued the War. Inter-
nationally, however, the level of criticism for the aerial 
bombardment increased dramatically in the wake of U.S. bomb 
attack. 
Interestingly the Soviet Union here seems to be 
critical to the U.S. escalating atrocities on Iraq. It was 
natural in view of previous Soviet relations. Though with 
Iraq the U.S.S.R. stood with U.S.A. against Iraq but it was 
not in favour of constant ruin and annihiliation of Iraq any 
more. Ironically a genuine criticism could not effect 
Congress and President Bush did not pay attention inspite of 
being a partner of U.S.S.R. this time, significantly, it was a 
policy of containment to check Arabs instead of coranunists. 
The U.S. Foreign policy experts wanted Bush administration to 
resist any sort of deal with Iraq that had some involvement of 
the Soviet Union and some shadow of Moscow as a protector of 
Iraq during the crisis. Mostly Soviet Union accepted all the 
resolutions against Iraq with in the purview of U.N. 
including authorisation of use of force against Iraq. But 
accordingly to Peter Schwetzer, a research analyst of U.S. 
foreign policy, "Soviet diplomat did this with some undesir-
ability."^^ 
47. 47th Annual Congress Quarterly, Vol. XIVII, 102nd 
Congress, 1st Session, 1^91, p. 447. 
48. The Times of India, Lucknow, February 19, 1991. 
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Generally proposals presented by Soviet Union to 
withdraw troops from Iraq, were some what light in nature and 
p!rone to Iraqi's peaceful withdrawal without any condition and 
these were accepted by Iraq, whereas U.S. and U.N.O. rejected 
and connived them. Soviet Union had to maintain its image in 
West Asia as well as in Iraq - on the other hand there was no 
remedy tc be a partner with U.S.A. Therefore, all the 
resolutions passed by U.N.O. willingly or unwillingly were 
admitted by Moscow. America all the time dominated the 
U.S.S.R. and misused the U.N.O. and decisions were taken with 
coloured glasses by the U.N. Security Council (which was 
supposed to be impartial just, and honest international 
organisation-during any crisis). 
The complexities of the international alliance 
arrayed against Iraq, were under scored by dra-a of Moscow's 
attempt during the week of February 18, 1991. Nonetheless 
Soviet drafted proposals, omitted some conditions from earlier 
offers including linkage of withdrawal to discuss the fate of 
the Palestinians - that the administration had viewed as 
particularly objectionable. Many lawmakers viewed the Soviet 
Iraqi discussions with suspicion, fearing that they would lead 
to a compromise that would allow Saddam Hussain to rebuild his 
military machinery strong after the war. Pennsyluvania 
Republican Representative Don Utter stated "There cannot be 
peace while Saddam Hussain remains in power and any proposal, 
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that is made by Soviets that keep their client in power of 
49 peace in West Asia. 
Krenlin v;as taking advantage of its opportunities with 
frequent diplomatic activities over the past week - visits of 
Tariq Aziz to Moscow. Edraound Sullivan editor of the 'Asian 
Digest' in London wrote - "The Soviet Union jiay have achieved 
more since Iraqi's invasion of Kuwait than it secured in the 
region at great extent in the previous four decades." 
There was growing concern in the Western capitals that 
Soviet Union night fae drifting away fron the coalition. 
Frequent, reluctance towards the coalition of the soviet 
Union, brought a sense of lurking fear among western countries 
that the Soviet Union might stand seperate drawing its 
presence. 
However with the end of dramatic of the cold war, the 
world community found a new chance to design a collective and 
international security policy. This opportunity, to contrive 
a security policy, helped international community to 
understand the nature of Gulf war into two ways. 
49. Congress Quarterly 102, Congress, Ilnd Session, Vol. 
Xi;Ii, 1991, p. 448. 
50. The Tines of India, Lucknow, 20th February, 1991. 
51. The Tines of India, Lucknow, February 18, 1991. 
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1. It put the international response to Iraqi's invasion 
of Kuwait in a context that applies to any serious 
breach of international law. 
2. It maped out a non war strategy 'punitive deterence', 
for resolving Gulf crisis the strategy looked like -
A. The embargo against Iraq continued backed up by 
52 
multinational force. 
B. U.S. er.erged as the only superpower in a uni-
polar world. 
One of the central characteristic of Soviet foreign 
policy in era of Michael Gorbachev was its dedication 
to the concept of 'new thinking'. There are five 
major principles of new soviet thinking that seemed to 
apply the Third world in general, and West asia in 
particular. 
1. Human survival should take precedence over 
interests of states, classes and ideologies, 
danger of nuclear war impelled it out. 
2. There is a need to abandon certain concepts 
"sphere of influence" and "vital interest" which 
were used during the cold war. 
3. A new concepts should be at the water material 
relations - 'The balance of interest' which would 
52. Dissent, Winter, 1991, p.5. 
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take into account the legitimate interest of the 
U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. or any other country. 
4. Primary reliance should be placed on political 
means for resolving regional conflicts using the 
U.N.O. if at all possible. 
5. There is an organic connection between regional 
conflicts and confrontation between superpowers. 
Hence there is need of joint action by the super-
powers to settle the most serious regional 
53 
conflicts specially in West asia. 
The question of Moscow emerged whether to continue the 
policy of inproving ties with G.C.C.many of whom had money 
that could be loaned for the U.S.S.R. or to give then up. 
Moreover by backing Saudi, Syrian and Egyptian Axis, 
U.S.A. see-ed doninating, the Arab World in near future of 
Iraq was defeated. A related consideration for Moscow was the 
status of Kuwait with which Soviet Union had established 
diplomatic relations in 1964 and to with whom it also had 
solid nilitary agreement. Soviet Kuwait relations had 
created new phenomenon in superpower-Gulf countries relations 
and U.S.S.R. had to -naintain such position in the eyes of Iraq 
and Kuwait in which its image might not distort. Conversly an 
action soviet policy aimed at getting out Iraq from Kuwait 
might will be rewarded by saudis to restablish Saudi soviet 
relations. •'•' 
53. Ibid., p. 4. 
54. Ibid.5 p. 4. 
55. Ibid., p.5. 
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Some Soviet specialist on West asia argued that Iraq 
might emerge from confrontation with enhanced prestige in 
Arab World due to its linkage in its actions in Kuwait to the 
Palestinian cause it was not in the interest of Moscow to 
oppose Iraq and antagonise Iraq for several reasons. Three 
additional factors premeated Soviet thinking about how to 
react to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
1. Afghanistan syndrome - shared by liberals and hardL 
liners. 
2. Economic crisis, that was gripping the U.S.S.R., 
blurred the chances to send military and bear its 
expenses. 
3. Muslim issue - fear of negative reaction from Central 
Asian republics because Kuwait and Iraq both were 
Muslim countries. 
Moscow continued to emphasis on political settlement 
of the Gulf crisis and U.S. invited the U.S.S.R. to parti-
cipate in the multinational force in Saudi Arab, U.S. policy 
in West Asia had been to keep the U.S.S.R. Out of the 
region. Soviet actions in war reflected diplomatically 
netural, that brought a new policy with limited military 
assistance to Iraq. Looking West World soviet Union tried its 
56. Ibid., p.p. 5,6. 
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best to sustain Marxist - Leninist legacy, to preserve its 
socialist values. Loosening its own original tactics and 
strategies used by £or:ier Soviet Leaders, Gorbachev could 
not tackle the growing distressful circumstances of the 
country. 
Moscow was at crossroad having to choose between its 
old confrontational policies and its new cooperative 
58 postures. In reality there was no choice left for hin. 
The U.S.S.R. was suprenely interested in preserving to stable 
relationships with the states and people on its southern 
borders. Moreover Soviet Union's efforts to mediate in the 
context of Soviet President Gorbachev's ambitions to win for 
U.S.S.R.'s permanent space in the common European home and a 
reputed player on the World diplomatic stage. Despite of its 
deformed image the U.S.S.R., as an exemplar of communist 
59 ideals still sought to maintain its traditional position. 
While Soviet foreign policy reflected neutrality in 
its military policy, was of low level assistance to Baghdad. 
Moscow was said to have prior knowledge of the invasion on 
Kuwait. Unsubstantiated reports said that Soviet Union 
continued its arms shipments untill war began. It was a 
57. Waston W. Bruce. The Military Sessions for the Gulf-
War Lancers International, New Delhi, lyyi, p.D^.. 
58. Ibid., p.55. 
59. The Bulletin of the Progranme C3f Arms Control Pis-
"ar-.ament, vol.2, No. 3, Spring 1991, p.p. 6-/. 
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military policy in transaction. Intense Soviet - A .iierican 
military stand off, gone off that had characterized so many 
crisis m the past. 
Soviet Policy During The Gulf War: 
In view of Robert Q Freedraan The Soviet foreign 
policy analyst - said "At Key juncture it coo-operated with 
the L'.S.S.R but it also tried to mediate the conflict and 
preserved its position in Iraq. While Iraq responded to the 
allied attack by bombording Israel, The soviet Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was worried about the implications of an 
expanded war". 
President Gorbachev moved to assert a post war 
policy in West Asia. He criticized Iraq for both threatening 
the use of weapons of mass destruction and trying to draw 
Israel into crisis U.S.S.R. called upon President Sadam 
Hussain to "Display realism which would make it possible to 
take path of reliable and just peaceful settlement." 
Moscow strongly supported U.S. in working out the 
storns for a stringent permanent ceasefire. Essentially 
Moscow accepted the inevitably for the rapid collapse of its 
62 
earstwhile ally. 
60. Waston W. Bruce,... op. cit., p.p. 58-59. 
61. Problem of Communism, July/August 91, Vol. XXXX, 
No.4, p.p. 12-14. 
62. Ibid., p.p. 14-16. 
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Now what could be done in reality. For Iraq it was 
a situation lonliness and its old trusted friend left it in 
the lurch. No doubt Moscow was some what hesitant to be 
standing entirely against Iraq but temptation of U.S. 
cooperation and hope for future, kept U.S.S.R. away from 
Iraq, soviet seemed prove to West and her position was that 
of only a mediator. (If there was any). Truly Iraq fought a 
all alone the massive and costly war without any sort of 
assistance from any corner of the world. This is an irony 
that Arabs also did not dare to stand with cooperative hands 
with Iraq. Moreover they took side of the superpowers. 
There were certain shortcoming from Iraqi side also. 
President Saddam Hussain's over-estimation of Soviet support 
and under estimation of U.S. coalition force were also 
responsible for his defeat. At the moment Arab World could 
not have estimated that within one year Soviet empire would 
disappear and there will prevail a vacuum of power to which 
West Asia may took any sort of assistance (in the absence of 
U.S.S.R). Subsequently they could not guess Amerian hegemony 
to that extent. 
In evaluating Soviet behaviour during the crisis 
caused by Iraqi invasion it was a mixture of Gorbachevian new 
thinking and traditional actions. The crux of new thinking 
was moscow's insistance on peaceful political settlement of 
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the crisis. Moscow's 'minimax policy' was an attempt to 
sustain traditional linkage with Iraq and to play a key role 
during the war, to be as mediator. 
In the Gulf crisis, Moscow was too closely following 
its own perceived national interests to be a genuine partner 
of U.S.A. in U.N.O. parameters. 
The effect of the Soviet behaviour on its position in 
West Asia appears mixed one, only Soviet diplomacy was avail-
able during this crisis. Moscow was too closely wanted to 
gain economics ties and friendship with Saudi Arabia and 
G.C.C. on the other hand termination of war was also in the 
interest of U.S.S.R. It might furnish the ground for 
establishment of friendship ties with Iraq as soon as war 
64 
could have got an end. 
Soviet Union for its parts saw West Asia as a region 
contiguous to its own borders and capable of posing a 
potential threat to its own security. Naturally Soviet Union 
sought to limit build up of hostile forces and establish its 
own influence directly. 
It remains a fact - "The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
about which Baghdad reported and failed to give Moscow 
advance notice despite explicit provisions in the 1972 
Soviet Iraqi Treaty requiring such notice posed a number of 
problems for Moscow." 
63. Ibid., p.p. 17-18. 
64. Ibid., p.p. 18,19 
Efrat oshe and Jacob, Superpowers and clients states 
ir. the Middle East - "the I.-rtbaiance or intluence, 
Rcutledge Publishers, New York, 1991. 
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C. Soviet Disintegration and West Asia:(Iraq) 
Zbignew Brezinsky viewed termination of ar-s race and 
strengthening of national military by frequent agreements 
reflected in Soviet foreign policy of new thinking and its 
moves towards U.S. cooperation and mutuality. 
New thinking and new trends in foreign policy and 
internal affairs to a certain extent seemed beneficial but 
the time, their failure and inapplicability and Soviet 
Crackdown hovered, the attempts to reform the Soviet empire 
led to its collapse. "It was a conjuncture of objective and 
subjective contradictions of long term accumulated weakness 
and short termed rnethods of their solutions, lihen Gorbachev 
came into power he sought radical changed in such a staunch 
community society that could have not been esti:iated to be 
disintegrated in future. Essentially there were two reasons 
of inadequacy of reforms in the Soviet Union -
1. Political economical social and organizational 
structures were so paralysed that they allow of no creative 
evolutions. Secondly pressure of capitalist world was 
comparatively much on living standards of political freedom 
than that of ar^s race which made the Soviet model in 
CO 
sustainable. In earlier stage it seemed not so much 
66. The Washington Quarterly, Vol.3, No.2, Spring 1991, 
p.i3. 
67. Seminar, May 1992, p. 18. 
68. News Statesman, Vol. 4, No.169, Dec. 1991, p.l. 
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declining but a weary and immensely powerful country. It was 
decaying econonically but politically it seened srable. 
A century of struggle brought coinmunisin to its 
predictable moment of truth. Without freer economic market, 
freer policies co:^ munist party proved unable to produce goods 
in sufficient, yet, these freedom oriented reforrs were 
certainly inconpatible with economist rule and this fact 
appeared whemenly in 1990-91. 
The Soviet economic crisis was clearly visible in 
declining growth rates, increasing security of exploitable 
resources and most important the worsening imbalance between 
military production and general production specially consumer 
goods. Dismal performance of agriculture for several 
decades was one of the reason of soviet structural collapse. 
It failed violently to fulfill good requirements and 
compelled Soviet Union to ask for $14 billion worth grain. In 
the first half of 1991 price increased up by S 191". The 
gross agriculture output for the country as a whole decreased 
by 2.3 per cent in 1990 inspite of food grain harvest. 
59. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No.5, Winter 1991/92, 
p.1667 ~~ 
70. The Econonist, January 1989, p.13. 
71. Foreign Affairs, Vol. No.5, p. 167. 
72. Mainstream Vol. XXX, No.12, January 1992, p.p.32,33. 
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Reforms in political field brought quick results and 
accordingly 'Glasnost' people ir.nediately got attracted by 
newly won freedom and liberties while in economic field it 
73 
was not forthcoming. It was a matter of great concern and 
anxiety that backbone of a country started to liquidate 
rapidly inspite of new and various reforms. In a strong 
communist economic structure, sudden democratic economi-
zation could not be successful and applicable. 
Solely, Gorbachev's new policies were not responsible 
but long term decline in economy (which could not be taken 
seriously by its leaders after Khuruschev), since Brezhnev 
period was the crux of the problem. 
Enourmous bureaucratic structure had got polluted by 
corruption earlier than Gorbachev's arrival. They 
increasingly neglected their goals of serving the civilians 
and political economic corruption encompassed it. Gorbachev 
criticized bureaucratic control. But hoplessness passivity 
and resentment among the people against the authorities, 
increased and it became very difficult to mobilize the 
people (almost whole population). 
The demand from Baltics for independence was most 
serious issue. Soviet German Pact of 1939 which brought the 
73. The Concept - an International Journal of Ideas, 
October/November, 1991, p.49. 
74. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No.5, 1991, Winter, p.168. 
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Baltics into Soviet territory, was rejected in 1989, by 
Congress of people's Deputies and declared independence in 
March 1990. Gorbachev tried to solve the problem but this 
crisis triggered off another ethnicity and nationalities. 
The Easy victory of Baltic's independence had 
strengthened the radical nationalists who disliked the 
Russians.' It was potentially the most lethal yet 
77 insoluable crisis in the system. Further nationalist 
surprising in ulcraine and Georgia and inter ethnic clashes 
between Ar:ninia and Azerbaijan over the Karavkh enclave, 
indicated that reforms were intensify and boosting up the 
ethnic nationalism. In March 1991 refrendum, Baltic states 
referred to participate, Russia and Central Asian republics 
78 backed it. Perestorika could not offer any solution. # 
One of the Gorbachev's new reforms for democrati-
zation of political system was introduced, but no significant 
political culture emerged at national level or republic level 
C.P.S.U. (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) dominated 
almost all the political system. Instead of elimination of 
party splittance there emerged three hostile groups in CPSU 
for central power. 
75. _Seninar, May 1992, p.19. 
76. The Economist. Vol. 320, No. 7122, Sept.,1991,p.^2. 
77. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No.5, p. 169, Winter 1991. 
78. Se-.inar, May 1992, p. 19. 
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1. Gorbachev and centerist 
2. Conzervatives and radical liberals. 
Cenzervatives were too traditional and wanted 
modernization without alterning any structure and repre-
sented Red Army, K.G.B. and CPSU. Radicals were too prompt 
to ask for a speady changes specially in market system. 
Gorbachev's situation was existing in dilemma standing on a 
crossroad, for him, it was difficult how to do, what to do, 
and where to do. Ultimately mismanagement of -odernization 
and traditional values proved fatal to the Soviet structure. 
After coTning to an extent of reforms and changes, Gorbachev 
moved backward. The conzervatives were seeking to maintain 
some linkage with old system for which Boris Yeltsin was 
striving tor. 
Economic hardships, political confession and ethnic 
disputes brought distorted vision before the people. The 
centre was loosing its credibility and political control and 
in these circumstances Gorbachev spelled out "Union Treaty" 
as life belt for the drowning Soviet Union. It was to give 
more independence to the Units and freedom among the people 
in all republics. This resulted in a loose control of centre 
and republics easily stood for their independence. Generally 
80 there regained zero power control over them. 
79. Ibid., p.p. 19, 20. 
80. Ibid., p. 20. 
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The unsuccessful coup of August 1991, led by 
Conservatives, brought the half of disintegration of the 
country. The coup's collapse speeded up drive to independence 
of six republics three Baltics and Moldvaia Arminia and 
Georgia (Luthiania, Estonia and Latvia) - which encouraged 
81 
other three - Ukrains, Bylorussia, and Uzbekistan. 
Conservatives accused Gorbachev of going too far and 
on 18th August 1991, they -asterminded the coup. Though it 
failed but could not :iake out Gorbachev's discredited image. 
Main Trends after the coup were adopted by several republics 
82 Baltics, Ukrains and Malvovia for independence. 
Gorbachev's fatal mistake was to delay in keeping the 
popular authorization that Yaltsin earlier suppressed 
Gorbachev. Gorbachev lost the balance in his team in Kremlin 
between the radicals and hardliners. His closest allies 
Alexander Yakolav and Shevardnadze (brains behind prestoika) 
83 had gone. 
After coup 1991, Gorbachev's former associate 
Alexander Yakolav and Eduard Shevardnadze commented -" He 
still does not understand." The situation in which the 
81. The Economist, vol. 320, No.7122, August 1991, p.2. 
82. Seminar, May 1992, p.p. 19,20. 
83. News Statesman and Society, Vol.4, No. 169, December, 
1991, p.6. 
84. Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, No.5, Winter 1991/92. 
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country has moved Salv states passed a resolution to 
establish the independent states common-wealth in Minsk. 
Naturally it was a mechanism to remove Gorbachev and 
85 Gorbachev had to resign on December 24, 1991. 
Q.S.S.R. supreme Soviet in its last setting on 
Decejber 16, 1991, dissolved itself alongwith remaining 
structure of U.S.S.R. - U.S.S.R. was decided dead, and 
commonwealth of independent states e-erged with its all 
86 
characteristics". The momentum of change led to a 
87 
systematic change. There was no renedy left except to 
this. The Soviet Union became the part of history. This was 
considered the victory for democracy and freedom and the 
West. America was not ready to take credit of its demise. 
U.S.A. recognised and welcomed the emergence of free 
independent democratic Russia led by its courageous President 
Boris Yeltsin.^^ 
The U.S. is now in a better position to exert some 
positive influence. The world has an interest ensuring 
90 
coherent command and control over Soviet weapons. 
85. Seminar, May 1992, p.2. 
86. The Times of India, December 27, 1991, p.l. 
87. Seminar, May 1992, p.22. 
89. U.S. Department of State Despatch, vol.2, No.52, 
December 30, 1991, p. 911. 
90. Ibid., p.912. 
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"As a consequence of the Soviet collapse we live in 
a world new one. We must take advantage of this new 
Russian revolution, set in motion with the defeat of August 
coup 1991, to cultivate relationships that can benefit not 
only Anierica but the entire world. For unlike Bolshevik 
revolution of 1917, this revolution of 1991 contains the 
seeds of brighter future and enduring peace. The U.S. 
definitely felt a great exhileration over this develop-ent. 
'.-Tnatever the original intentions of ' Perestroika' and 
'Glasnost' all powerful Stalinist States, started to 
disintegrate. The new civilized society was breaking out 
accross the Soviet Union. 'Perestroika' originally initiated 
for the pi,rpose of humanizing and vitalizing Marxism and 
93 Leninism, ironically, ended up producing defeat instead. 
Virtually, the U.S.S.R. moved towards peace but 
American did not, as they were waiting for its decomposition 
of their rival and subsequently sole dominance all over the 
world. 
Russia and West Asia: 
Soviet Union departed - from international political 
scene with its all paraphernalia, leaving U.S.A. as only 
superpower and its representative the commonwealth of 
91. National Review, Vol. 43, No.24, Dec. 30, 1991, p.14. 
92. Department of State Despatch, vol. 2, No.5. 
93. Ibid., p. 888. 
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Independent States (CIS). Soviet, sudden disappearance 
brought a political power vacuum. Soviet Union as an ally and 
great supporting shadow was no more for Iraq and other third 
world countries. For the West Asia it was a great setback 
specially for Iraq (inspite of recent neutral policy of the 
U.S.S.R.). 
The Soviet Union had traditionally been active 
participant in West Asia and its position as a mediator, 
during the war, had got complicated on account of its 
relations with Arab radicals. The disintegration of U.S.S.R. 
resulted into a vague structure of commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States, not able to shoulder the burden of foreign 
heritage and values of its pre-decessors. Only Russia had 
been formulating new policies, designing constitutional 
changes and framing new strategies with its efforts to 
maintain coherence with former approaches and interest in 
294 
west Asian region. 
People residing in Russia, have a strong link with 
West Asia and prospectus for growing interests in renewing 
ties with their old neighbours and friends have 
95 
broadened. Diplomatic relations were established with Israel 
and expanded in the Arab world in U.A.E., Oman, Qatar, and 
Saudia Arabia, by opening soviet (former) Russian embassies . 
This provided Moscow a better opportunity in future. 
94. The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 
IV, No.l, spring lyyz, p.p. 141, 143. 
95. Ibid., p. 145. 
96. Ibid., p. 143. 
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Fast reapproachment between republics and 
neighbouring countries brought nearer G.C.C. countries to 
close cooperation with Islamic republics which are members of 
commonwealth. A group of central Asia states, and Azerbijan 
joined with the membership of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan 
97 econor:ic cooperation organistion. 
Iran and turkey including Afghanistan can play a key 
role having some advantages and benefits with Central Asian 
republics and Transcaucasion states, because of ccnnion 
borders which connects them naturally on the ground of 
econotny, political cooperation and culture. Secondly, there 
is cool compatability on the ground of ethnicity and religion 
98 
among states. 
To maintain relations with Iraq Russia seems more 
pragnatic and is influenced at times by the U.S.A. as she 
cannot afford to antagonise U.S.A. - U.S. hegomonistic 
designes are apparently fulfilled in a unipolar world, where 
there is no rival but there is free world for arbitrationv 
Epecially U.S. atrocities on Iraq are increasing and Iraq is 
all alone to bear it. 
97. Ibid., p. 157 
98. Ibid., p.158 
CHAPTER - V 
C O N C L U S I O N 
CHAPTER - V 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Super powers involvement in the third world 
specially in West Asia, reflects the nature of relations 
between s-all powers and big ones. Their rivalry in West 
Asia highlights a different attitude, approach and incli-
nation to a particular country in different circumstances. 
Soviet - Iraq relations are viewed with in the parameters of 
superpower rivalry in early stage and co-operation in its 
last stage. The Soviet Union had made significant advance-
ments in every sector of West Asia where its increased 
presence and influence could improve its international 
position. "Soviet support to Arab nationalism, struggles 
with the remanants of western and colonial trends, its 
existing indifferences with Israel and Zionism and 
ideological influence, drew the Arab world towards it 
psychologically." 
After the World War II, the emergence of super-
powers confronting each other created hostile centres and it 
was the period of cold war. Since 1985 onwards cold-war 
started to diminish - which compelled to view the inter-
national scenario from different angle. 
1. Lenczowsky George, Soviet Advances in the Middle 
East, American Institute for Public Policy Research, 
1971, Washington, p.l. 
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Diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and Iraq 
were established in 1944 which were mostly of military and 
commercial nature specially since 1958 after general 
Kassim's arrival Soviet Union showed its keen interest. The 
departure of British involvement brought a consciousness 
among two governments to establish lasting relationship with 
each other. Baghdad's nove to accept Moscow's assistance and 
goodwill was based on requirement of powerful supporter as 
patron against imperialism and to weed out all remanants of 
western colonialism and to establish Iraq as an autonomous 
2 
member of the world order of nation states. 
Relations with Soviet Union were strained when Iraq 
joined Baghdad Pact in 1955. Establishment of Ba'ath Party 
was an encouraging factor to strengthen ideological linkage 
between relations Iraq and Soviet Union. During 1960 to 1970 
relations were by and large, excellent, politically, 
economically, militarily and morally as well as it was seen 
3 
'Patron-client' relationship. 
Second revolution of Ba'ath party in July 1968 was 
successful. It brought many pragmatic changes specially 
2. S:nolansky Oles, Betti M Smolansky, The Soviet Quest 
For Influence. USSR and Iraq, Duke University Press, 
London, 1991, p. ZbU. 
3. Ibid., p. 281. 
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nationalization of Iraqi oil companies. Being a supporter of 
Arab nationalism soviet Union stood as a shield against 
western threat to protect radical Arab states - whether it 
was Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Turkey or Iran. Iraq being one of 
them received much attention in 1970's it was the tire when 
Soviet policy got a setback due to pro-western moves of 
Anwar Sadat, subsequently whole attention diverted towards 
Iraq. 
Soviet-Iraqi treaty of 1972 was a hallmark on the 
canvass of Soviet West Asian relations and it was to be 
renewed after 15 years. Soviet interest in Kurdish problem, 
has been essentially a tactical matter. Generally Kremlin 
leaders abstained from directly supporting Kurdish insurgents 
and sought political solutions to this problems. But during 
the displeasure period they supported Kurdish insurgents. 
And this direct involvement was not liked by Iraq . 
Inspite of getting protective wall of USSR Baghdad 
never allowed I.C.P." (Iraqi Communist Party) to get much 
influence. In late seventies relations deteriorated due to 
Baghdad's atrocities Iraqi Communist Party and USSR reacted 
later on. 
* Iraqi Communist Party, 
4. Ibid., p. 283. 
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Consequently there was an infringement in relations. 
Military, political and economic Kremlin had appeared to have 
some direct influence over Iraq. Soviet quest to establish 
relations with Kuwait, was felt as 'betrayal' to Iraq. In 
the meantime in (late seventies) Soviet Union opposed Iraqi 
claim on border issue with Kuwait. In 1978 when USSR 
criticized Iraqi behaviour towards I.C.P., Saddam Hussain 
categorically stated not to tolerate any interference of its 
foe or friend. Moscow leaders had known their li-its of 
influence then. 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan during 1979, was 
strongly criticized by Iraq, subsequently, Iraq attacked on 
Iran in September 1980 without giving any prior indications 
and information to the Soviet Union. Soviet Union stopped 
military shipments to Baghdad. In the meantime, Iran could 
not prove itself a reliable state for the Soviet Union; due 
to its anti-communist moves (specially support to Afghan 
Mujahideen). Thus Soviets could not tolerate Iranian 
military equipments which were again resumed to Iraq. 
Iraq has been a customer of Soviet goods since mid-
seventies but in the meantime balance shifted sonewhat. 
Preferences were given to western market except military 
means. From 1980 to 1982 Baghdad bore a big brunt fros Soviet 
5. Ibid., p. 288. 
124 
side. Politically, Iraq was a constituent of third world 
bloc. The USSR aligned with it, due to its anti-colonial, 
anti-imperial, anti-western and non-aligned orientations. 
Many times Iraq did not loose its right to express its 
opinion, as Afghan intervention was strongly condemned. 
Arrival of Gorbachev brought an unprecedented changes 
in superpowers relations. By late 1970's and particularly by 
early 80s Soviet policy in all its dimensions had reached a 
dead end and required a major strategic modification. 
Gorbacheve's new thinking had significantly influenced the 
process of changing Soviet foreign policy. His policies 
brought out a way of co-operation, peaceful settlement and 
non-intervention. Gradually cold war came to an end. The 
post cold war phenomenon changed the attitudes, views and 
approaches of the superpowers. 
Soviet Union opposed Iraqi claim on Kuwait in August 
1990. It was more influential than Soviet opposition for the 
same claims in 1973. Moreover, Soviets had established 
relations with Kuwait and G.C.C. countries, its criticism to 
Iraq was natural. It must be having a soft corner for Iraq on 
old reliable ally but it could not exhibit its will infront of 
U.S. pressure. Soviet Union was not expected to be fragile 
internally and externally that could not take any step by its 
6. ibid., p. 290. 
7. Survival ^ J}ily_ August, 1988, Vol. 30, No. 4, ISSN 1988, 
p.p. 293-98. 
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own will for Iraq. James Baker, the then Secrerary of States 
and foreign minister of Iraq Mr. Tariq Aziz talks for peaceful 
settlement usually failed. Confrontations in internal affairs 
specially between Edvard Shevardnadze and President Gorbachev 
brought a very critical situation for the President to take 
any strong step towards Iraq and U.S.A. to ccnvince it for 
peaceful settlement. Neither would he successfully remain 
true friend of Iraq, nor could open-heartedly support U.S.A. 
and its moves. 
Ostensibly, parameters of UN-resolutions and in view 
of international community U.S.S.R. had taken a right step 
whereas all the time Gorbachev remained conscious for Iraq. 
Gorbacheve's efforts for political settlement in favour of 
Iraq proved of no avail because of internal variations in 
views, policies and their implementations. 
Every direction seemed to be closed for the Soviet 
Union. There was no chance to stand against Kuwait and GCC 
no way to go against Iraq boldly, no remedy to move against 
international law and community, no possibility to connive 
its internal economic and political crisis. Not only this, 
but it could be assumed that US Iraq relations would also be 
improved due to improving political post cold war wra, in West 
Asia and lack of rivalry. 
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But these assumptions on certain grounds could not be 
proved. The situation would have been somewhat different if 
these crisis would have appeared during the cold war. 
Iraq had already estimated declining position of its 
vital superporter and felt a vacuum, resulting by the changing 
circunstance to be happened in near future. President Sacdarn 
Hussain argued in February 1990 addressing fourth Su-nit 
meeting of Arab Co-operation Council states that with the 
deterioration and crumbling of the U.S.S.R. Arabs had lost 
the counte-weight that prevented the imposition of a pro-
o 
Israeli Pax American on West Asian World. 
However after the truce of Iran-Iraq war in August 
1988 Soviets should have improved its relations with Iraq with 
new strategies and renewal of Soviet-Iraqi treaty, if it had 
made good relations with Kuwait. It should have maintained a 
balance with its old allies. He not only failed to do this 
but could not convince national socialism America and U.N.O.; 
to its policies towards Iraq, these circumstances compelled 
to accept US pressure. In February 1991, Soviet peace 
proposals were rejected by U.S., consequently Soviet had lost 
its credibility of being friend patron and protecting shield. 
Any atempt made by it was suppressed by U.N.O. and U.S.A. In 
itself U.S.S.R. was economically crippled, loosing gradually 
status of superpower, could not stand viably. 
8. SURVIVAL, vol. XXXIV, 1991. 
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Soviets were in dilemma as during mediation and were 
hesitant, indicisive and inclined towards U.S.A. Certain 
factors were responsible for this turn of destiny in Soviet-
Iraq relations, viz. unsuccessful policy of 'new thinking" 
innovated by Gorbachev, economic crisis, Soviet relations with 
Kuwait and G.C.C countries, arrogance of Iraq, Soviet 
cooperation with U.S., U.S. pressure on U.N.O and the 
Soviet Union and varying reaction of international connunity. 
1. Soviet collapse could never be estimated and there was 
a hope that after cold war, international phenomenon would be 
healthy. For Soviet Union and Iraq, it could be thought that 
in an era of co-operation and peace, relations would 
strengthen; and congenial relationship would last long 
2. Gorbachevian, West Asian policies could not be proved 
successful and relevant. Gorbachev found himself standing on 
crossroad, when crisis had broken out. Misfortunately, 
Gorbachev failed to formulate a pragmatic policy to solve VJest 
Asian problems. Moreover internal crisis defeated external 
policies. It was necessary for Soviet Union to maintain ties 
with Saudi Arabia, G.C.C. countries and Kuwait. 
3. Had Soviet Union not been under U.S. pressure it would 
have taken its own measures. It could have used veto power 
against the harsh resolutions of the U.N.O., specially 
economic ones. U.S.A. did not allow Iraq to materialize her 
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straregy to turn this into Arab - Israeli war. This situation 
nighr have been to the advantage of Iraq. 
^. If West Asian countries except Jordan and Palestine 
would not have taken the side of Saudi - U.S. coalition, Iraq 
nighc have got moral support (if not material). Being 
strategically and militarily weak (now) West Asian states 
sought shelter under U.S. shadow U.S. was seen as the only 
protector of Kuwait. They may have known about gradual Soviet 
deco-position. In future, definitely there was no power to 
stand against U.S.A.; as U.S.S.R. was on the path of 
disintegration. There was no alternative ahead with U.S.A. 
Gradually non-aligned movement lost its significance 
and relevance in post cold war era. The intermittent 
conflicts between member states of non-aligned movement had 
once again demonstrated, (as in Iraq Kuwait conflict more 
blatant than ever), that they are potential source of destabi-
lization of aggressor state and of unity of non-align 
9 
movement. 
Iraq should have taken some positive steps instead of 
destructive and violent one. Perhaps Saddam Hussain failed 
to get feel of changing international political system. He 
was mistaken in his calculations as he thought he would 
easily take Kuwait without any resistence. 
9. Current Topics, Review of International Relations 
October 1990, p.p. 19-20. 
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The war could have been easily averted if certain 
tactical approaches would have been taken by the U.S.S.R and 
U.S.A both U.S.S.R should have convinced U.S.A to take some 
other sort of tool to out Iraq from Kuwait on the other hand, 
its o\<m pursuance should have been strong to convince Iraq and 
Kuwait both, because upto that time U.S.S.R had normal 
relations with both belligerents. Visualizing the profitable 
gains in future the soft inclination of Soviet Union towards 
Kuwait which battered the faith of Iraq in its old friend, 
(Soviet Union) was a detrimental step taken by it. Signifi-
cantly, President Bush no longer bothered to refer Soviet 
Union as power or at least its contribution and role 
(whatever it was) during the Gulf crisis. All the agreements, 
settlements, and joint negotiations made between Gorbachev and 
President Bush in Helsinki were forgotten by the U.S.A. 
Generally it connived Soviet partnership given by it, 
specially during the crisis. Moreover Soviet role had become 
more problematic because of internal power struggle. 
Situations gave rise to another sort of diplomacy avoiding to 
give any opportunity to Gorbachev to initiate any policy for 
post Gulf conflict. 
In retrospect, it can be seen that right from the 
beginning Gorbachev underestimated the George Bush ad:ninis-
tration to intervene in war not so much to liberate Kuwait 
but to destroy President Saddam Hussain. Similarly he over-
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estimated the defiance and power of Saddam Hussain. Thus, 
miscalculations were part of Gorbachev's difficulties. His 
compulsions were different. He had to take into account the 
sensitivity of Soviet Muslims, who were upset by the 
destruction of Saddam Hussain, a Muslim leader. As far as 
ideology factor is concerned, had Gorbachev not abandoned the 
track of communism and Marxist ideology, it could have 
maintained an ideological old link with Iraqi 3a'ath 
government. But in post cold war era 'ideology' factor shed 
off its significance and there was no longer confrontation 
between communism and liberalism east and west. Moscow 
itself gave up old legacies specially of ideology and moved 
towards free democracy. President Bush succintly sunaed up 
national interest and old objectives after the end of the cold 
war, in new world order - "The survival of the U.S.A. as a 
free and independent nation, with its fundamental values 
intact and its institutions and people secure." 
Hence U.S.A.'s increasing monopoly diminished the 
hope of third world countries in the absence of any rival to 
it (U.S.A.) Had Soviet Union not collapsed with all its super-
power character Iraq would have been in a different position. 
Undubiously, Soviet could not do much worthwhile as they 
should have done. But the circumstances were not favourable 
to Michael Gorbachev and he becane a sucked lemon for 
Washington, Arabs and whole international community. 
10. Tne Times of India, May 10, 1992, p.12 
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Gorbachev had to try to regain and restablish a place 
for the Soviet Union in West Asia by showing Arabs its 
reluctance towards security council resolutions authorizing 
military actions. He had to maintain relations with Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia as well. Evidently, diplomacy under the 
condition war is matter of speed and secrecy. speed to over 
come the momentum of fighting and secrecy to preserve the 
confidence of all sides. Gorbechev's efforts lacked both, 
rather whole effort lacked an appropriate degree of direction 
and control. 
Naturally what could have Soviet Union done after the 
termination of war? The honest answer is, very little or 
nothing. •'••'• 
Total absence of U.S.S.R fron international scene has 
created a vacuum in international politics and Iraq was left 
with no friend. Ostensibly creating a fuss of West Asia 
peace conference since November 1991, Madrid conference 
onwards, has been playing a dominating role in West Asia and 
recent successful dialogue of P.L.O. - Israel in September 
1993, for Palestinian autonomy, proves this point. U.S. made 
liberation of Kuwait its secondary objective, while the 
primary goals were destruction of military and industrial 
potentials of Iraq. Infact, U.S. was not interested in safety 
11. Current Affairs Middle East.. April, 1991, p.p. 23-24. 
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of Kuwait but to humiliate Iraq and dominate West Asia. 
In such a situation it was of paramount importance to cause 
obstruction between the union of Iran-Iraq which would 
ultimately weaken Iraq. Iran-Iraq unification naturally 
would be having strong relations with Central Asia, that is a 
hidden threat for U.S.A. 
Clinton era too emulates the same policies of Bush in 
regard with Iraq. Despite the end of the war, frequent 
attacks on fragile grounds by U.S.A. on Iraq, shows U.S. 
hegeraonistic approach to the region. 
U.S. led air attack on Iraqi radar and anti-air craft 
missiles was an act of punishment and warning the President 
Hussain - on the refusal to remove his missiles out of 'No-fly 
Zone' in the 'South' part of the country in defiance of 
13 
western demands. President Clinton in his inaugural address 
insisted if their vital interests are challenged or the will 
and conscience of the international community is hurt, they 
will act with peaceful diplomacy, when possible with force -
when and where necessary. 
12. Indian Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. XVI, 
p.p. / - S. 
13. The Times of India, New Delhi, January 16, 1993. 
14. The Times of India, New Delhi, January 22, 1993. 
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Despite of so many attacks, atrocities and ruination. 
President Saddam Hussain rer^ ains firm. There is no remedy to 
move anywhere for peace and order because U.N.O. has lost its 
sanctity and credibility, and being governed by one power 
alone. It needs reorientation and restructuring of its 
mechanism- U.S.A. is -nisusing the U.N.O. and has got more 
opportunities to intervene in the third world as seen in 
So-alia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Haiti etc. U.S. virulent 
pressure and U.N. cruelities on small states - like Bosina or 
Russia itself, or West Asian countries - have dragged the 
whole scenario into an unhealthy and pernicious atmosphere of 
uncertainty and insecurity. 
After the Gulf War 1991 U.S. was left as sole super-
power and she has secured victory to her own advantage. 
Ironically, it has planted the seeds of its own destruction by 
an unseen, unprecedented and unpredictable event and emerged 
power. a United Germany is now a strong power. And France-
German alliance may change the scenario, being emerged as 
challenge for the whole Europe and U.S. designs, on the other 
hand Iran-Iraq co-operation with strong central Asia 
republics, may stand as a challenge from West Asia and 
Central Asia as seen in recent developing relations with Iran 
and Central Asian countries. However, right now it seems 
inpossible (specially unification of Muslin countries). 
Any invisible and hidden power may emerge against U.S.A. In 
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the absence of any strong power still U.S. hegenonistic 
designs and interests will continue to flourish. 
To keep the Soviet Union out of West Asia and to 
manoevre her into an effective of secondary role in the 
region, always received the top nost priority in the 
impler.entation of U.S. policy. This objective was very 
successfully achieved during the Gulf war. Both the super-
powers were a force to reckon with in West Asia and they 
concluded a series of political economic and military 
agreements, which gave a ruling say in the affairs of region 
including war making. 
In the absnece of mighty Soviet Union U.S. will secure 
free access to West Asian oil. Since the time when its 
allies Western Europe and Japan started depending on Gulf oil 
for their industrial viability and economic prosperity, 
maintainance of free flow of oil from West Asia has become 
vitally important for the United States. Hence, U.S. 
defended Kuwait and tried to dominate Saddam Hussain'Kliedsco-
pically changing circumstances of international politics^ may 
sweep off the existing situation of U.S.^  West Asia or any 
region in a unipolar world, any time. 
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A P P N E N D I X - I 
PACT OF MUTUAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF 
IRAQ, THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, THE UNITED KINGDOM, 
THE DOMINION OF PAKISTAN, AND THE KINGDOM OF IRAN 
(BAGHDAD PACT) FEBRUARY 24, 1955 
Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing 
between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order 
to complement the contents of the Treaty of Friendship and 
Good Neighbourhood concluded between His Majesty the King of 
Iraq and His Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic 
signed in Ankara on March 29, 1946, which recognized the fact 
that peace and security between the two countries in an 
integral part of the peace and security of all the nations of 
the world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, 
and that it is the basis for their foreign policies. 
ARTICLE - 1 
Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations 
Chater the High Contracting Parties with cooperate for their 
security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to 
give effect to this cooperation may form the subject of 
special agreements with each other. 
ARTICLE - II 
In order to ensure the realisation and effect appli-
cation of the cooperation provided for in article 1 above, the 
competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will 
159 
determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact 
enters into force. These measures will beco-e operative as 
soon as they have been approved by the Governments of High 
Contracting Parties. 
ARTICLE - 3 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain 
fron any interference whatsoever in each other's internal 
affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a 
peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter. 
ARTICLE - 4 
The High Contracting Parties declare that the deposit-
tions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of 
the international obligations contracted by either of them 
with any third State or States. They do not derogate from 
and cannot be interpreted as derogating from the said 
international obligations. The High Contracting Parties 
undertake not to enter into any international obligation 
incompatible with the present pact. 
ARTICLE - 5 
This pact shall be open for accession to any member of 
the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the 
security and peace in this region and which is fully 
recognized by both of the High Contracting - Parties. 
Accesssion shall come into force from the date of which the 
instrument of accession of the State concerned is deposited 
with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. 
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Any according state party to the present pact may 
conclude special agreements, in accordance with article 1, 
with one or more States parties to the present pact. The 
competent authority of any acceding State may determine 
measures in accordance with article 2. These measures will 
become operative as soon as they have been approved by the 
Governments of the parties concerned. 
ARTICLE - 6 
A Permanent Council at ministerial level will be set 
up to function within the framework of the purposes of this 
pact when at least four powers became parties to the pact. 
The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure. 
ARTICLE - 7 
This pact remain in force for a period of five years 
renewable for other five year periods. Any Contracting Party 
may withdraw from the pact by notifying the other parties in 
writing of its desire to do so six months before the 
expiration of any of the above mentioned periods, in which 
case the pact remains valid for the other parties. 
ARTICLE - 8 
This pact shall be ratified by the contracting parties 
and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as 
possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of 
the exchange of ratifications. 
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In witness whereof, the said plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present part in Arabic, Turkish and English, all 
three texts being equally authentic except in the Done in 
duplicate at Baghdad this second day of Rajab 1374 Hijri 
corresponding to the Twenty-fourth day of February 1955. 
A P P E N D I X - II 
THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE 
Message from President Eisenhower to 
Congress, January 5, 1957 
I. 
The Middle East has abruptly reached a new and crucial 
stage in its long and important history. In past decades 
many of the countries in that area were not fully self-
governing. Other nations exercised considerable authority in 
the area and the security of the region was largely built 
around their power. But since the First World War there has 
been a steady evolution toward self-government and indepen-
dence. This development the United States has welcomed and 
has encouraged. Our country supports without reservation the 
full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of 
the Middle East. 
The evolution to independence has in the main been a 
peaceful process. But the' area has been often troubled. 
Persistent cross-currents of distrust and fear with raids 
back and forth across national boundaries have brought about a 
high degree of instability in much of the Mid East. Just 
recently there have been hostilities involving Western 
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European nations that once exercised much influence in the 
area. Also the relatively large attack by Israel in October 
has intensified the basic differences between that nation and 
its Arab neighbours. All this instability has been 
heightened and, at times, manipulated by International 
Communis-:. 
II. 
Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the 
Middle East. That was true of the Czars and it is true of the 
Bolsheviks. The reasons are not hard to find. They do not 
affect Russia's security, for no one plans to use the Middle 
East as a base for aggression against Russia. Never for a 
moment has the United States entertained such a thought. 
The Soviet Union has nothing whatsoever to fear from 
the United States in the Middle East, or anywhere else in the 
world, so long as its rulers do not themselves first resort 
to aggression. 
That statement I make solemnly and emphatically. 
Neither does Russia's desire to dominate the Middle 
East spring from its own economic interest in the area. Russia 
does not appreciably use or depend upon the Suez Canal. In 
1955 soviet traffic through the Canal represented only about 
three fourths of ll of the total. The Soviets have no need 
for, and could provide no market for, the petroleum resources 
which constitute the principal natural wealth of the area. 
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Indeed, the Soviet Union is a substantial exporter of 
petroleum products. 
The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is 
solely that of power politics. Considering here announced 
purpose of communizing the world, it is easy to understand her 
hope of dominating the Middle East. 
This region has always been the crossroads of the 
continents of the Eastern Hemisphere. The Suez Canal enables 
the nations of Asia and Europe to carry on the commerce that 
it essential if these countries are to maintain well-rounded 
and prosperous economies. The Middle East provides a gateway 
between Eurasia and Africa. 
It contains about two thirds of the presently known 
oil deposits of the world and it normally supplies the 
petroleum needs of many nations of Europe, Asia and Africa. 
The nations of Europe are peculiarly deopendent upon this 
supply and this dependency relates to transportation as well 
as to production. This has been vividly demonstrated since 
the closing of the Suez Canal and some of the pipelines. 
Alternate ways of transportation and, indeed, alternate 
sources of power, can, if necessary, be developed. But these 
cannot be considered as early prospects. 
These things stress the immense importance of the 
Middle East. If the nations of that area should lose their 
independence, if they were dominated by allien forces hostile 
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to freedom, that would be both a tragedy for the area and for 
many other free nations whose economic life would be subject 
to near strangulation. Western Europe would be endangered 
just as though there had been no Marshal Plan, no North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. The free nations of Asia and 
Africa, too, would be placed in serious jeopardy. And the 
countries of the Middle East would lose the markets upon which 
their economies depend. All this would have the most adverse, 
if not disastrous, effect upon our own nation's econonic life 
and political prospects. 
Then there are other factors, which transcend the 
material. The Middle East is the birth place of three great 
religions - Moslem, Christian and Hebrew. Mecca and 
Jerusalem are more than places on the map. They symbolize 
religions which teach that the spirit has supremacy over 
matter and that the individual has a dignity and rights of 
which no despotic government can rightfully deprive him. It 
would be intolerable if the holy places of the Middle East 
should be subjected to a rule that florifiers authentic 
materialism. 
International Communism, of course, seeks to mask 
its purposes of domination by expressions of good will and by 
superficially attractive offers of political,economic, outght, 
in elementary wisdom, to look behind the mask. 
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Remember Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In 1939 the 
Soviet Union entered into mutual assistance pacts with these 
then independent countries; and the Soviet Foreign Minister, 
addressing the Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supre:ne 
Soviet in October 1939, solemnly and publicly declared that 
"we stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the 
pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare 
that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of 
the Baltic countries is only to the enteres inte est of our 
common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs." Yet in 
1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forcibly 
incorporated into the Soviet Union. 
Soviet control of the satellite nations of Eastern 
Europe has been forcibly maintained in spite of solemn 
promises of a contracy intent, made during World War II. 
Stalin's death brought hope that this pattern would 
change. And we read the pledge of the VJarsaw Treaty of 1955 
that the Soviet Union would follow in satellite countries 
"the principles of mutual respect for their independence and 
sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs". But we 
have just seen the subjugation of Hungary by naked armed 
force. In the aftermath of this Hungarian tragedy, would 
respect for and belief in Soviet promises have sunk to a new 
low. International communism needs and seeks a recognizable 
success. 
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Thus, we have these simple and indisputable facts: 
1) The Middle East, which has always been covered by 
Russia, would today be prized more than ever by Inter-
national Communism. 
2) The Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not 
scruple to use any means to gain their ends. 
3) The free nations of the Mid East need, and for the 
nost part want, added strength to assure thei| 
continued independence. 
III. 
Our thoughts naturally turn to the United Nations as a 
protector of snail nations. Its charter gives it primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Our country has given the United Nations its ful!L 
support in relation to the hostilities in Hungary and in 
Egypt. The United Nations was able to bring about a cease-
fire and withdrawal of hostile forces from Egypt becauseic 
was dealing with governments and peoples who had a decen': 
respect for the opinions of mankind as reflected in the 
United Nations General Assembly. But in the case of Hungary, 
the situation was different. The Soviet Union vetoed by the 
Security Council to require the withdrawal of Soviet armed 
forces from Hungary. And it has shown callous indifference to 
the reconmendations, even the censure, of the General Assembly 
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The United Nations can always be helpful, but it cannot be a 
wholly dependable protector of freedom when the ambitions of 
the Soviet Union are involved. 
IV. 
Under all the circumstances I have laid before you, a 
great responsibility now devolves upon the United States. We 
have showra, so that none can doubt, our dedication to the 
principle that force shall not be used internationally for any 
aggressive purpose and that the integrity and independence of 
the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate. Seldom in 
history has a nation's dedication to principle been tested as 
severely as ours during recent weeks. 
There is a general recognition in the Middle East, as 
elsewhere, that the United States does not seek either 
political or economic domination over any other people. Our 
desire is a world environment of freedom, not servitude. On 
the other hand many, if not all of the nations of the Middle 
East are aware of the danger that stems from International 
Communism and welcome closer cooperation with the United 
States to realize for themselves the United States goals of 
independence, economic well-being and spiritual growth. 
If the Middle East is to continue its geographic role 
of uniting rather than separating East and West; if its vast 
economic resources are to serve the well-being of the peoples 
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there, as well as that of the others; and if its culture and 
religions and their shrines are to be preser\'ed for the 
uplifting of the spirits of the peoples, then the United 
States must make more evident its willingness tc support the 
independence of the freedom-loving nations of the area. 
V. 
Under these circumstances I deem it necessary to seek 
the cooperation of the Congress. Only with the cooperation 
can we give the reasurance needed to deter aggression, to 
give courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to 
freedom and thus prevent a chain of events which would 
gravely endanger all of the free world. 
There have been several Executive declarations made 
by the United States in relation to the Middle East. 
Nevertheless, weaknesses in the present situation and 
the increased danger from International communism, convince 
me that the basic United States Policy should now find 
expression in joint action by the Congress and the Executive 
Furtheraore, our joint resolve should be so couched as to make 
it apparent that if need be our words will be backed by 
action. 
VI. 
It is nothing new for the President and the Congress 
to join the recognize that the national integrity of other 
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free nations is directly related to our own security. 
We have joined to create and support the security 
systen of the United Nations. We have reinforced the 
collective security system of the United Nations by a series 
of collective defense arrangements. Today we have security 
treaties with 42 other nations which recognize that their , 
and our, peace and security are inter-twined. We have joined 
to take decisive action in relation to Greece and Turkey and 
in relations to Taiwain. 
Thus, the United States through the joint action of 
the President and the Congress, or in the case of treaties, 
the Senate, has manifested in many endangered areas its 
purpose to support free and independent governments - and 
peace - against external menace, notably the menace of Inter-
national Communism. Thereby we have helped to inaintain peace 
and security during a period of great danger. It is now 
essential that the United States should manifest through joint 
action of the President and the Congress our determination to 
assist those nations of the Mid East area which desire that 
assistance. 
The action which I propose would have the following 
features. 
It would, first of all, authorize the United States to 
cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in 
the general area of the Middle East in the development of 
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economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national 
independence. 
It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive 
to undertake in the same region programme of military 
assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of 
nations which desires such aid. 
It would, in the third place, authorize such 
assistance and cooperation to inlcude the employrnent of the 
armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the 
territorial integrity and political independence of such 
nations, requesting such aid, against overt arned aggression 
from any nation controlled by International Communism. 
These measures would have to be consonant with the 
treaty obligations of the United States, including the Charter 
of the United Nations and with any action or recommendations 
of the United Nations. They would also, if armed attack 
occurs, be subject to the over-riding authority of the United 
Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter. 
The present proposal would, in the fourth place, 
authorize the President to employ, for economic and defensive 
military purposes, sums available under the Mutual Security 
Act of 1954, as amended without regard to existing limitations. 
The legislation now requested should not include the 
authorization or appropriation of funds because I believe 
that, under the conditions I suggest, presently appropriated 
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funds will be adequate for the balance of the present fiscal 
year ending June 30. I shall, however, seek in subsequent 
legislation the authorization of $ 200,000,000 to be avail-
able during each of the fiscal years 1958 and 1959 for dis-
cretionary use in the area, in addition to the other mutual 
security programmes for the area hereafter provided for by the 
Congress. 
VII. 
This program will not solve all the problems of the 
Middle East. Neither does it represent the totality of our 
policies for the area. There are the problems of Palestine 
and relations between Israel and the Arab States, and the 
future of the Arab refugees. There is the problem of the 
future status of the Suez Canal. These difficulties are 
aggravated by International communism, but they would exist 
quite apart from the threat. It is not the purpose of the 
legislation I propose to deal directly with these problems. 
The United Nations is actively concerning itself with all 
these matters, and we are supporting the United Nations. The 
United States has made clear, notably by Secretary Dulls* 
address of August 26, 1955, that we are willing to do much to 
assist the United Nations in solving the basic problems of 
Palestine. 
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The proposed legislation is primarily designed to deal 
with the possibility of communist aggression, direct and 
indirect. There is imperative need that any lack of power in 
the area should be made good, not by external or alien 
force, but by the increased vigor and security of the 
independent nations of the area. 
Experience shows that indirect aggression rarely if 
ever succeeds where there is reasonable security against 
direct aggression; where the government possesses loyal 
security forces, and where economic conditions are such as not 
to ::ake Co:nmunism seem an attractive alternative. The program 
I suggest deals with all three aspects of this matter and 
this with the problem of indirect aggression. 
It is my hope and belief that if our purpose be 
proclairied, as proposed by the requested legislation, that 
very fact will serve to halt any contemplated aggression. We 
shall have heartened the patriots who are dedicated to the 
independence of their nations. They will not feel that they 
stand alone, under the menace of great power. And I should 
add that patriotism is, throughout, this area, a 
powerful sentiment. It is true that fear sometimes perverts 
true patriotism into fanaticism and to the acceptance of 
dangerous enticements from without. But if that fear can be 
allayed, then the climate will be more favourable to the 
attcin-ent of worthy national ambitions. 
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And as I have indicated, it will also be necessary for 
us to contribute economically to strengthen those countries, 
or groups of countries, which have governments manifestly 
dedicated to the preservation of independence and resistance 
to subversion. Such measures will provide the greatest 
insurance against Communist inroads. Words alone are not 
enough. 
VIII. 
Let me refer again to the request authority to employ 
the armed forces of the United States to assist to defend the 
territorial integrity and the political independence of any 
nation in the area against communist armed aggression. Such 
authority would not be exercised except at the desire of the 
nation attacked. Beyond this it is my profound hope that 
this authority would never have to be exercised at all. 
Nothing is more necessary to assure this than that our 
policy with respect to the defense of the area be promptly 
and clearly determined and declared. Thus the United Nations 
and all friendly governments, and indeed governments which are 
not friendly, will know where we stand. 
If, contrary to my hope and expectation of the policy 
which I ask the Congress to join me in proclaiming, I would of 
course maintain hour-by-hour contact with the Congress if it 
were in session. And if the Congress were not in session, and 
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if the situation had grave implications, I would of course, at 
once call the Congress into special session. 
In the situation now existing, the greatest risk, as 
is often the case, is that ambitious depots may miscalculate. 
If power-hundry Communists should either falsely or correctly 
estimate that the Middle East is inadequately defended, they 
might be tempted to use open measures of armed attack. If so, 
that would start a chain of circumstances which would almost 
surely involve the United States in military action. I am 
convinced that the best insurance against this dangerous 
contingency is to make clear now our readiness to cooperate 
fully and freely with our friends of the Middle East in ways 
consonant with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations. I intend promptly to send a special mission to the 
Middle East to explain the cooperation we are prepared to 
give. 
IX. 
The policy which I outline involves certain burdens 
and indeed risks for the United States. Those who covet the 
area will not like what is proposed. Already, they are 
grossly distorting our purpose. However, before this American 
have seen our nation's vital interests and human freedom in 
jeopardy, and then fortitude and resolution have been equal 
to the crisis, regardless of hostile distortion of our words, 
motives, and actions. 
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Indeed, the sacrifices of the American people in the 
cause of freedom have, even since the close of World War II 
been measured in many billions of dollars and in thousands of 
the precious lives of our youth. These sacrifices, by which 
great areas of the world have been preserved to freedom, must 
not be thrown away. 
In those momentous periods of the past, the President 
and the Congress have united, xizithout partisanship, to serve 
the vital interests of the United States and of the free 
world. 
The occasion has come for us to manifest again our 
national unity in support of freedom and to show our deep 
respect for the rights and independence of every nation -
however great, however small. We seek not violence, but 
peace. To this purpose we must now devote our energies, our 
determination, ourselves. 
The WHITE HOUSE ^WIGHT D. EISENHOWER 
January 5, 1957 
A P P E N D I X - III 
THE BAATH PARTY - A HISTORY FROM ITS ORIGIN TO 
1966 - BY JOHN F. DEVLIN 
Pub. by Hoover Institution Press 
Stanford University, Stanford, California, p.345 
The Constitution of the Baath Party Adopted in April,1947: 
Arab Nationalism - An Anthology edited by Sylvia, G. Haiin, 
p.p. 233-41. copyright C 1962. The Regents of the University 
California reprinted by permission of the University of 
California Press. 
Fundamental Principles 
Principle First - Unity and Freedom of Arab Nations. Baath 
Party believes: 
a) The Arab fatherland constitutes and indivisible 
political and economic unity. No Arab country can hire 
apart from the others. 
b) The Arab Nation constitutes a cultural unity. Any 
differences existing among its sons are accidental and 
unimportant. They will all disappears with the 
awakening of the Arab consciousness. 
c) The Arab fatherland belongs to the Arabs. They alone 
have the right to administer its affairs, to dispose 
of its wealth and to direct its destinies. 
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Principle Second - Personality of the Arab Nation 
The Arab Nation is characterized by virtues of which 
are the result of its successive rebirth. The virtues are 
characterized by virtuality and creativeness and by an ability 
for transfer-nation and renewal. Its renewal is always linked 
to growth in personal freedom, and harmony between its 
evolution and national interest. 
The Party of Arab Baath Believes that 
1) Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of 
belief, as well as artistic freedom, are sacred. No 
authority can diminish them. 
2) The value of the citizens is measured - onceall 
opportunities have been given them - by the action 
they take to further the progress and prosperity of 
the Arab nation, without to any other criterion. 
Third Principle - The mission of the Arab Nation 
The Arab nation has an eternal mission. This mission 
reveals itself in ever new and related forms through 
the different stages of history. It aims at the 
renewal of human values, at the quickening of human 
progress, at increasing harmony and mutual help anong 
the nations. 
The Party of the Arab Baath therefore believes that -
1) Coloniation and all the goes with it, is a criminal 
enterprise. The Arabs must fight it with all possible 
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means, just as they must take it on themselves to 
help, according to their physical and moral abilities, 
all peoples fighting for their freedom. 
2) Humanity constitutes a whole, the interest of which 
are solidarity and values and civilization of which 
are common to all. The Arabs are enriched by world 
civilization and enrich it in their turn, they stretch 
a fraternal hand to other nations and collaborate 
with them for the establishmnet of just institutions 
which will ensure for all the people's prosperity and 
peace, as well and moral and spiritual advance. 
Foreign Policy of the Party -
Article - 22 
The foreign policy of the Arab State will be guided 
by the interests of Arab nationalism and of the eternal 
mission of the Arab which seeks to establish in cooperation 
with other nations a free, harmonious and secure world, 
continuously advancing in progress. 
Article - 23 
The Arabs will struggle with all their power to 
destroy the foundations of colonialism and of foreign 
occupation and to suppress all foreign political or economic 
influence in their country. 
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Article - 24 
Since the Arab people is the sole source of power, all 
treaties, pacts, and documents concluded by governments which 
detract from the total sovereignty of the Arabs will be 
abrogated. 
Article - 25 
Arab foreign policy seeks to give a true picture of 
the will of the Arabs to live in freedom, and of their 
sincere desire to see all other nation enjoy the same liberty. 
A P P E N D I X - IV 
SOVIET IRAQI TREATY - 1972 
Iraq - Soviet Union Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation. Mr. Kosygin's visit to Baghdad. 
April 6-10, 1972. 
The Soviet Iraqi treaty of friendship and cooperation 
signed in Baghdad by Mr. Kosygin and President Al Baker on 
April 9, 1972, consisted of 14 articles. 
Article 1 Iraq and U.S.SR. declared that "unviable 
countries and their peoples"; and that they would develop all 
round cooperation in the political economic trade, scientific 
technical and other fields, "On the basis of respect for the 
state sovereignty, traditional integrity and non-interference 
in one anothers internal affairs". 
Article 2 - The two countries would "cooperate closely and 
comprehensively in ensuring conditions for preserving and 
further developing the social and economic gains of their 
people and respect for the sovereignty of each of them over 
all their natural resource". 
Article 3 - Stated that Iraq and USSR would "continue to 
come out for peace throughout the world, for the easing of 
international tensions, and for the attainment of general and 
complete disarmament, encompassing both nuclear and con-
ventional weapons under effective international control." 
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Article 4 - Said that both countries "condenn imperialisn 
and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations." and 
would continue to wage an undeviating struggle against 
imperialism and Zionism for the complete . . . abolition of 
colonialismand neo-colonialism, racialismand apartheid." 
Article 5 - Iraq and the USSR would "expand and deepen their 
cooperation in economic, technical and scientific, fields!, 
would exchange experience in industry, agriculture, 
irrigation, water conservation and utilization of oil and 
other natural resources, "as well as in the training of 
national cadres"; and would expand trade and shipping 
between two countries "on the basis of the principles of 
equality mutual benefit and most favoured nation treatment". 
Article 6 - The two countries would develop mutual contacts 
in the fields of science, artcs, literature, education, public 
health, tourism sports and mass media etc. 
Article 7 - Iraq and USSR would consult each other regularly 
on all Important international question affecting the 
interests of the two countries, as well as on question 
concerning the further development of bilateral relations. 
Article 8 - "In the event of situations developing which 
threaten the peace of either of the sides or create a threat 
to peace or the danger of violation"; Iraq and USSR would 
"immediately contact each other with the aim of cooperation In 
the strengthening interest of removing the threat." 
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Article 9 - "In the interest of security of both countries the 
High Contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation 
in the strengthening of their defence capabilities." 
Article 10 - "Each of High contracting Parties declares that 
it will not enter into alliance or take part in any groupings 
of States or in actions or undertakings directed against the 
other Contracting Party." 
Article 11 - The two countries declared thattheir commitments 
under existing international treaties were not in contradic-
tions to the provisions of the present treaty and undertook 
not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with 
it. 
Article 12 - The treaty was concluded for a period of 15 
years and would be automatically prolonged for subsequent 
period of five years, unless one of the per parties expressed 
its desires to terminate the treaty by notifying the other 
ones; 12 months earlier its expiration. 
Article 13 - Any difference that might arise between the 
parties concerning the interpretation of provisions of the 
treaty would be resolved bilaterally in the spirit of friend-
ship, mutual respect and understanding. 
Article 14 - The treaty would enter into force on exchange of 
ratification instruments, which would be affected in Moscow 
"in the shorted possible period of time." The treaty was drawn 
up in Russia and Arabic, equally authentic (Soviet Embassy 
Press Department, London). Send by Kosygin and Al-Baker. 
J-V-•'?+-'•-•-•*••*• 
A P P E N D I X - V 
DOCUMENTS ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 1978 
Edited by Darshan Singh 
Joint Soviet Iraqi communique 14 Dec, 1978 
The Deputy Secretary General of the Arab Socialist 
Renaissance Party (BAATH), Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary 
Command Council of the Iraqi Republic Sadam Hussain was in the 
Soviet Union between December 11 and 13, 1978, for an official 
friendly visit, at the invitation of the CPSU Central 
Committee and the Soviet Government. 
Sadam Hussain was received for a talk by the General 
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the 
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Lenoid Brezhnev. They 
held an exchange of views, which passed in a friendly 
atmosphere, on question of mutual interest. 
On the Iraqi side - Member of the BAATH Leadership, 
Member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), Minister 
of the Interior of the Iraqi Republic Izzat Ibrahim, Member of 
the BAATH Leadership, Member of the RCC Tariq Aziz, Member of 
the BAATH Leadership, Member of the RCC, Minister of Planning 
of the Iraqi Republic Adnan Hussain. Foreign Minister of the 
Iraqi Republic Saadun Hammadi, and the Ambassador of the Iraqi 
Republic in the USSR Murtadha Said Abdul Baqi. 
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Special attention was given to the situation the 
Middle East. The sides expressed deep concern over the tension 
prevailing in the area as a result of Israel's aggressive 
expansionist policy, supported by imperialist quarters. 
They strongly condemned the Israeli-Egyptian deal made 
at Camp David with the active participation of the U.S.A., and 
the agreement being prepared on its basis in Washington, as a 
collusion behind the Arabs' backs, contrary to their interests, 
and on an anti-Arab basis. They are of the opinion that this 
deal boils down to working out partial separate agreements 
that would permit Israel to retain the captured Arab lands 
and to prevent the realisation of the Palestine Arab people's 
legitimate rights. This policy of separate deals, the sides 
are convinced,obstructs the attainment of a just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East. 
The sides condemn the capitulatory actions of the 
Egyptian leadership aimed at spliting the ranks of the Arabs 
and inflicting serious damage on the Arab peoples' struggle 
for national liberation and stronger independence. 
The Soviet Union and Iraq believe that in the 
situation obtaining in the Middle East, the task of rallying 
and invigoraling all forces opposing a capitulatory line in 
Middle East affairs, is becoming particularly pressing. 
Sadam Hussain described the steps taken by Iraq in 
this direction, measures to improve relations between Iraq and 
Syria and the intention of these two countries' leaderships to 
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follow the road of all-round cooperation in accordance with 
the Charter of Joint National Actions concluded between them 
in October this year. the Soviet side highly assessed the 
resolve manifested by the leaders of Iraq and Syria to act in 
unison with the objective of frustrating the capitulatory 
course in Middle East affairs, strengthening the unity 
between them and the cohesion of the Arab countries in 
repelling the Israeli aggression, and ensuring the Arab 
peoples' legitimate rights. 
The Soviet side highly assessed Iraq's initiative and 
efforts in convening the Pan-Arab conference of head of state 
and government in Baghdad last November, which made an 
important contribution to the consolidation of the Arab 
countries in their struggle against imperialist plans in the 
Middle East and the capitulatory course in Middle East 
affairs. The sides noted the importance of implementing these 
decisions of the Baghdad Conference. 
The Soviet Union and Iraq voiced the deep conviction 
that a just lasting peace in the Middle East can only be 
achieved after the liberation of all occupied Arab territories 
and in case of the full satisfaction of the legitimate and 
inalienable national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, 
including its right to self-determination and the creation of 
an independent state. 
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The sides noted with satisfaction the steady and 
fruitful development of Soviet Iraqi relations on the firm 
foudnation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, to the 
benefit of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Iraq. They 
confirmed the presence of favourable factors for the further 
deepening of equal Soviet Iraqi cooperation in the political 
and other spheres. 
The sides reiteratred their readiness to cooperate 
further in strengthening the defence capacity of the Iraqi 
Republic, regarding this as an important factor of consoli-
dating its national indeoendence and state sovereignty. 
The sides assessed positively the achievements in 
bilateral economic cooperation and confirmed the broad oppor-
tunities and prospects available in this matter. They will 
keep bending efforts towards the development and improvement 
of such cooperation. 
The Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic State their 
resolve to go on strengthening the bonds of Soviet-Iraqi 
friendship, which they regard as a historical gain of the two 
states, particularly at present, when imperialism and Zionism 
are attempting to split the Arab peoples and implement a 
separate settlement at the expense of the national interests 
of the Arabs. 
The Iraqi side highly appreciated the support which 
the Soviet Union is giving to the Arab people in their just 
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struggle for national emancipatiuon. The sides expressed the 
firm convinction that the unity of the Arab countries on an 
anti-imperialist basis, cooperation between them and with the 
socialist states and other progressive forces of the vorld 
constitute the basis condition for successful struggle against 
the imperialist aggression in the Middle East. 
During the exchange of views on international issues 
the Soviet Union and Iraq reiterated the need to strengthen 
international detente, to take effective measures towards 
ending the arms race, and for the early convocation of a vorld 
disarmanent conference. Both sides come out for the 
realisation of the decisions of the UN General Assembly 
session on disarmanent. 
The sides regard the non-alignment movement as an 
important factor in the struggle for the establishment of 
equitable international relations and a fair international 
economic order. They support the struggle against colonialism 
and exploitation in every form and manifestation. The Soviet 
Union highly appreciates the positive role played by the Iraqi 
Republic in the non-alignment movement. 
The sides pledged firm solidarity with the peoples 
struggling against imperialism, neocolonialism, Zionis- and 
racial discrimination. They pledge their complete support to 
the struggles waged by the liberation movements in Na-ibia, 
ZiTibabwe and the RSA for their freedom and independence. 
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The sides expressed profound satisfaction with the 
results of the visit to the Soviet Union by the BAATH Deputy 
Secretary General of Iraq Sadam Hussain. They confirmed the 
significance of continuing the practice of contacts and 
consultations between the leaders of the Soviet Union and 
Iraq aimed at further developing the relations of friendship 
and cooperation between the two countries. Sadam Hussain 
expressed profound gratitude, to the CPSU Central Committee 
and the Soviet Government for the hospitality and warm 
reception accorded him and his party during the visit to the 
Soviet Union. 
(Pravda, December 14, 1978) 
A P P E N D I X - VI 
UNITED AS 
NATIONS 
Seal General Assembly Security Council 
Distr. 
General 
A/45/400 
S 211479 
9 August 1990 
ENGLISH 
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECURITY COUNCIL 
Forty-fifth session Forty-fifth Year 
Itea 35 of the provisional agenda* 
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Letter dated 9 August 1990 from the Charge d'affairs 
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-GeneraF 
I have the honour to transmit herewth the text of the 
statement by the USSR Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 9 August 
1990 concerning the situation in the region of the Persian 
Gulf. 
I should be grateful if you would have this letter and 
its annex circulated as an official document of the General 
Assembly, under item 35 of the provisional agenda, and also as 
an official document of the Security Council. 
(Signed) V. LOZINSKIY 
Acting Permanent Representative of the USSR 
to the United Nations 
* A/45/150 and Corrl. 1. 
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ANNEX 
Statement by the USSR Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
The situation on the region of the Persian Gulf is 
becoming increasingly dramatic. Following the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraqi forces on 2 August, there have been such 
serious develop::ients in the region as the so-called "merger" 
of Iraq and Kuwait proclaimed yesterday and the deployment of 
United States naval and air forces in Saudi Arabia, which 
Washington justifies as being in the interests of the defence 
of that country. The trend towards escalating hostility and 
inflamed passion, unfortunately, is continuing to intensify at 
a rapid pace. 
This turn of events has caused alarm and concern in 
Moscow because all this is occurring in a region which is 
already oversaturated with "combustible material" in the form 
of long-standing conflicts, old grievances and mutual 
territorial claims. At the same time, important political and 
economic interests of a large number of States, including the 
Soviet Union, are closely intertwined here. Accordingly, from 
the very beginning of the crisis in the region of the Gulf, 
which was brought about the Iraqi armed invasion of Kuwait, 
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we have firmly and clearly advocated extinguishing as speedly 
as possible the conflagration that has broken out, re-est-
ablishing the situation as it existed before 2 August, and 
engaging the parties in a political dialogue aimed at a 
peaceful settlement of the differences. 
In addition to efforts made within the framework of 
the Security Council, we had active contacts with the Iraqi ; 
leadership, inter alia, through an exchange of messages beween 
the Presidents of the USSR and Iraq in Order to channel the 
course of events precisely in this direction. We thought that 
this exchange of views with the Iraqi side justified the hope 
that the matter would lead to the implementation of Security 
Council resolution 660 (1990) and thus to the speedy defusing 
of the crisis. 
Regrettably, we are forced to recognize that these 
hopes of ours were not realized. Not only has Iraq not with-
drawn its troops from Kuwait, but it also declared yesterday 
the actual annexation of the country. (It is difficult and 
saddening for us to describe in this way the recent acts by 
Iraq, a country to which we are tied through long-standing 
friendly relations. Although we would like to maintain this 
friendship, in the current situation we cannot assume a 
position of silence and, all the more, act against our 
conscience). Our approach to this fundamental questior 
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remains steadfast - the sovereignty, national independence and 
territorial integrity of the State of Kuwait must be fully 
restored and protected. This is called for in the relevant 
Security Council resolution. 
The events occurring now in the area of the Persian 
Gulf are demonstrating with a particular clarity how 
important it is in such situations to be prudent and cautious 
and not to commit acts which may add further fuel to the 
fire. We would like once again to point out that the Soviet 
Union is opposed to reliance on force and to unilateral 
solutions. Experience over very many year offers convincing 
proof that collective efforts and the full use of United 
Nations mechanism are the surest and wisest way to act in 
conflict situations. 
The concrete terms, we feel that the Security Council 
should now deal with this very critical question on a perma-
nent basis. We are also prepared to accept the immediate 
beginning of consultations within the Military Staff Committee 
of the Security Council, which, under the Charter of the 
United Nations, can carry out very important functions. 
In our view, the efforts of the Arab countries them-
selves can play a special role in preventing the current 
situation in the Persian Gulf from developing into an even 
greater military conflict. We attentively followed the 
reports of the holding in Cairo of the emergency meeting of 
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Heads of Arab States and hope that the results of the meeting 
will be an important part of the overall action taken in 
connection with the situation around Kuwait. 
We would like once again to stress that the critical 
and unpredictable nature of the current situation in the 
region of the Persian Gulf urgently requires that all those 
who are directly involved in the dangerous confrontation 
developing there should demonstrate respect for the will of 
the international community and a feeling of lofty responsi-
bility for the fate of the world. 
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A P P E N D I X - VII 
SOVIET EIGHT POINT PEACE PLAN FOR IRAQ 
February 21, 1991 
1. Iraq would make a full and unconditional withdrawal 
from Kuwait. 
2. . The withdrawal would start on the second day after 
hostilities ceased. 
3. Iraqi forces would depart according to a fixed time 
table. 
4. After two third withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait 
U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq would be lifted. 
5. Withdrawal was to be monitored by observers from 
neutral countries following a cease-fire; under U.N. 
directions. 
6. All prisoners of war would be released when the cease-
fire become effective. 
7. The troops withdrawal would begin second day of the 
ceasefire. 
8. Work on details and specifics would continue and would 
be presented on February 22, 1991 to security council 
members. 
Signed foreign Minister Signed 
of Iraq - Mr. Tariq Aziz President 
Gorbachev 
1968; 
1972; 
1973; 
1974: 
1975; 
1976; 
A P P E N D I X - VIII 
CHRONOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS OF SOVIET IRAQ 
RELATIONS - 1968 TO 1991 
Soviet recognition to Iraq government as Baathist 
regime. 
A friendship and cooperation treaty was signed in 
April 1972 between Soviet Union and Iraq. 
A cooperation agreement between Baath Party and 
Soviet Communist Party (30th November 1973). 
Moscow officially announced 'Kurdistan Autonomy Law' 
promulgated by Iraqi government. 
Bilateral cooperation was marked by the visit to 
Baghdad of a Soviet delegation led by water develop-
ment Minister - Alexei Fisky, to examine progress on 
various irrigation projects carried out with Soviet 
assistance. 
The under Secretary of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign 
Trade went to Moscow on January 3rd 1976, to attend 
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a meeting of joint economic and technical cooperation 
commission. 
1977: 
The Soviets undertook to supply Iraq with IL-76 long 
range military transport plans. 
1978: 
Joint Soviet Iraqi communique on 11, 13 December 1978, 
was passed to pay attention the situation in West 
Asia. Polit bureau member of the CPSU Central 
Committee Chairman of the USSR Council of ministers 
Alexei Kosygin and Deputy Secretary General of the 
Baath Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council of 
the Iraqi Republic Saddam Hussain, held talks which 
passed in an atmosphere of friendship and understand-
ing. 
1979-80: 
Intervention in Afghanistan by USSR was stringently 
criticized by Iraq. Since late seventies relations 
had become strained 1980 brought a gulf crisis for 
Iraq, conflict with Iran. Last major deal of weapons 
with Iraq was made in late 1979. 
1981-85: 
In early stage of Gulf War, Soviets unfriendly stance 
and till towards Iran was severely criticized by Iraq, 
after Brezhnev, Kestanin Chernekov and Andropov did 
not leave any stunning development. 
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1985: 
1986-87: 
1988; 
1989: 
President Saddam Hussain's visit to Moscow for peace-
ful settlement of the Gulf war; with Soviet leader 
Michael Gorbachev and President Andrei Gromykov. The 
sides expressed that cooperation between USSR and 
Iraq would gain scope for the good of the people of 
the two countries. 
A Soviet settlement circulated on January 8, pointed 
out earliest termination of Iran-Iraq armed conflict. 
The Soviet government was prepared to give every 
assistance to any honest and constructive efforts 
including those with the framework of the U.N. 
channel of peaceful solution. 
The Soviet Union acknowledged on March 9, that it had 
supplied missiles to Iraq but not sufficient range 
consequently missiles were supplies under a military 
cooperation agreement between the two countries. 
The Soviet Union agreed to build new power plants to 
renovateand set up oil rigs in Iraq under an accord 
signed by the two countries on Feb. 11, 1989. The 
agreement was ained at expanding economic and 
technical cooperation between USSR and the Gulf Arab 
1990: 
199 
States. The Soviet Union under the agreement was to 
build 9 number of thermo and hydropower plants and 
expand several other facilities by the Russians in the 
past 30 years. 
The Soviet Union, Iraq's main supplier decided to 
suspend arms sales to Baghdad because of its invasion 
of Kuwait. Joint Statements by U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. 
denounced the Iraqi action as crude and illegal. 
1991 : (During the War) 
Soviet Union tried its to be as mediator being in a 
dilemma. It was not in a position to stand viably 
against U.S.A. nor to support directly Iraq its old 
ally and trusted friend. 
However, on 21 February 1991, soviet Union passed 
eight point peace plan (light in nature) for Iraq. 
1991: December -
Soviet Union disintegrated with all its superpower 
paraphernalia and Iraq lost its strong support for 
ever. 
